

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

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CONTROL OF OFFICE BUILDING

THE Government's decision to introduce as one of its first measures the regulation of office building is a most important step in cutting the Gordian knot which has been becoming increasingly tangled in recent years. The problem of controlling the growth of commercial buildings has been most acute in central London, and the impact of the new policy will be felt there in much greater force than elsewhere. In order to understand the position, it is necessary to look back over the course of events since the end of the second world war.

The Facts about London

Before 1939 there were about 87 million square feet of offices in central London, of which about $9\frac{1}{2}$ m. square feet suffered very severe war damage. After the war building priorities and controls were such that for some years there was no opportunity to erect new office buildings. During these years, however, the L.C.C. gave consent to a large number of applications for permission to build office blocks. At that time the danger of excessive office building in the heart of London was not recognised either by the Central Government or by the L.C.C., and in any event the prospect of actually constructing the buildings for which consent was being given appeared to be very remote.

During the 1950s the situation began to change and by mid-1962 office floor space in the central area had increased by nearly one-third (27.8m. square feet) over the pre-war figure. Future commitments entered into by the planning authority will bring this figure to 67.4m. square feet, a total increase of nearly four-fifths over the 1939 position.

Between 1951 and 1961 employment in central London rose by 160,000 persons, while the number of residents in the County of London fell by 150,000. As a result, the journey to work of those employed in the central area was becoming more costly in terms of time, money, and physical discomfort. Office employment in the central area has been increasing at the rate of 15,000 jobs a year, and the planning commitments already made will produce a situation which, if unchecked, will increase the number of office workers in the central area to 900,000 by 1971. It must be borne in mind that this figure does not include the very large numbers of persons

CONTROL OF OFFICE BUILDING

working in shops, restaurants, factories, garages, warehouses, and other forms of non-office employment in the central area. The total magnitude of the army which invades the central area on every working day can be seen from the fact that in 1961 no fewer than 1.3m. people were coming in daily to central London between 7 a.m. and 10 a.m., of which only slightly over half were office workers.

The Onslaught of Office Building

The effects of the onslaught of the faceless office block are apparent everywhere in the Metropolis. Houses, flats, hotels, cinemas, shops, clubs—all have fallen beneath the drive of the big commercial firms and development companies bent on finding a prestige site or reaping a swift profit from a modern office block. The quality of the environment in the centre of the national capital has deteriorated severely during the past ten years as a result of the mad rush for office accommodation.

The need to stem the tide if the whole of central London is not to become a wilderness of office buildings was recognised by Sir Keith Joseph as Minister of Housing and Local Government in the last Government. He was, however, unwilling to take positive measures to restrict office building, but decided to rely on voluntary persuasion. The White Paper issued in February 1963¹ said that the Government believed that more effective steps must now be taken to influence the future rate and distribution of office growth and that the rate of growth in the centre must be checked, and offices be better distributed over London as a whole and further afield. The White Paper explicitly rejected control by a system of licences for new buildings similar to that which is applied to factory buildings on the ground that new office blocks are often built for letting, so that the developer when seeking planning permission may not know how many tenants he would have or who they would be. The Government therefore decided to set up a Location of Offices Bureau; to remove as much Government work from central London as possible; to encourage the building of office centres outside the heart of London; and to withdraw the right to add 10 per cent. to the cubic capacity of a building erected before 1947 either on rebuilding or by way of addition or enlargement—a right which enabled astute developers to add as much as 40 per cent. to the floor space of a building without having to obtain planning consent.

¹ *London: Employment: Housing: Land*. Cmd. 1953/1963.

CONTROL OF OFFICE BUILDING

The Location of Offices Bureau

The Location of Offices Bureau was set up in April 1963 and has been actively engaged since then in drawing the attention of firms in central London to the great economic and social advantages of moving from the centre. The advantages are cheaper rents, lower wages and salaries, better amenities, more healthy conditions, and room for expansion. While L.O.B. has had a measure of success in persuading a certain number of firms to leave the central zone, it has had no influence over the destinations to which they have gone: most of the firms who moved have gone to locations within the London region, and almost none have been willing to go anywhere beyond fifty miles from the centre of London. Furthermore, most of the offices in the centre which have been vacated have been re-occupied by other firms. The net result of the whole operation has thus been to increase the total amount of office employment in the London region. These considerations led the Standing Conference on London Regional Planning to criticise the work of L.O.B. From the standpoint of the central area there is no advantage in one firm moving out if another tenant occupies the vacant office, while from the standpoint of the Metropolitan region the position is such that unless the growth of office employment can be brought rapidly under control effective planning is utterly impossible.

The Need for Positive Action

In the light of this situation the decision of the Labour Government is quite essential for the planning and sane development of the South-East region. The requirement that an office development permit must be obtained from the Board of Trade before a new building can be constructed or a change of use made in an existing building, is unlikely to present any difficulty in practice.

Restriction on the building of new offices in London, which will be the first area to which the new control will be applied—and no permits will be granted in this area save in exceptional circumstances—is only a preliminary to securing a better disposition of commercial employment throughout the country. The fantastic concentration of office building in London is shown by the fact that it is estimated that less than 10m. square feet of office accommodation is available in such great cities as Birmingham, Liverpool, or Manchester. The whole balance in the distribution of non-industrial employment opportunities must be radically changed if the pressure on London

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is to be dealt with in a constructive manner. This will call not merely for regional planning, but prior to that for a national plan dealing broadly with the geographical settlement of the population. We now know that local planning is futile without regional planning. How long will it take us to see that regional planning must be preceded by national planning? Hitherto economic planning and physical planning have been running on separate sets of tram-lines which never meet and with little or no co-ordination between them. A resolute attempt must be made to bring together the two kinds of planning, at least in terms of basic policies.

The Government is to be commended for having taken an essential step; but it is a negative one. It must be followed by positive policies which will encourage and indeed facilitate the better distribution of both office and other forms of employment throughout the country. Whether this can best be effected by the concentration of offices in a few of the largest provincial cities or whether they should be distributed more widely among a substantial number of smaller towns (which is what has happened in the case of recent Civil Service removals from central London) is an interesting and difficult problem about which there is much to be said on both sides of the argument. It is a problem which will call for much hard thinking in the coming months.

THE FRENCH-CANADIAN QUESTION

RAMSAY COOK

SINCE 1962 Canada has been passing through a period of critical national and political instability. In the federal general election of that year the Progressive Conservative government, which four years earlier had won the most resounding victory in Canadian electoral history, was barely returned as a minority government. The next year was marked by fumbling indecisiveness, economic uncertainty, almost unbelievable confusion in defence and foreign policy, a palace revolt within the Cabinet, and finally a new election. Confronted by these events it is not surprising that one French-Canadian editor wrote, "*Y a-t-il une politique militaire canadienne? Y a-t-il une politique étrangère canadienne? Y a-t-il un gouvernement canadien?*" In the circumstances none of the questions was entirely fanciful.

Tension between Ottawa and Quebec

The election which took place in the spring of 1963 was only slightly more decisive than its predecessor: the Conservatives lost a few more seats, giving Lester Pearson's Liberal Party an opportunity to form a minority government. While order has largely been restored to the country's economic affairs, and some of the confusion in foreign and defence matters swept away, the general sense of uneasiness about the country's direction and future remains widespread. Bruce Hutchison, a veteran journalist and staunch Canadian nationalist, observed recently that Lester Pearson is the first Prime Minister, "who can no longer be sure" that Canadians are willing to continue to pay the price of nationhood. While there is continuing concern about Canada's unequal partnership with the United States, the major source of the country's present difficulties is domestic, not foreign. That source is the most sensitive area of the Canadian polity: the relations between French- and English-speaking Canadians and more particularly, the relations between the Federal government at Ottawa and the government of the province of Quebec. Never have federal-provincial relations been so unsettled, so complicated, and even so

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strained as they have been in the past two years. There is an obvious irony (though it is probably also a fortunate coincidence) in the fact that the governments of both Canada and Quebec are Liberal and that the Prime Minister of Canada, Lester Pearson, and the Premier of Quebec, Jean Lesage, were colleagues in the St. Laurent government before the Conservative victory in 1957.

The tensions between Quebec and Ottawa must be seen in a wide perspective. In the first place there is a kind of rhythm in the Canadian federal system in which periods of centralisation are followed by provincial revolt and decentralisation. The years between 1939 and 1957 were characterised by vigorous federal leadership and the dominance of Ottawa. Quebec never accepted this centralisation fully, though its attitude was ambiguous: it consistently elected a firmly provincial autonomist *Union nationale* government in Quebec, but just as regularly re-elected the supporters of the centralising Liberals at Ottawa. By the mid-fifties provinces other than Quebec were growing restive under federal tutelage and the number of provincial Conservative régimes increased. John Diefenbaker successfully took advantage of this provincial unrest in his campaign to dislodge the twenty-two-year-old Liberal régime in 1957.

The Diefenbaker Episode

The Diefenbaker victory had a peculiar effect on French Canada. The slim 1957 success was won despite Quebec, which clung to its traditional Liberal allegiance. But that election frightened French Canadians for it proved that a federal election could be won virtually without the support of Quebec. It was a long time since the minority position of the French Canadian had been so graphically illustrated. In 1958, however, the situation was rectified when the Diefenbaker landslide included a Conservative majority in Quebec for the first time since 1887. But the apparent strength of the Conservative Party in Quebec was misleading. In the first place the Quebec wing of the federal party included almost no one of experience who could both state Quebec's case in the federal Cabinet and fulfil his ministerial duties effectively. The one man who might have played that role, Léon Balcer, had opposed John Diefenbaker's candidacy for the party leadership and was therefore somewhat under a cloud. The result was that the Diefenbaker government was never *en rapport* with the aspirations of French Canada.

THE FRENCH-CANADIAN QUESTION

The lack of French-Canadian leadership in the Conservative government reflected something that proved an even more serious weakness: Conservative electoral strength in Quebec was built on the shakiest of foundations. In Quebec there had been no provincial Conservative Party since it merged with a group of dissident Liberals in 1935 to form the *Union nationale* led by the one-time Conservative, Maurice Duplessis. In 1957 and especially in 1958, the federal Conservative Party succeeded where it previously had failed in obtaining the support of the *Union nationale* machine. The alliance was an unnatural one based only on a common hostility to the Liberal Party. The result was that the *Union nationale*, an ardently French-Canadian nationalist party, helped send to Ottawa French-speaking Conservatives whose intense autonomism was bound to make them unhappy in a party dominated by Diefenbaker's "one Canada" philosophy. It is not surprising that one French-Canadian Conservative backbencher was, by 1961, openly describing Confederation as a "fool's paradise" for Quebec.

The Union Nationale

The Diefenbaker landslide in Quebec in 1958 bore within itself the seeds of its own destruction. The *Union nationale*, which had held power in Quebec since 1944, had become a corrupt, autocratic, and intensely conservative régime, which stayed in office by skilfully playing on traditional French-Canadian fears of an Ottawa dominated by the English-speaking majority. Since the federal government was Liberal, Duplessis convinced Quebec voters that provincial autonomy could only be defended by keeping the provincial Liberals out of power. But once Diefenbaker had removed the Liberal menace from Ottawa the old game could no longer be successfully played. This gave the provincial Liberals a new lease on life, which they grasped impatiently. For several years, under the guidance of the impressively intellectual but cold Georges Lapalme, the party had been building up an organisation and defining a progressive programme. At the same time it was losing elections. In 1958 the crushing defeat of the federal Liberals made an extremely dynamic young politician available to the provincial party. He was Jean Lesage, a capable, attractive ex-Cabinet Minister, well known as a persistent spokesman for Quebec's interests in Ottawa. Doubtless when Jean Lesage took over the leadership of the provincial Liberal party one of his main concerns was to rebuild the fortunes of his party at Ottawa. But

a series of unpredictable events thrust him into power in Quebec in less than two years.

In 1959 the *Union nationale* experienced almost unbelievable bad fortune. First its founder and leader—a man who had been a true “*chef*” in the Canadian tradition—Maurice Duplessis, died. His successor was a man more in tune with the times than the aging Duplessis had been. But Paul Sauvé, the new leader, had very little time in which to implement the progressive social ideas he subscribed to; before his first year of office was ended he suffered a fatal heart attack. This left the party in a state of internal strife, totally unprepared for the election of June 1960. That election brought Lesage to office in Quebec and marked the beginning of the end for the Quebec federal Conservatives who could no longer rely on the formerly powerful *Union nationale* machine for support.

A Liberal Government in Quebec

Since Quebec's voice was so ineffectively expressed in the Conservative Cabinet at Ottawa, many French Canadians, after 1960, turned their eyes to Quebec city for leadership. They were not disappointed. While Diefenbaker's government seemed bewildered in the face of the country's numerous problems, Lesage's Liberal *équipe* at Quebec was in the process of unwrapping a programme of modernisation designed to bring public policies into line with the economic and social developments of the previous twenty-five years. Before 1960 bright young French Canadians looked to Ottawa or to such federal institutions as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the National Film Board as havens where they could express their ideas without fear of the penalties which the Duplessis administration used freely against its critics. Now these people found their province, and especially the provincial government, anxious to make full use of their talents. A new atmosphere of freedom seemed to prevail in Quebec and at last it was possible to question every traditional institution, including Confederation itself. Some of the noise in today's Quebec is the sound of exploding myths, some the noise of a society working furiously to modernise itself, and some an old noise rejuvenated: nationalism.

Discontents Released

The death of Duplessis removed a cap which had kept the seething discontents of French Canada sealed up for more than a decade. It is doubtful if even Duplessis could have kept the cap on much

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longer, for the social and economic forces at work were much too potent. Quebec, like so much of North America since 1940, has experienced a period of accelerated industrial and urban growth. While this was not the sudden process that is sometimes suggested—the stereotyped *Maria Chapdelaine* view of Quebec's arcadian culture has been outdated since the twenties—there can be no doubt that the war and post-war economic boom transformed Quebec into a society very much like Ontario or the Eastern United States in its social organisation. This economic development was carried out very largely through the investment of non-French-Canadian capital. The result was that class lines and "national" lines tended to coincide. Moreover, Quebec remained remarkably backward in adopting the kind of social welfare policies that make a modern industrial society acceptable to the great mass of the people who live in it without owning much of it.

The Duplessis Régime

The fact was that the *Union nationale* government's public philosophy was a nineteenth-century capitalist's dream: foreign capital was invited to a province with enormous natural resources, stable government, low taxes, cheap and largely unorganised labour. Premier Duplessis consistently fought federal welfare policies as infringements on provincial rights, but rarely did he offer any alternative policies of his own. The bitterly fought strikes in Quebec in the forties and fifties were reminiscent of the 1890's in other parts of North America. In these labour disputes the Duplessis government openly identified itself with "foreign" capital against French-Canadian labour. The enormous under-representation of urban areas in the provincial legislature meant that the *Union nationale* had little to fear from the votes of angry trade unionists. Despite his reactionary policies Duplessis never failed to win re-election through a combination of electoral corruption, personal charisma, and an ear finely tuned to the frustrations of French Canada's minority complex. He skilfully used nationalism as a shield to protect his conservative policies in the sham battles he fought against Ottawa, while at the same time allowing the alienation of the province's economy. It is no wonder that in progressive circles, both inside and outside Quebec, French-Canadian nationalism became highly suspect. An intellectual, who today is a separatist of the socialist variety, wrote in 1958 that "those who like me have experienced the bankruptcy of what is called our 'national doctrine' must seek a new direction. They

do not believe that the Nationalist orientation can ever produce a living culture, a living politics, living men".

In these years of Duplessis' ascendancy a new French-Canadian middle class was spawned. This class was composed of people who in growing numbers were turning away from the traditional professions of French Canada: law, medicine, journalism and the Church. Instead, though only slowly because of the continued domination of clerically-directed classical education in Quebec, the most ambitious young people turned to business, engineering and the social sciences. These people, as well as many members of the traditional professions, began to look at society in a new fashion. Many of them discovered that to advance in their professions they had to adopt much of the culture of the dominant, English-speaking minority: they had to leave their language in the cloakroom with their coats at the office. The new nationalism of Quebec is partly a reflection of the tension created in the minds of young people who want both to succeed in their professions but also maintain their culture.

A New Role for the State

It was these same people, the urban middle class, as well as the urban working class, which became increasingly critical of the out-dated social philosophy of the provincial government. They wanted the kind of positive state that would help them solve their problems by providing better educational opportunities, higher welfare benefits, better housing facilities, and equitable labour laws. If Quebec was to be modernised and if French Canadians were going to exercise any control over that society there was only one institution which could be used: the state. In the provincial government French Canadians unquestionably had an institution that belonged to them if they chose to use it. In the past the Church had been the major institution of *la survivance*; today it is the state. That is the real, indeed only, revolution that has taken place in Quebec. It is also at the root of the friction between the federal and provincial government.

In the past French Canadians looked upon the state with a deep suspicion. For one thing the state had been for nearly a century after the Conquest an instrument of English domination. Then, too, the French Canadian, faithful to his Church, believed that an active state could threaten the prerogatives of the Church. Therefore, the Church rather than the state played the predominant role in the educational, medical and social welfare fields. But the

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practical limitations of the Church grew increasingly obvious as the traditional parish organisation disintegrated under the impact of industrialisation and urbanisation. By the end of the fifties the demand for state action was becoming irresistible. Today it is no longer resisted; two years ago Premier Lesage remarked: "It must be clearly understood that the State of Quebec acts as a fulcrum for the whole French Canadian community; and that at the present time it is the instrument needed for the community's cultural, economic and social progress".

Traditionally French Canadians believed that if they exercised control over their language, their laws and their religion, their survival as a distinctive community would be guaranteed. Each of these categories was placed in the hands of the provincial government at Confederation. But in recent years it became patently obvious that survival was endangered by economic and social changes. Economically and socially Quebec was becoming indistinguishable from English-speaking North America. Was cultural assimilation an inevitable consequence? If the answer was to be no, French Canadians realised that new instruments of survival were necessary.

The Liberal Party, elected in 1960, reflected this new attitude and indicated a willingness to translate it into policy. It reflected more than it created the attitude and there can be no doubt that many, though not all, of Premier Lesage's ministers have seen the state move into areas that they would not have anticipated five years ago. Like any other democratic government, the Lesage Cabinet is a coalition of different shades of opinion stretching over a fairly broad spectrum from moderate left to moderate right. There can, however, be no doubt that the left has asserted its ascendancy within the Cabinet. And it is no accident that as it has shifted leftward, it has also grown more nationalist. In both respects it reflects the changing temper of the province.

Quebec Moves to the Left

The first two years of the Lesage government saw a general cleaning up of corruption, the enactment of several social welfare measures and labour laws, and increased concern with education. But in 1962 a new departure was taken with the decision to nationalise eleven private hydro-electric companies, thus completing a step begun in 1944 with the creation of Quebec Hydro. It was the radical intellectual, René Lévesque, Minister of Natural Resources, who was the author of this policy. Its main intention

was to give the government control of an industry that was fundamental to the economic development of the province. But while the decision was economic, it was also nationalist. In the 1962 election, called as a referendum on power nationalisation, the Liberals campaigned on the slogan, "*maître chez nous*". The success of this appeal clearly showed that although nationalism under Duplessis may have been somewhat discredited among intellectuals, it was far from dead among the populace. Indeed, under Lesage, and particularly Lévesque, nationalism has been divested of its reactionary image, and given a progressive façade and content. But the fact is that the Liberals appeal to the same sentiment of nationalism that Duplessis exploited so successfully. The difference is in the means proposed to guarantee *la survivance*; no public man in Quebec ever questions the end.

A Revival of Nationalism

The positive nationalism of the Lesage government is a heavy drain on public funds. To extend welfare benefits, nationalise hydro, improve and increase the civil service, enter directly into economic expansion, extend and reform education, all require the expenditure of huge sums of money. In its search for revenue Quebec found that nearly every source was already being tapped by Ottawa. Since the Second World War Ottawa had grown accustomed to initiating the country's major welfare and developmental policies. While the Quebec government had often objected, Ottawa usually proceeded in one fashion or another. Moreover, ever since the wartime and "cold war" emergencies, Ottawa has kept a tight-fisted control on all the major sources of revenue. The Lesage government, autonomist from the start and nationalist to an increasing degree, quickly made plain its unwillingness to accept passively either Ottawa's exclusive initiative in developmental policies or its primacy in the fields of direct taxation. While the Diefenbaker government moved slightly in the direction of decentralisation, it was meagre in comparison with the galloping pace of the Quebec government's reforms and expenditures.

While the friction between the Lesage and the Diefenbaker governments at first had the appearance of a traditional quarrel between Liberals and Conservatives, Premier Lesage completely dispelled that notion in his budget speech delivered on April 5, 1963. He made it clear that his government was so committed to autonomy and to costly reform measures that it would expect whichever party was in power in Ottawa to meet Quebec's fiscal

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demands in twelve months. This statement, widely described as an "ultimatum," was delivered three days before the voting in the federal general election. Since it was widely expected that the Liberals would be called upon to form a government in Ottawa after the election, the "ultimatum" came as a shock to many federal politicians. In fact, it was a shrewd declaration of independence. If the Liberals were elected Lesage wanted it to be perfectly clear, especially to the voters of Quebec, that his government would not be a mere handmaiden of federal policies. That declaration of independence has since been made formal by an almost complete separation of the federal and provincial party organisations in Quebec. Though this move shocked many English Canadians its real purpose was nothing more than to destroy the bogey of federal domination that the *Union nationale* had used so effectively against the provincial Liberals in the past.

Nevertheless Premier Lesage's insistence on the independence of his party was an accurate reflection of the new mood of the province. This new mood manifested itself in a profound suspicion of the federal government. Ottawa's reputation reached an all-time low during the last year of the Diefenbaker régime, and nowhere was its reputation worse than in Quebec. But while the federal government could easily be restored to a place of honour in English Canada, the *malaise* was deeper in Quebec. After the death of Duplessis a new generation of Quebecers began to make their voices heard. Though the majority of these people found their views well represented by the Lesage government, and especially by the voluble René Lévesque, there were others who were discovering new forms of radicalism that could be fitted into the old nationalist moulds. Everywhere in Quebec after 1960 there was a questioning of traditional values. The traditional role of the state was rejected, the place of the Church in society and the layman in the Church questioned, the purposes of education endlessly debated and, naturally, French Canada's position in Confederation was examined. There seemed so many necessary tasks to be undertaken in Quebec itself that many French Canadians lost interest in the rest of Canada. Then, too, there were those who concluded that the source of Quebec's problems was Confederation itself.

The Separatist Movement

There have always been people in Quebec who have believed that French Canada's ultimate salvation could only be achieved if the

full status of independent nationhood was acquired. But these groups, in the past, have never been strong. Today they represent, according to the only serious analysis that has been made, something like 13 per cent. of the population of Quebec. Of these separatists the vast majority are well educated, below thirty, and with a prosperous family background. They are, in fact, typical middle-class students and young professional people. Like the ideologically-minded everywhere, these young radicals reject the compromises and scorn the pragmatism of their elders in the Lesage government. Where Lesage cautiously develops the interventionist state, the radicals call for full-scale socialism and *planification*; where Lesage carefully increases state control over the previously Church-controlled educational system, the radicals advocate complete secularisation or *laïcisme*; where Lesage defends his province's autonomy, the impatient youth demand national independence, or *séparatisme*. The separatist movement, which has never yet entered politics actively, is divided within itself, expressing views stretching all the way from a tiny fringe of terrorists, through marxist anti-clericals, to clerical corporatists on the far right. All, despite effusive democratic professions, verge on a totalitarianism enforced on them by their commitment to nationalist absolutes. Indeed, it sometimes appears that this young generation of anti-clericals has rejected the absolutes of the Roman Catholic faith only to accept the absolutes of a nationalist faith. Nearly all of their writings show an intense interest in the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa, a profound ignorance of economics, and a pride in the achievements of contemporary France.

Its Strength, Actual and Potential

Despite the widespread publicity the separatists have gained, partly as a result of tight organisation and youthful enthusiasm, and partly as a result of scattered acts of violence, the movement does not command broadly-based support in Quebec. Its strength could grow rapidly, however, if the Lesage government lost its reform impulse, or if English Canadians refused to respond to the moderate demands for change being made by the provincial Liberal government. At the moment, both of these dangers are present, but not threateningly so. If the movement was to grow it would have to spread into the working-class population of the province. So far the working people have remained largely immune to separatism, suspecting that they would have to pay the undoubted price that separatism would entail. The leaders of

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the two major trade union organisations have made their opposition to separatism unmistakably clear. Jean Marchand, leader of an exclusively Quebec union, stated just over a year ago that in his view Quebec's problems had very little to do with the constitution. It goes without saying that the business community and those responsible for the province's economic growth are opposed to separatism, which they fear may discourage investment in Quebec.

The Social Credit Party

Separatism, with its several faces, is only one political manifestation of Quebec's contemporary social turmoil. A no less striking phenomenon, and one based on much wider electoral support, is *créditisme*, the Quebec version of the economic heresies of Major Douglas. Where separatism is the panacea offered by the ambitious middle-class intellectual as a solution for all Quebec's problems, *créditisme* has found its main support among the lower middle class and the urban and rural lower classes. But like separatism, *créditisme* is a symptom of the revolt against the old order.

Until 1962 no federal party, other than the Liberals and Conservatives, had ever made any appreciable impact on the French-Canadian voter. Yet in the 1962 federal election twenty-six Quebec constituencies returned Social Credit members. The leader of the party was a fiery, demagogic, automobile dealer, Réal Caouette, who admits a one-time admiration for Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. While Caouette, unlike most English-Canadian supporters of the Social Credit party, is a true Douglasite monetary reformer, his main electoral appeal was the slogan "*Vous n'avez rien à perdre*". Much of his party's vote came from people who were disillusioned with the Conservatives without having been won back by the Liberals. What the social credit vote seemed to exemplify was a rootless, aimless, *poujadiste* discontent with the status quo among people whom Premier Lesage's sophisticated reformers had failed to reach.

Like every other group in present-day Quebec, Réal Caouette's party soon became afflicted with *nationalisme*. By 1963 Caouette had broken with the English-Canadian leader of his party, forming a separate Quebec group. While it is not a separatist party, its concern for monetary reform has been largely replaced by rather confused demands for constitutional reform. It is unlikely that the *créditiste* party will survive much beyond another election. In the meantime, however, it stands as an unsettling reminder of

the ease with which discontented people can be attracted to a properly presented slogan.

Both separatism and *créditisme* represent in extreme form the intensity of the nationalist impulse in Quebec and the widespread dissatisfaction with the social, economic and political status quo. Although the source of much of this discontent is in Quebec society itself and can therefore only be removed by the provincial government, there is an inevitable tendency to blame Confederation itself. While the vast proportion of Quebecers reject separatism at present, there are very few articulate French Canadians who are satisfied with the existing position of the French Canadian in Confederation. A host of suggestions to rectify the situation have been made. Few are very specific and, of those, most seem impractical or unacceptable from the English-Canadian viewpoint.

Currently a view put forward by several vocal groups in Quebec is that an entirely new constitution should be devised to meet the needs of the "two nations" in Canada. Under this new constitution each nation would have its own sovereign state, but the two would be associated in a loose confederal arrangement, each represented equally, and each having the right of veto. This theory of "associate states", though it seems to have won the vague approval of two members of the Quebec provincial cabinet, has very little prospect of acceptance. In the first place, Premier Lesage himself is realistic enough to know, and to have said so publicly, that the time is not ripe for full-scale constitutional revision. English Canada remains largely unconvinced of the need for radical constitutional change. Moreover, there is a committee of the Quebec legislature currently examining a wide range of proposals for constitutional change, and the government will certainly not commit itself before that committee has done its work. Finally, on the basis of the meagre details of the "associate state" theory that have so far been presented, it is fairly clear that it would create economic chaos and endless political instability. It is, in fact, only a thinly disguised form of separatism.

"Co-operative Federalism"

For the immediate future the present constitutional structure, modified substantially in its workings, offers considerable hope. In the current parlance the new approach is called "co-operative federalism". In general this means a commitment by the federal government to the decentralisation of responsibilities and revenues and close, almost continuous, consultation between the federal and

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provincial authorities on nearly every aspect of policy. This even includes federal-provincial meetings on such unquestionably federal responsibilities as international trade. What it means above all is careful, detailed negotiations rather than rhetorical appeals to "national unity" and "provincial rights". Some French Canadians suspect this highly empirical approach as another Anglo-Saxon ruse. But the well-trained civil service that has been built up in Quebec, as well as the highly responsible French-Canadian politicians at both Ottawa and Quebec, recognise that it is the only realistic approach, given the mood of English as well as French Canada. Like most Canadian public policies "co-operative federalism" is really another word for compromise. Maurice Lamontagne, one of Prime Minister Pearson's closest French-Canadian advisers and chief author of the new approach to federal-provincial relations, said recently that "Confederation . . . remodelled to establish a balance of forces which form our country and to satisfy to a greater extent Quebec's aspirations is, I feel, the only real hope of the French Canadians. It is the only way to a mutually acceptable compromise. Co-operative federalism is half way between federalism *de tutelle* which existed until 1963, but which is no longer acceptable to French Canadians, and confederative federalism which is no longer satisfactory for present-day problems and which the English Canadians would not accept".

A second aspect of the new approach to relations between French and English Canadians is a clear commitment on the part of the federal government to improving the status of French Canadians in federal institutions. More French Canadians are being appointed to better civil service posts and, more important, French is gradually becoming a more "normal" language in the public service. Moreover, the federal government has established a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to investigate the whole range of problems relating to French-English relations. The French-speaking co-chairman of this Commission is André Laurendeau, one of the most intelligent and respected men in Quebec. As the editor of the nationalist Montreal daily, *Le Devoir*, Laurendeau never failed to defend Quebec's autonomy or the rights of French Canadians. But he was also an effective opponent of separatism, the more so, no doubt, since he himself had been a separatist in his youth in the thirties.

The Commission has the task of examining the place of French and English Canadians, as well as the role of the numerous ethnic groups or new Canadians, in Canadian society. Its most difficult,

and at the same time most important task, will be to consider the treatment of the French-Canadian minorities outside of Quebec. Here it will be concerned with one of the oldest and most bitter grievances of French Canadians. While the English-speaking minority in Quebec has a completely separate educational system and constitutionally guaranteed bilingualism, the 17 per cent. of French Canadians who live outside Quebec have no such privileges. In some provinces bilingual schools exist in a limited way—in Ontario, New Brunswick and Saskatchewan—but they are precarious and sometimes impose extra tax burdens on French and Catholic parents. While French Canadians have long asked for more equitable treatment, the response from English Canada, until recently, has been negative. Today many French-Canadian nationalists, particularly those of the separatist variety, advocate the abandonment of the minorities to inevitable assimilation. For many separatists, the opposite side of this coin would be a unilingual Quebec. Most French Canadians, however, remain reluctant to accept this attitude, believing that the minorities are a part of the French-Canadian nation and that it would be immoral to abandon them. As for the minorities, there is no stronger anti-separatist group in Canada than the leaders of the French-speaking Acadians in New Brunswick.

The problem of the minorities will receive a great deal of attention from the Royal Commission. The difficulty will arise, however, when the time comes to implement the Commission's recommendations. Many of these recommendations will doubtless relate to educational matters and that is a wholly provincial concern. The fact is that English Canadians have not yet come to accept the view that French Canadians are different from other minority groups and therefore have a right to special treatment. Yet the solution to the present crisis in Canada depends in large part on the practical acceptance of the fact that Quebec is not a province like the others, and that the French-Canadian minorities are not minorities like the others.

The resolution of the current difficulties depends on both the federal and Quebec governments. Perhaps more on the latter than the former, for the source of the problem is economic, social and educational more than constitutional. But there is always the danger that the more impatient, more ideological groups will force the Quebec government to turn its eyes from practical reforms to constitutional debate. There is also the danger that the anti-French-Canadian voices in English Canada will grow so strong as to

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convince the moderate people of Quebec that there is no real hope of two nations living peacefully within the bosom of a single state. Both these dangers are increased by the instability of the minority government at Ottawa.

A New and Different Canada?

Still, the readjustments that have already been made are reasons for optimism about the future. But the Canada that emerges from the present heated debate will be a different country, and probably a better one to live in. And there can be no doubt that the change will be largely the result of the transformation that has taken place in Quebec. René Lévesque summed up that change in an interview just over a year ago when he described his province as "a nation awake, in full swing, fed up with being seen as a museum, as 'the quaint old province of Quebec'; a nation bent on advancing, rising, no longer just content to endure".

If Quebec nationalism becomes too assertive and self-centred, it will undoubtedly stimulate an equally self-centred and assertive response from English Canadians, in which case the country will face a crisis unlike anything it has ever witnessed before. Contrary to the general belief, Canada's problem is one of too much nationalism, not too little. Indeed, the central paradox of the country is that its unity is strongest when its various nationalisms remain muted. "The Canadian state cannot be devoted to absolute nationalism, the focus of a homogeneous national will", a distinguished Canadian historian wrote two decades ago. "The two nationalities and four sections prevent it." That is the hard truth that Canadians are trying to relearn today.

THE PRINCIPATE

BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL

I

To lessen the share of any ONE in the conduct of public affairs, such was the chief concern of the political thinkers, from Locke onwards, whom we currently acknowledge as our teachers. However unproven and unlikely that Louis XIV actually said "*L'État, c'est moi*", this legendary statement serves to represent in the form of an aggrandised shadow the reality which our mentors meant to expose, denounce, and oppose. Personal rule has indeed undergone a process of decline in European States, beginning according to countries, sooner or later after the 1680s when Louis XIV shone and Locke wrote. This we can properly call *de-monarchisation*. This term is here taken to imply, not only that power slips out of the hands of anointed kings, but that it does not accumulate in the hands of any ONE, however labelled. For we must be mindful, as Algernon Sidney so aptly put it, "that the most absolute Princes that are or have been in the World, never had the name of King: whereas it has frequently been given to those whose powers have been very much restrained."¹

In this process of de-monarchisation we can distinguish two successive and quite different stages: in the first monarchic authority is limited, circumscribed, by the attribution to Parliament of legislative power and the power of the purse: the structure of the Federal Government in the United States perfectly pictures the accomplishment of this first stage. In the second stage, ministers fell into complete dependence upon Parliament, so much so that they became its own revokable commissioners, holding office by its favour and as long as this favour endured. It was at the height of this second stage that a man of my age found things opening his eyes to take in the political scene on the morrow of the First World War.

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¹ Algernon Sidney, *Discourse concerning Government*, Chap. III, Sect. 32, p. 368, of the Second Edition, London, 1704.

From Parliamentary Government to the Principate

There was then a striking uniformity in political institutions: this indeed was frequently referred to, during the first years of the League of Nations, as a promise of mutual understanding and a guarantee of international order.

It should be stressed that in none of the Parliaments then existing was there an absolute majority of one disciplined group: this feature suffices to build up enormous personal power in the hands of the Prime Minister, whose colleagues in the Cabinet thereby become mere lieutenants, whose back-benchers become mere soldiers, striving, by faithful service, to attract their General's eye. It was quite otherwise when the parliamentary system was in its heyday. Having to make up his majority from diverse groups, none of which was disciplined, and having to make up his governmental team from colleagues who brought him some contingent of votes, the chief executive was impeded from personal rule. The political élite was most hostile to such personal rule: it was this feeling which led to the eviction of both Clémenceau and Lloyd George despite their great war services, or rather because of the great popular prestige such services had earned them.

To those who have witnessed parliamentary government so widespread and so undisputed, the change that has come about in the past forty years or so seems enormous. Looking down the list of states that are now members of the United Nations, how many do we find where power is not concentrated in the hands of a single man? It is unimportant whether or not this monopoly of political power is written into the constitution: Octavius did not have to change the outward forms of the Roman Republic to empty them of all substance and to inaugurate the Principate.²

Problems for Discussion

"Principate" is the generic noun I have proposed to designate all our contemporary régimes where the body politic is in fact vested in one man.³ I have chosen this term because it seems to me the most neutral, equally acceptable to those who approve of such régimes as to those who disapprove of them.

This being our subject, it seems to me that discussion falls naturally into the three divisions of time: in the past, *explanation*

² "Insurgere paulatim, munia senatus, magistratuum, legum in se trahere", says Tacitus, *Annals*, Book I, § II.

³ The flatterer Gallus says to Tiberius: "Ut, sua confessione, argueretur unum esse reipublicae corpus, atque unius animo regendum". Tacitus, *Annals*, Book I, § XII.

of the phenomenon; in the present, *appreciation*; in the future, *prognostication*. To put it another way:

(a) What are the sources and causes of the phenomenon? How and why has it developed?

(b) Just what is the nature of the phenomenon and what value-judgments can be passed upon it?

(c) What evolution thereof can be plausibly foreseen? And what are the conditions for alternative deflections of its course?

Positive Causes of Monarchisation

There is no lack of explanations of the phenomenon: they could even be said to abound. First, there is the rapid extension of governmental activities in the twentieth century, which has materially swelled the state bureaucracy and psychologically increased the prestige of the Executive. The more the work of government involves initiative, the less it is the simple, routine execution of laws passed by the legislature—and the more so-called “executive” power springs from the limitation which was implied in the very name given to it by Locke and which continued in practice well into the nineteenth century. The importance which is in fact given to the Executive focuses attention upon its Head: as the Executive becomes more active it is also more personalised.

“We can predict with assurance”, wrote Gabriel Tarde in 1899, “that the future shall offer personifications of Authority and Power outshining the figures of Caesar, Louis XIV and Napoleon.”⁴ But must the rise in the importance of the Executive so benefit its head? It seems that we are prone to regard the Executive as naturally of a monarchic complexion. The idea never seems to have been questioned in European history. It has been put very clearly by Léon Blum: “I like work to be well done and I know that all collective work requires fixed rules and single direction. This direction must be exercised by the President of the Council. . . . We must get used to seeing him for what he is and what he should be: a monarch. . . .”⁵

I found this quotation from Léon Blum in the very interesting work that Léo Moulin has devoted to the constitution of religious orders, in which the author shows to what extent the governmental

⁴ Gabriel Tarde, *Les Transformations du Pouvoir*, Paris, 1899, p. 219.

⁵ Léon Blum, *La Réforme Gouvernementale*, Paris, 1936. It should be noted that Léon Blum adds: “A monarch, whose field of action is laid out in advance, a temporary, constantly revokable monarch, but one entrusted nevertheless with the entire executive power”. It is the reservations expressed here that have tended to disappear.

practices developed within these bodies, with their highly selective "citizenship", have influenced the political practice of States.⁶ These constitutions demonstrate that the fundamental tendency of the European mind has been to contrast an assembly that legislates and controls with the strictly *unitary* character of the Executive: action is monarchic.

One is reminded that, in the period from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, when it was felt socially necessary to increase the intervention of the central government, this took the form of *the rise of absolute monarchy*. On the other hand, the reaction against absolute monarchy coincided with the rise of ideas that have usually been associated with the slogan "*Laisser faire, laisser passer*".

But if the twentieth century was to be a time of great socialist transformation, did this necessarily involve a strong resurgence of personal power? Louis-Napoléon affirmed as much in his very revealing book of 1839, which deserves careful study. There is a great deal of historical truth in his formula "Just as public opinion had demanded the weakening of Power, regarding it as hostile, it favoured its heightening, having come to regard it as protective and constructive".⁷

However, the nineteenth-century socialists, whose ideas were to be put into practice in the twentieth century, hated personal power no less than that of the capitalists, and did not think that the former was necessary to curb the latter. Any contrary opinion attributed to Marx is founded upon an erroneous reading of his formula of "the dictatorship of the proletariat", by which he meant no more than a temporary suspension of the division between the legislative power and the executive power, the undivided power going to a multitude of workers' councils, not to a single man. Elie Halévy has tried to show that authoritarian government had no original connection with the idea of socialism, but that the experience of the "militarisation of Society" brought about during the Great War of 1914-18 inspired a militarisation of politics and government. This thesis gave rise to a discussion of very great interest⁸ and deserves to be taken up again.

The connection between single leadership and war is too well known to need emphasising. Is it necessary to recall that the

⁶ Léo Moulin, *Le Monde vivant des Religieux*, Calman-Lévy, 1964.

⁷ *Des Idées Napoléoniennes*, by Prince Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, Paris, 1839.

⁸ A discussion which is taken up in Elie Halévy's still relevant book, *L'Ere des Tyrannies*, Paris, Gallimard, 1938.

Romans never had the slightest notion of the unity of the executive power? On the contrary, government was spread out over several different magistratures, of which each had at least two titularies at any one time, with *par potestas*. It was only during a military campaign, over the army he commanded and in the field of operations assigned to him, that the consul enjoyed any undivided power. Undivided power upon the whole people was granted only to a dictator, nominated in times of exceptional danger. He alone was accorded an *imperium*, that was to be exercised not in some specific place outside the territory, but upon the people itself. He was *magister populi*, without any sharer in his power, since the "master of cavalry", who also appeared in such circumstances, was nothing but his coadjutor, appointed by himself.⁹ Reference to Roman political genius makes the association of single leadership and military function quite clear. It would also be interesting to trace the gradual introduction into politics of a military vocabulary—something which, incidentally, attracted the notice of Baudelaire.

After Saint-Simon, almost everyone took up the contrast he had drawn between the military concern and the industrial concern as principles of political and social institutions. The contrast that this difference of principle brought into political institutions seems to have been overshadowed in our own time by the likening of the enterprise of economic progress to a military enterprise, not only in the name of the "struggle" against social reaction, which is plausible, but also in the sense of a "war of conquest" directed "against nature", which is entirely metaphorical. It is the Head of government who has benefited from the notion of the "generalissimo".

Moreover, in the case of the huge and confused category of "under-developed countries" or "new States", a great many reasons for the personalisation of power are cited. They can be drawn from the "distant" past or from the "recent" past, from immediate needs or from long-term projects. Thus it is said (invoking the "distant" past) that peoples without education can picture government only in the shape of a chief, or (invoking the "recent" past) that a struggle for independence has identified its achievement with some leading figure; or again (now invoking a present and future requirement) it is said that in order to "integrate" disparate peoples into one nation, a "founder" is necessary,

⁹ The character of the Roman dictatorship is particularly well brought out by L. Lange, *Histoire intérieure de Rome jusqu'à la bataille d'Actium*. French edition, Paris, 1888, Appendix to Vol. I.

as represented in ancient mythology; or further that rapid modernisation is a species of "social mobilisation",¹⁰ a term which naturally suggests a "generalissimo".

Here are many impressive reasons: nor do I quote all those given; but this very abundance arouses suspicion. Are we then to think that parliamentary government is "not yet" suitable to economically retarded countries, and "no longer" suitable for economically advanced ones? Are we to regard personal government as called for in the case of the first to remedy the dearth of administrative personnel, and in the case of the last to overcome its weight? It seems to me that we are burdened with all too many explanations for the same phenomenon: would it not then be a simplification to reverse the terms of our problem?

On the Probability of the Monarchic Form

If we assumed at the outset that the monarchic form of government is the most probable, then we could not be surprised to find it associated with very diverse circumstances: indeed it would then seem unreasonable to look for the conditions of appearance of this most common alternative, and more in accordance with the principle of intellectual parsimony to inquire into the conditions of appearance of the more uncommon alternative: the non-monarchical form.

Now this assumption, that the monarchic form is the most probable, is one to which we are strongly induced by the study of history, which, at least, establishes beyond doubt that this form has been by far the most frequent. Omitting human societies so small and rural as to do without any command institutions, we find the phenomenon "State" strongly correlated with the phenomenon "monarchy". This can be strikingly displayed if, taking the States with known histories during the last twenty centuries, we roughly estimate therefrom the percentage of human lives which have been lived under a monarchic régime: this percentage will appear quite overwhelming. Or again one could make a kind of historical film composed of successive shots, decade by decade, of maps of the world meant to bring out the positions and population weights of republican States: these would be seen to gain some ground at times, as in the fifth century B.C. But such gains have not proved irreversible.

¹⁰ A very significant expression coined by Karl Deutsch. Among many important pieces of work by this author stressing that theme see his "Social Mobilization and Political Development," in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LV, No. 3, September 1961.

It would be unwarranted to take the enormous preponderance of the monarchic form in the past as the *a priori* measure of its probability in the future: but neither does its marked decline during a few generations offer any guarantee of a continuing process of gradual extinction.

When parliamentary régimes stood at their height, two prejudices were very widely held that later proved to be unfounded: a general prejudice that a phenomenon "of the past" could be regarded as "surpassed", and a specific prejudice that only the descendants of past kings would be prone to restore a monarchic power. These two prejudices undermined the vigilance that the republicans of Rome had ever exercised: these Romans were ever ready to suspect one or other among themselves of aspiring to the *regnum*, to *dominatio*,¹¹ the monarchy being considered as always restorable by any ambitious man exploiting favourable circumstances. Not only was any attempt at restoration a capital crime among the Romans, but the institutions were so arranged as to prevent its ever coming about.

"The laws of Rome", says Montesquieu, "had wisely divided public power into a great number of magistratures, which supported, checked and moderated each other: as then each had no more than limited power, each citizen was apt to participate in them; and the people, seeing several personages pass before it one after another, never became accustomed to any one of them."¹²

The political institutions of Rome were assuredly complex. But the Roman republic lasted for four and a half centuries, while the English republic, which succeeded the very limited monarchy of Charles I, soon developed into the unlimited rule of Oliver Cromwell, and the French republic brought down the limited power of Louis XVI, only to be replaced by the imperial power of Napoleon. History repeated itself in the same way with the second French republic: Napoleon III had more power than was ever exercised by Louis-Philippe.

The Prevention of Personal Rule

If we regard personal rule as inevitable unless sufficiently strong measures are taken to prevent it, we are soon led to a consideration of the factors that make for its prevention.

¹¹ Cf. J. Hellegouarc'h, *Le Vocabulaire Latin des Relations et des Partis Politiques sous la République*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1963.

¹² *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur Décadence*, 1736, Chap. XI.

The most natural and most important of the factors that go to prevent the monopolisation of power by *one* man is the desire of the *others* not to relinquish power. This could be seen at work in a cabinet of the Third Republic, in which each minister considered himself master of his own department, and was not in the least disposed to see himself as a mere lieutenant of the President of the Council appointed by this leader to act under his orders. It was to be seen in the French Parliament of the same period, when the deputies were unwilling to let a Head of Government escape their control. This is perhaps the place to note, as the most gradual mode of progression to the Principate, the change that has occurred in the status of the parliamentary deputy.¹³ If the parliamentary deputy no longer owes his seat to the confidence that his electors have in him personally, but gets it from the party on condition that he votes for the government of his party, a Chamber or a party with a disciplined majority is no more than a rubber-stamp Assembly; and when the Head of the party is the true Head of the Government, his Ministers are reduced to the rank of lieutenants that he can dismiss as he wishes, as Mr. Macmillan dismissed seven of his principal ministers at a single stroke. Indeed, the British Prime Minister has in fact become far more powerful than the President of the United States, though at the turn of the century the position was the other way round.¹⁴

Generally, the monopolisation of power meets its greatest obstacle in the political élite. As an example of the phenomenon in general, I shall take one from outside the field of government properly so called—from the American Trade Union movement. Since the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. merged, there has been a General President of the whole union movement: but he has no personal power over the whole “people” of the unions. The different parts of this “whole people” are severally ruled by the leaders of the particular unions, such as the President of the Automobile Workers, the President of the Steelworkers, the President of the Teamsters. Here is a striking analogy with the situation of the medieval King; just like the medieval King, the General President has direct authority over some people, the membership of his own union, but he cannot directly move the

¹³ The origin of this process has been admirably described by M. Ostrogorski, *La Démocratie et l'organisation des partis politiques*, 2 vols., Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1903.

¹⁴ This fact was brought out by Max Beloff in a correspondence in the *Daily Telegraph* in 1960.

members of the other unions: this lies with their respective leaders or "barons"; so that no movement of the "whole unionised people" can be brought about by the General President alone: as discrete parts of the "whole people" acknowledge no other direct authority than that of their respective leaders, therefore it is only with the consent and participation of these various specific leaders or "direct Lords" that the whole people can be moved. Indeed, a powerful "union Lord" can defy not only the General President but also a coalition of this "overlord" with a great majority of "other Lords", as Charles the Bold of Burgundy did relatively to Louis XI, as the President of the Teamsters has done in recent years relatively to the General President of the A.F.L.C.I.O. backed by a majority of the union leaders. It is clear that, in the A.F.L.C.I.O. or even in the British T.U.C., the existence of a General President or a General Secretary in no way implies that these men are in fact the "monarchs" of the Trade Union movements: it is the individual "barons" who hold power, and it is the congress of union "barons" that takes decisions, by which, moreover, a dissident "baron" is not effectively bound.

Starting from such a weak position, the medieval monarch moved up to absolute monarchy, because he succeeded in transferring to himself the psychological allegiance of the barons' constituents. Why should the "teamsters" so transfer their allegiance to the General President? Whatever can be said against their specific leader, it cannot be gainsaid that he has advanced their interests? The word "constituency" is charged with meaning: wherever there is a solid following, a power thereby is constituted, and the overall constitution of power depends upon the distribution of followings. There is no place for a power monopolist where many people "matter" in the political field, thanks to the backing they personally obtain from their several constituencies, and provided these people who "matter" jointly operate in an effective manner. To rob them of their power, the would-be monopolist must tempt away their following: he has to "concentrate upon his own head the hopes of the nation" as the youthful Bonaparte wrote in his *Souper de Beaucaire*. The political set help him to this if they behave selfishly, as the Roman Senators when Tiberius Gracchus proposed his reforms; by their obstruction, they drove him to courses which they could call tyrannical but all they gained was to make people wonder whether perhaps *dominatio* was not the condition of reforms: which stacked the

cards in favour of Marius, Cinna, Catilina, and finally Caesar. But it need not be for selfish reasons that the political set ceases to satisfy: it may perform inefficiently out of mere loyalty to now untimely routines.

Whatever the cause, if the people become dissatisfied with the performance of the political set, then the assertive fellow who promises to break the obstruction gains their ear. Indeed, belatedly and suddenly aware of such discontent, the political set is apt to panic and throw itself into the arms of a saviour. Thus a loss of confident contact between the political notables and the people provides two roads to personal power. Jean Bodin has worked out these two ways with perfect clarity.¹⁵ An aspirant to the Principate might very well use both ways at once, at one moment the sword of the people, at another the shield of the *optimates*. Such was Octavius's plan: sometimes he posed as Caesar's inheritor, at others as the defender of the Senate.

II

Reviewing in 1792 the work of France's Constituent Assembly, Necker deplored that the ruling spirit in such recasting of institutions has been to present "each successive defeat of the Executive power as a victory for liberty".¹⁶ The French legislators, he said, had been eager to outdo, to outshine the English: as the English had wisely laid the foundations of liberty, in order to surpass their reputation and reap the glory of originality, something quite new had to be done: what offered itself was the complete abasement of the Executive power. "But wise men cannot fail to perceive that where the English have sought to restrain the abuses of the Executive while maintaining its activity, we clumsy legislators have struck out blindly and, to prevent the abuses of the Administration, have destroyed its power to serve." "Things having been brought to this pass, it is idle to complain that the National Assembly usurps the functions of the Executive."¹⁷ For, as he goes on to explain, public action is necessary, and if the so-called "Executive" has been incapacitated, then this action must be taken by that other power which is free to move.

¹⁵ Jean Bodin, *Les Six Livres de la République*, Paris, 1576, Book II, Chap. IV.

¹⁶ Necker, *Du Pouvoir Exécutif dans les Grands Etats*, 2 vols. 1792 (no date of publication mentioned), Vol. I, p. 343. I would like to mention that I regard as regrettable the fall into almost complete oblivion of this very interesting book by a man of great experience.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

Necker's analysis presents a remarkable parallel with those which, in America, had preceded and prepared the Convention of 1787. At first the Insurgents had also sought the belittling of the Executive, an attitude the more understandable in that the Executive Power had been, until the rising, exercised by Governors nominated in England. But very soon they discovered the serious disadvantages of such abasement, and found that the State of New York, where wide powers were left to the Governor, fared far better than the other States. It was in the light of these facts that the Presidency of the United States was constituted as we still know it today.¹⁸ It is very significant that the champions of a strong Executive have always tried to maintain, against the overwhelming evidence of history, that the word "monarchy" is applicable only in the case of hereditary rule: this was to avoid a reaction of "psychological allergy", as we now say, to the truly "monarchical" concentration of power which seemed to them to be necessary. An elective monarchy, no doubt, but one that was in fact all the stronger for being so, since the election was in practice, if not juridically, popular. On the other hand, a monarchy to which all legislative power was refused, and whose action was, by the "power of the purse", to use the forthright expression dear to the Genevan De Lolme,¹⁹ submitted to the control of Congress.

Though it differs from the Roman formula, which divided the Executive into magistratures, while conferring on them the right to *agere cum populo* and therefore a certain initiative in the matter of laws, the American system has this in common with the Roman system—they both lasted a long time and brought their Republics to leadership of the world in which they lived.

However great the power of the President of the United States may be, recent developments in the world have been such that it now appears to be the *minimum* form of the Principate, so much so that we can use it as cut-off point: the régimes of our time can be arranged according to their effective degree of personal power and divided into two classes. Where the actual power of an individual is, in his own country, greater than that of the President of the United States, we shall call it a Principate.

¹⁸ Charles C. Thach, *The Creation of the Presidency 1775-1789, a Study in Constitutional History*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1922.

¹⁹ Cf. J. L. De Lolme, *La Constitution de l'Angleterre*, Amsterdam, 1771.

The Intellectual Vogue of the Principate

Not only are Principates very numerous today but, what is more surprising, in the older democracies the tendency of political journalists or theorists seems to work in that direction. It is now a "progressive" doctrine in the United States that Congress should be "reformed", "reconstructed" so as to afford to the President a "faithful", a "reliable" majority. Some toy with the idea of suppressing "mid-term" elections (a change which would of course imply a change in the duration of mandates), many look for ways of submitting Senators and Representatives to voting discipline; in short, moving towards the abolition of the separation of powers is deemed "progressive".

It is indeed understandable that "liberals" should be annoyed by the resistance of Congress to such reasonable measures as MEDICARE, but must such annoyance lead to structural changes leading to absolute power? Again it is understandable that fear of such concentration of power should be dulled by reference to the British experience; for who would call the British government domineering and oppressive, although a disciplined parliamentary majority is available to vote any laws which the Government deems necessary? But the fact that the potentially unlimited power inherent in such arrangements is not realised in this case does not mean that this is also the case elsewhere, for example, in Ghana, where the same institutions have been set up. It seems to me that the political journalists and theorists of the old democracies should be aware that the institutions they recommend also serve as examples in quite different circumstances.

Are we to believe that the absence of constitutional precautions is dangerous in the case of "new" nations, while it is not so in the case of "experienced" ones? It is a matter for discussion, but my own opinion is that there is a danger in both cases.

Such was the feeling of the "constitutionalists" who made their views known with such force after the collapse of the "Caesarism" of Napoleon I. They never said that institutions to limit the exercise of power were necessary in Russia but not in England. According to them, "constitutional charters" were necessary everywhere. Napoleon had brilliantly demonstrated that the proclamation of the Sovereignty of the People was in itself no guarantee against *dominatio*. Indeed, the opposite can be argued. Call Sovereignty the attribute of One: we shall not then be so rash as to conceive it unlimited; but it seems safe to do so if it is

called the attribute of "We All"; but "We All" cannot exercise it; allow it then to pass into the hands of ONE: his power, reared upon the basis of popular sovereignty shall rise far above that of any king. When used to build a monarchy, the popular principle outbuilds the monarchic principle. This was carefully explained by Benjamin Constant, who had to look no further than the events of his own time.²⁰

The lessons learnt from the Napoleonic experience had then brought almost the entire world of letters to "constitutionalism", to a belief in institutions that limit personal rule. It is very strange that the experience of Hitler—and how much worse *that* was!—did not start a similar movement!

Politician in Disfavour

Let us try, however, to understand. But first let us follow Titus-Livius, who makes us witnesses of the exchanges between the Roman consul, Titus Quinctius Flaminius, and the tyrant of Sparta, Nabis.²¹ "I am called a tyrant", says Nabis, "for having freed the slaves and given land to the needy. Our institutions, it is true, are not yours. In your country, one serves in the cavalry or in the infantry according to one's income, and you wish the plebs to be dominated by the rich. Our law-giver did not wish to entrust public-affairs to the small number of men you call the Senate, nor to a dominant class in the state, but he sought a levelling of fortunes and dignities, so that the nation would find a greater number of men willing to defend it."

After this apologia, Nabis listens without interest to the Consul, who blames him for bloodshed, for not holding free assemblies in which an opposition could make itself heard, and finally enjoining him to produce, in their chains, all those whom he has had arrested, so that their families at least will know that they still live.

How much of this dialogue would have to be changed in order to place it in Guantanamo, for example? To how many contemporary instances would it not apply, representing exactly the arguments used against each other now? The intellectuals of today are

²⁰ These developments are to be found at the beginning of his famous work, *Principes de Politique applicables à tous les gouvernements représentatifs et particulièrement à la Constitution actuelle de la France*, Paris, May 1815. Moreover, in his pamphlet, *De l'Esprit de Conquête et de l'Usurpation dans leurs rapports avec la civilisation européenne* (Hanover, 1813), he had developed another connected theme: that emergent monarchies are far more vigorous than hereditary ones, which he presents as "softened by habit, surrounded by intermediary bodies that both sustain and limit it", appeased by a self-confidence "which makes power less shadowy".

²¹ Titus-Livius, Book XXXIV, sections XXXI and XXXII.

for the most part on the side of Nabis. This attitude is not as new as it might appear. Bodin writes: "Tyranny can also be that of a Prince against the nobles, as always occurs during violent changes from an Aristocracy to a Monarchy, when the Prince kills, banishes, or confiscates the possessions of the greatest; or a needy and poor Prince, who knows not where he may obtain money, often asks it of the rich, rightly or wrongly; or again, a Prince may wish to free the common people from the servitude of the noble and rich, and by so doing obtains the support of the poor. For of all tyrants, there is none less detestable than he who, attacking the rich, spares the blood of the poor".²²

If I have spoken of tyranny, it is not to identify all Principates with tyranny. This would be to employ one of those rhetorical devices, by which Louis XVI was called a "despot". But I had a perfectly valid reason for beginning with tyranny: for it represents in its strongest form the conditions, in some ways "organic", that lead to a Principate. It is a state of crisis in the relations between the ruling class and the people which leads the latter to desire a liberator, or the former to accept a saviour. Such a crisis may be described from different points of view.

The rise of Bonaparte provides a particularly interesting case. The ruling class of the *Ancien Régime* was divested of power, dispossessed, and finally guillotined without offering the least resistance. It is an incontestable historical fact (though often slurred over) that the victories won from the privileged classes after the convocation of the States General were obtained from adversaries who made no attempt at resistance: this can be seen very clearly in the notes of Arthur Young, who predicted a violent reaction on the part of the aristocracy, a reaction that never took place in any form.²³ Finding no adversary, the Revolution had no need of a leader. But some years after the Revolution, with the notables of the *Ancien Régime* quite eliminated, others had arisen in their stead, politicians who had survived the various purges, or new rich, who had bought for a song the land confiscated from the Church or the *émigrés*, who had sold supplies to the armies, creditors of the State. At present they rode high, but they did not feel safe. They were anxious to stabilise their acquired situations; and for this purpose they wished to be preserved as well from a further wave of

²² Jean Bodin, *Les Six Livres de la République*, Book II, Chap. IV, "De la Monarchie Tyrannique".

²³ Arthur Young, *Travels During the Years 1787, 1788 and 1789*, Second Edition, London, 1794, Vol. I, p. 138 *et seq.*

revolution as from any reflux. The revolution had to be stopped and consolidated. This is why the new ruling class appealed to Bonaparte. The result was entirely to their advantage. One has only to read the declarations in favour of hereditary monarchy made by the "Tribunes" in *floréal* of the year XII: it is from the mouth of the *parvenus* of the Revolution that one hears the cry for measures which "will deliver us from the dangers that must threaten to destroy and to devour the fruits of this revolution . . .".²⁴

The Change of Élites

Bonaparte consolidated the results of the Revolution. The work of Beau de Loménie²⁵ shows how those who rose with the Revolution formed a class of "lords" who reigned over French politics under the July Monarchy and over the French²⁶ economy for a century and a half. The cemetery of Père-Lachaise is a very good place to follow, from the inscriptions on the tombstones, the dynastic histories of this "new" ruling class: member of the Convention, prefect under the Empire, peer under the July Monarchy and chairman of a large company under the Third Republic.

This historical example reveals how a revolutionary upheaval destroys élites only to create others, as Pareto pointed out²⁷; the consolidation of the position of the new élites presents a problem, which can result in a strong man being called as "consolidator", but also, which is more important to our present concerns, once he has consolidated the position of the new élite, they no longer have any need for personal rule. It may be presumed that the eliminated élite was "unfunctional" and was eliminated for being so. It may also be presumed that the élite which was formed by and benefited from the revolution is the result of "natural selection", was "adapted" to the period, and capable, after a difficult transition period, of obtaining fairly lasting popular acceptance. Finally, strengthened by this popular acceptance, it could fight and defend the monarchy. This is what happened in England with the Whig aristocracy and in France with the "*grande bourgeoisie*" created by the Revolution and the Napoleonic régime.

These observations would suggest that there is Bonapartisation in periods in which one élite replaces another: when the established

²⁴ Speech by Costaz, in the session of 10 *floréal*, year 12.

²⁵ Emmanuel Beau de Loménie, *Les Dynasties Bourgeoises*, 3 vols., Paris.

²⁶ The fusion of the political and economic élites under the July monarchy is the subject of a report by A. J. Tudesq to the Table Ronde de l'Association Française de Science Politique, November 15-16, 1963.

²⁷ See especially the Introduction to his work, *Les Systèmes Socialistes*, 2 vols., Paris, 1902.

élite is strong and accepted, it prevents the concentration of power in the hands of one man. When it ceases to be strong and accepted, it sees a concentration of personal power form against it, or relinquishes power to a single protector. Rising élites, according to the circumstances, need personal power either to direct the conditions that give rise to them, to pave the way for them, or to consecrate their arrival. Once established, a new, dynamic, and fairly popular élite can dispense with personal power.

Despots, in the true sense of the term, have never allowed themselves to be surrounded by a group of men of recognised merit. They have always filled the highest posts by men whom the prejudices of the time have prevented from acquiring a great personal following (such as freed slaves, eunuchs, foreigners); often they have been clever enough to retain members of the old élite, sometimes its most vicious examples, as stalking horses. Certain of the Roman emperors used members of the senatorial nobility in this way—thus lending them an artificial survival. It is the height of despotic cleverness to keep on discredited “leaders” to prevent the appearance of men of real merit.

Of course, these ruses of the despots are ruinous in the long run, since they deny the State and Society the cadres that are really needed. It is probably by this very impoverishment of the cadres that the Roman and Ottoman Empires perished, while the French monarchy flourished for so long by favouring the rise of élites, by rewarding merit and by breaking the power of decadent and “unfunctional” aristocratic groups.²⁸ It is for having slackened in its role of “liquidator” that it perished. By allowing itself to become paralysed by ancient “unfunctional” élites, the monarchy aroused the antagonism of the people and then, by an astonishing *volte face*, became their champion, and in the end shared their fate.

Our Period as One of Changing Élites

The correlation suggested between Bonapartisation and change in élites would explain the frequency of the first phenomenon, the second being a characteristic of our time.

First, on account of the strength of the new nationalisms. A country that has lived long under colonial rule has seen its leading elements associated with the ruling Power and tends to reject one with the other. In certain ways, this has been prepared by the colonial Power itself, which has usually consolidated and

²⁸ This is the theme of Augustin Thierry in his *Du Tiers État*, Paris, 1953.

extended the power of traditional élites in order to provide itself with *cadres*. At the same time, it has formed new intellectual élites, without providing them with jobs. Nationalist emotion will be particularly strong if the struggle for independence has been hard and the old élites can be charged with "collaboration". But the same phenomena are to be seen in countries that have long been independent, as in Latin America where opinion is ranged against foreign companies that exploit the natural resources of the country and, by association, against natives who are involved with these companies.

Moreover, the landowning class is always an object of attack, since their fortunes arouse a resentment all the more justified when their large share of the national revenue is spent on consumption and on the consumption of foreign goods. The case of Japan, where the landowners, in the Meiji period, converted their income from agriculture into industrial equipment for the development of the nation, is rare.²⁹

It should be noticed that the changes in élites now taking place in a third of the world are not necessarily stable. In fact, the intellectual élites that succeed the social élites are often characterised by ability in *expression* rather than in *action*. In this case, the feeling that they discuss rather than fulfil the promises they have made—which cannot in any case be fulfilled very quickly—aids the rise of a Prince. In cases where independence has been achieved only after armed struggle, the élites forged by this struggle no doubt possess practical abilities; but either the struggle gives rise to a single leader, or the dissensions of the leaders after victory call forth a single leader to discipline the others.

The charge of élites in European countries presents aspects that are less striking but no less important.

Not only in the social field is there a shift from owners to managers,³⁰ but in the political field there is an even more pronounced change. Traditionally, the representatives of the people have been drawn from the liberal professions: men of literary or legal training, well qualified in argument. Thérémin explained enthusiastically, in 1796,³¹ that the political tendency of the French Revolution had been to transfer government to men of letters, and

²⁹ "Aspects politiques et sociaux du développement économique." *Futuribles* No. 28. *Bulletin S.E.D.E.I.S.*, April 20, 1962.

³⁰ M. M. Postan, "The Economic and Social System in 1970". *Futuribles* No. 10. *Bulletin S.E.D.E.I.S.*, September 1, 1961.

³¹ Charles Thérémin, *De la Situation Intérieure de la République*, pluviôse, year V (December 1796–January 1797).

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that this transfer, suddenly or gradual, was taking place throughout Europe. And he was right. However much Society developed into a plutocracy, it is true that in the political field it was members of the liberal professions that predominated.

The reputation of the abilities of these men is now declining. Independents in a world of large-scale industry, possessing a classical education in a period of scientific fashion, the members of the liberal professions suffer from a loss of prestige and are quite plainly being replaced in popular esteem by "scientists" and "experts".³²

But at present the injection of scientists and experts into the apparatus of government is only the work of the Executive, and by their recruitment the Executive gains in prestige over assemblies which remain in the hands of an élite that is less and less valued by popular opinion. This is a phenomenon that can be observed in the Press, where journalists show far more interest in the opinion of an expert than in that of a parliamentarian.

One may wonder if the growing prestige of scientists and experts will one day allow them to inherit the role played until now by lawyers and men of letters. It may be thought that the difference in the nature of these abilities might present an obstacle. They are not orators capable of inspiring an assembly or writers capable of persuading public opinion.

The Polysynody

Consequently this technocratic élite must make its influence felt in some other way: in the committees.

The network of inter-ministerial committees that are to be found in every modern Administration is a system of communications by means of which strong personalities in the civil service can spread their influence throughout the Administration. A civil servant in charge of a rich department, who propagates his views through a network of communications, is a "lord" of our time. His weakness is that he is confined to one place. But in practice even this is hardly so. It is with such lords that a modern Caesar in fact shares his power. Is an increasing autonomy of the civil service conceivable? Easily. Can we conceive of problems to be solved by Caesar being presented by civil servants in a way that suggests a particular answer? Even more easily. Can the civil service be said to exercise upon the head of the government a restraining and guiding influence less visible

³² Robert C. Word, "The Rise of an Apolitical Élite", in Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, *Scientists and National Policy-Making*, New York, 1964.

but possibly as efficient than that previously exercised by Parliament? It is no way inconceivable: it is still fictitious to speak of a "Senate of Civil Servants" but it could become a reality. It also seems to me to be wrong to associate the term of Caesarism and Bureaucracy as I have often seen done. Bureaucracy may be a corrective to Caesarism rather than an instrument of it.

III

I do not think anyone will deny that the tendency of our time is in the direction of the Principate. I could wish for no other proof than the welcome given to the thesis of Benjamin Akzin on "the rebirth of monarchy".³³ When I was young, the essay that appeared with this title would have been taken by all readers as an apology for personal government. In our time, not a single reader, to my knowledge, has seen in it anything but a desire to limit personal government by regularising its status. It was plain to all that the author, contrasting what had been the royal power with the power now exercised by the Prince, was concerned to confine the second within the limits of the first. He probably thought that if the concentration of power in the hands of one man was *formalised*, it would at the same time be limited; since nobody would be so foolish as to assign unlimited power to one man, such a monopoly of power could only occur if it were not formally recognised. It is certainly permissible to think that personal power gains much from the confusion created between Prince and People, whereas if the distinction is well marked, the people is far more vigilant. Keynes spoke of the "monetary veil": there is a veil in politics, too, a veil which can hide the Prince, if he can say that he is merely obeying something which is in fact only an echo of what he has himself initiated. Akzin thought that in tearing aside the veil, the grandeur of personal rule would be unmasked, and that the process so well described by De Lolme of building trenches against this rule would be facilitated. But just as it is significant that readers recognised in the thesis of Akzin an intention to restrict personal power, so it would seem unlikely that things would happen as he imagines. For in giving a crown, the peoples believe they are giving too much, while dictators see it as a means of circumscribing their power.

While Akzin's thesis deserves extensive discussion, it is here mentioned only as a symptom of a widespread belief among political writers in the progress of the Principate.

³³ *Futuribles* No. 13. *Bulletin S.E.D.E.I.S.*, October 1, 1961.

A New Constitutionalism

This calls for a new doctrine of Constitutionalism. The old doctrine, which we associate with the name of Locke, and which has served so well, has now lost its appeal almost everywhere. The crying danger is that we should be left without any Constitutionalism because the ancient one does not suit the new role of government. The old idea was that (foreign affairs set apart) good government consisted in the faithful application of sensible rules. The rules were thought of as obvious enough to be laid down by representatives elected for a single brief session. Seeing to it that the rules laid down were observed, such was the necessary but subordinate role of the government, therefore given by Locke the telling name of "Executive". This structure could suit a purely "police-man" State which had merely to provide a framework for the activities of private individuals, regarded as the sole source of movement in the social body. An illustration of the system can be offered, if we think of traffic on a given road network. The representatives of the motorists meet from time to time, and revise the rules governing the traffic. The road police enforces the rules.

But this will not do if we have to foresee the rise in volume and the shift in direction of motor traffic, taking into account the increase of wealth, the displacement of employment areas and of residential dormitories. It is then necessary to draw up a long-term programme for the reconstruction of towns and ways of communication. This is the theme of the British Buchanan Report. Who ordered such a report? A minister. Who drew it up? Experts. Who will choose, among the various "solutions" proposed, the one to be implemented? The British Cabinet. Parliament will be asked simply to vote the funds necessary to carry out the measures.

This example clearly shows how the initiative has fallen to the Executive (therefore now misnamed). And yet the example chosen concerns so individualistic an activity as motor circulation. The purpose of the government here is to let the people use the cars procured with their own means, according to their own wishes, with minimum impediment to each other. It is otherwise when the Government devises a policy concerning scientific research. Here the assumption is not that individual scientists will build with their own means their individual laboratories, and the problem is not merely how to prevent the smells from laboratories inconveniencing neighbours. Here there is a concern to increase the volume of research and to induce it into directions which are

deemed most profitable to human welfare. These are two different examples of *policies*.

It seems obvious that *policies* are becoming a major feature of modern government. As one thought of laying down laws, one now thinks of planning policies. And for the planning of such policies, it is not enough to be a sensible man, chosen as such by his neighbours. Anyone who desires to maintain as far as possible the importance of Parliament should be eager to equip deputies with all the means (experts) and procedures (sub-committees) enabling them to take some efficient part in the elaboration of policies: this has been done for the United States Congress, but, to my astonishment, nothing of the kind has been attempted in Europe (many a time did I, under the Fourth Republic, stress its desirability). I am not sufficiently informed to state whether the challenge of "policy construction" has been satisfactorily met in the American Congress, but as for Europe it seems to me that it has not even been faced, and the European Parliaments (I do not exclude the British) seem to be sinking in importance, a process which gives rise to heated denials rather than effective remedies.

If we now turn to the public servants, it is clear enough that carrying out policies is something quite different from attending to the execution of laws. It is a matter of conducting operations with a given goal, taking the initiatives and decisions which seem necessary, adjusting measures to circumstances. The men who are in charge of such policies are somewhat like field commanders. From this it follows that such public servants are important magistrates, while they are not mere executors of parliamentary laws, neither are they mere subordinates of the Prince. The very volume of the functions assumed by the Executive makes it impossible for the Head Executive to control them. He must let policy operators forge ahead. This leads to an actual division of executive magistracies, those effectively holding important magistracies more often than not being civil servants rather than ministers. While the Prince obviously has a decisive say-so the nature of things seldom allows it to be more than an instruction to slow down or speed up a policy or deflect it somewhat.

At the height of absolute monarchy the King would say, through his chancellors: "The fundamental laws of our kingdom put us in a condition of fortunate powerlessness to . . .". This expression, which has always fascinated me,³⁴ has its modern

³⁴ I have spoken of this in *De la Souveraineté*, Paris, 1955, Part III, Chap. III.

equivalent, or may have it. The fundamental laws above mentioned were not laws as we understand them but agreed principles, and our long-term policies are in fact future obligations that can seem no less fortunate. I am far from believing that "policies" can replace principles, and I should like to see the Prince bound by principles before being bound by policies: but I can see that the power of the first is in decline and therefore I vest my hopes in the second.

State Power and Personal Power

Already in 1835 Tocqueville was writing: "Everything seems to combine to increase indefinitely the prerogatives of the central government".³⁵ Yet this was at a time when the doctrine of complete economic liberty was at its height, McCulloch *regnante*. Tocqueville invited the reader to observe "that, during the half-century that has just passed, centralisation has grown everywhere in hundreds of different ways". That this process of centralisation was not foreseen by Locke, one can well understand, but that it was not perceived by the constitutionalists of the French Restoration is more surprising. In fact, if they were not unaware of it, they believed it to be connected either with circumstances, great wars, or with monarchy, especially of course in its Napoleonic form. Tocqueville, on the contrary, found that the phenomenon had, among other reasons, "a single great cause . . . this cause is the development of industry". He anticipates in an amazing way, by saying of the State: "It is not only the greatest industrialist, it tends more and more to make itself the leader or rather the master of all the others". But at the same time the position of the monarch is weakened: the State becomes stronger, its head becomes weaker: this is illogical, "and I do not doubt that at the end of all these throne-shaking disturbances, sovereigns will be found to be more powerful than they were before".

More powerful than ever before—that is easy to understand. To recover no more than the same degree of monarchisation of State power as existed before means a much greater power of the monarch over Society, if, in the meantime, the power of the State over Society has much increased. This, if I may be allowed to recall it, was the central idea of a work³⁶ which has often been

³⁵ This and the following quotations from Tocqueville are taken from *De la Démocratie en Amérique*, Part IV, Chap. V.

³⁶ B. de Jouvenel, *Du Pouvoir, Histoire Naturelle de sa Croissance*, Geneva, 1945. Published in Britain and the United States under the title *On Power*.

interpreted as a single denunciation of the increase in the power of the State, whereas its essential purpose was to warn that, in proportion to this increase, the seizure and control of the State power by a single will present greater dangers. This "single" will can never, of course, be the will of all (which is not single and which has, in the singular, only a mythical existence).

Supposing that our predecessors, liberal political thinkers like Benjamin Constant, Simonde de Sismondi, and Alexis de Tocqueville, found themselves thrown into present circumstances. Anxious above all to combat *dominatio*, they might take up two very different positions. The first would consist of combating to the utmost the extension of State power, which they would see as a means of domination: this attitude would lead them to defend in principle all forms of private power, whatever it may be, not for itself, but as something different, and consequently as a refuge. Whatever the vices of "the other Power" it has the virtue of being "other". Consider Grotius who, however much he preferred in principle the institutions of the United Provinces to those of the French monarchy, was happy to find a refuge in the latter when he escaped from his imprisonment in the United Provinces. Of the powers whose increase we applaud, hopeful of their beneficent use, we can never be assured that they shall not fall in the hands of persecutors: and when such evil days are upon us, any realm to which these powers do not stretch becomes to us a haven: it is the foreign Power then which appears as a protector, indirectly, only because your own country's policemen must stop at its frontiers.^{36a} Similarly, it is a useful precaution to maintain in your country realms which are secured from the possible frenzies of public authority. If, according to a presently ruling political mania, you are unfit for public employment, as "a security risk", or on any other grounds, it is a good thing that there are other employers who are in a position to take independent action. No less a person than Trotsky made this point. It is on such grounds

^{36a} This is why—and not for reasons of nationalism—the idea of a world government seems to me appalling. Its supporters, moved by the most praiseworthy intentions, seem unconscious of the risk. They sacrifice the ultimate recourse which the diversity of States affords us against tyranny. How precious seems the low wall of a foreign frontier that lets through the refugee and stops the pursuer! So many of us have had this experience that surely we should draw conclusions from it. Before speaking in favour of a world government which would admit no such walls, one should imagine Hitler's or Stalin's régime spread upon the planet. But a world government, you may say, could not take on such a character. Are you sure, I mean absolutely sure that there is no possibility of this ever happening? For it needs no more than a slight possibility of so great an evil to weight towards a negative value the "mathematical expectation" of World Government, and to make a choice in its favour an insane bet.

that there being besides the Public Power other powers which are independent, whatever they may be, is of great value.

The second attitude that our liberal thinkers could adopt would be to accept the ever-growing role of the State, but to organise it in such a way that the apparatus developed to provide social needs could not become an instrument of domination in the service of a single will, either of a man or a group. So many desirable things seem possible in our time only by State action that a limitation on this action would also limit their realisation. It is understandable that the great majority of intellectuals should be in favour of an extension of State power. But what is surprising is that they make no mention of the precautions necessary to prevent the oppressive use of this extended power. It is only in specific cases that the problem is seen to exist at all. Thus it is permissible to think that the educative possibilities of radio and television would be better served by making it a public service. But it is obvious that it also provides the government with a powerful instrument for propagating its policies. In this case, it is seen to be necessary to organise a public service in such a way that its employees are not used as servants of the government.

The greater the State machine and the more completely it penetrates Society, the more important it is that it should not become an instrument of domination for whoever happens to have got into the central control cabin. It is not an easy problem. The most immediate solution is the autonomy of the public organs. But it must be recognised that popular feeling works against it and quite understandably. It is a plain fact that whenever a service becomes "public", thereby it escapes the direct, day-to-day pressure of the public. It is not the motto of public services that "the customer is always right". Conscious of a moral superiority in working for the nation, and not for profit, executives high and low, earnestly concerned to provide the best possible service, are also convinced that the ignorant customers are the worst possible judges of performance, and are seldom prone to recognise as an obligation this responsiveness to current complaints or demands which is a necessity in the case of a private service. Therefore members of the public usually lodge their complaints with parliamentarians; if these become ineffective, the public turns to the Head of the Administration and set him up in their minds as a sort of overall "Tribune of the People" against the bureaucratic system. Thus popular protests against "bureaucracy" tend constantly to strengthen the power of the Prince over the State

machine, which is the very thing we were trying to avoid. It could hardly be otherwise unless the public (in the concrete) found in public bodies the same immediate sensitivity to its demands that "private" bodies, without the benefit of "royal" prerogative, are subject to. We find within the State the same situation we have been discussing. The growth of the State creates a class of administrative "Notables". In order to resist personal rule, they must themselves have built up a basis of goodwill with the general public. It is certain that the prestige of the great civil servants in France²⁷ is a factor in the limitation of personal rule: for they constitute a body of accepted "Notables" that can temper a personal rule that the body of political notables who had lost their following²⁸ are unable to prevent.

The Basis of a New Constitutionalism

The more Society is dominated by the State, the less it is possible for the State to remain monolithic. It must acquire the natural complexity of what it absorbs. But traditional "Constitutionalism" no longer meets the needs of the present situation.

The great liberal thinkers wished to reduce the role of the State to that of a general supervisor. The rules governing the actions of individuals were laid down by a legislating assembly: the servants of the State (the Executive) were inspectors who supervised the application of those rules. But the State has completely changed its character: it is now a general employer.

A reconstruction of the State in alignment with its new role will logically follow. The less one thinks about this reconstruction, the more dangerous its absence becomes. The term *lettre de cachet* has remained synonymous with arbitrary role: yet it was nothing more than a personal letter from the King, giving orders that did not pass through the normal channels, just as evocation was the withdrawal of a case from the normal juridical process. Practices of this kind are not necessarily mere caprices: they could be symptomatic of a lack of adaptation of the regular system to the needs of the time. But it would be preferable to reorganise the State system than to have a duality of heavy routine and sudden decisions. There is a strong tendency to such a duality in the old States of today: the dynamism of the Prince compensates for the

²⁷ Bernard Gournay, *Les Grands Fonctionnaires*, Table Ronde de l'Association de Science Politique, November 15-16, 1963.

²⁸ Leo Hamon, *La Latitude d'Action des Catégories Dirigeantes: Réalités et Limites* (Table Ronde, etc.).

inertia of the departments. As to the political danger, it is manifestly untrue that personal omnipotence is less dangerous when armed with a popular mandate; on the contrary, it provides greater latitude. It is also untrue that an organisation as cumbersome and complex as that of the modern State can be well directed by the "boss": we have only to refer to the experience of the great industrial corporations (and how much smaller and simpler they are than the modern State!).

Organisation, Decision, Information

It is no doubt because the State is surrounded by mystery that one does not apply to its structure the remedial reflection that has already been applied with profit to the structure of organisations in general: but we are coming to it.³⁹

If the problem of organisation were clearly posed, taking into account the objectives recorded to the State and the "products" which are expected of it, a re-division of the powers of decision would result. It is the weakness of political theory that rights of decision are attributed *en masse* to subjects who cannot exercise them in practice. It is the starting-point of a practical theory that a union of "All" can take only very few decisions, and these must be reduced to a simple, pre-arranged (yet how important and influential!) alternative, while on the other hand "One" is quite unable to take all decisions. It follows, therefore, that there must be a re-division of decisions.⁴⁰

In fact, the notion of Decision allows us to give a wider meaning to the concept of Constitution. For the effective constitution of a nation (constitution without a capital "C") can mean the total structure of the powers of decision, both private and public. First, there are the decisions that individuals take for themselves and which involve only their own means: to protect the area of these decisions was the purpose of the classical Declarations of the Rights of Man, which assuredly have not lost their relevance. Above this area, there are decisions which involve collective means, either private or public. It is important to recognise explicitly that decisions involving collective means are but rarely a matter for

³⁹ Cf. C. J. Friedrich, "Organization Theory and Political Style", in *Public Policy*, Vol. X, Harvard, 1960; Herbert Kaufmann, "Organization Theory and Political Theory", in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVIII, March 1964; there are numerous other references that could be given.

⁴⁰ Cf. Jacob Marshak, *Efficient and Viable Organisational Forms and Theory of an Efficient Several-Person Firm*, Cowles Foundation Paper No. 150, Yale University, New-Haven, 1960.

"collective decision": fictions here conceal reality and dissipate responsibility. Almost all so-called "collective" decisions are in fact, and must be, taken separately by a small number of individuals, who are not the same for all. This must be admitted, if we are to be lucid, and we must determine whether the effective decision-makers are the best informed, and what results accrue from exposing them to the limitations of reality, including the material day-to-day pressure of the public.

Non-Authoritarian Planning

For me, the great merits of the French system of planning are first of all political. It recognises, in the economic field, a wide variety of effective decision-makers, from the Governor of the Banque de France to trade union leaders, including the heads of public and private industry. There is no question of ordering all these "officers of Society" to obey an authoritarian plan, even less of replacing all these autonomous officers by docile agents of the central authority. But they have all been presented with a vision of a possible future, reasonable and attractive enough for each one to make it his own, and to apply his own particular authority to its realisation. Pierre Massé has been concerned to impart to such a common vision a longer range than the four or five years of a Plan, and a wider extent than that of quantitative growth.⁴¹ Some of us would like to see a "Surmising Forum" where the possibilities and hazards of the future would be continuously discussed.⁴² The fundamental idea, of course, is to expel as far as possible the need for command, thanks to the increasingly far-seeing co-operation of free agents. It is unfortunately all too obvious that one must take into account what Cournot⁴³ called "the impassioned movements of the human heart". However, in certain conditions, these impassioned movements can no doubt be arrested at source. Three conditions come to mind immediately. First, that in all fields a sufficiently rapid renewal of the effective decision-makers should prevent, on the one hand, a loss of dynamism in the system and, on the other, an accumulation of young, inadequately placed talent.⁴⁴

⁴¹ It is for this purpose that he established the "1985 Group" of the Plan.

⁴² This is a main theme of our FUTURIBLES venture.

⁴³ Notice the remarkable contrast he makes between the rationality that can be imported into the social economy and the resorts to passion that occur in politics. *Traité de l'Enchaînement des Idées Fondamentales dans les Sciences et dans l'Histoire*, §§ 459 and 460, p. 525 of the edition of 1911.

⁴⁴ There are very interesting ideas on this subject in the book by Michael Young, *The Rise of the Meritocracy*, London, 1958.

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Second, that all neglected or adversely affected interests should be able to make themselves heard, which presupposes great concrete progress in Representation. Third, that the judiciary be placed on an equally honourable footing with the other powers to protect the weaker members of the community not only against arbitrary decisions but also against certain shocks inevitable in a dynamic Administration.

Returning to the second point, I would note that one of the greatest causes of the decline of the European Parliaments is the loss of their representative function. Even in England the parliamentary majority in the Commons is no more than the tail of a comet of which the Cabinet is the head. Now that parliamentary elections are substantially the election of a Government, it is this Government, springing from a popular election, that represents the nation, and those members of the victorious party who do not get seats in the Government are no more than its pale and passive aspect, the reflection of the representation of the Nation which in its active aspect is formed by the Government. If the representatives are to have a function to equal that of the Government, it must be a different one. Against the Government, that represents the Nation in its entirety, the assembly must represent the Nation in its diversity, in its constitutive parts, either in terms of region or socio-professional group. Each of its members should make himself the advocate for the cause of some social group (not forgetting either the young or, more important, the old, who are becoming the submerged class of our dynamic society).

The great weakness of the representative political system today is that everyone claims to speak in the name of all. This is all very well during elections, but once the majority has chosen the team which will have the right to act in the name of all, the voices henceforth useful are those raised in the name of discrete parts of the public. The chosen rulers must not think in terms of fifty million times "the average Frenchman" (or Briton, etc.), but in terms of a great diversity of people. Serving "the people" means in fact serving many kinds of people, and for this, you must know how each kind is faring. And it is a representation so broken down according to discrete sections, which provides this information. Each group must have its speaker: such seems to me the mode of representation towards which we are moving. This is to be seen in the case of discussions on a "national incomes policy". The "representatives" are not the "elected of the People", but the spokesmen of particular groups. And it should be noted that

the growing complexity of Society can only multiply these particular groups. Those with whom one must "parley" constitute the parliamentary reality.

I shall say no more, as neo-constitutionalism is not my present subject. This theme has appeared in a discussion of the Principate only because the Principate itself seemed to me to be a permanent possibility in any political system, which occurs whenever a fault in the system provides it with an opportunity.

Personal Power and the Personalisation of Power

It is an incontrovertible fact that countries have returned to the practice of being represented by a single man. The practitioners of politics are well aware of this: look, for example, at the strong criticism that rose within the British Conservative Party against the nomination of Sir Alec Douglas-Home as Mr. Macmillan's successor. What was the nature of these criticisms? It was felt that the personality of the new Conservative leader was insufficiently attractive to the general public. The term "attractive" is particularly apt here, as it is on the whole a question of attracting interest, sympathy . . . and votes. The victory of the party is therefore regarded as dependent to a considerable extent on the personal popularity of the man at its head, a man whose "image", to use the language of advertising, plays a leading part. Some years before the same question was asked within the Labour Party: all those who knew Hugh Gaitskell have retained the memory of a man who combined the highest qualities of heart and mind, of a sensitive and noble character: but was this exceptional personality also the most apt to make an impact on the electorate? It was complained that he was not, and a most interesting inquiry⁴⁵ revealed that the electorate votes for "the man", that is, "the image".

In France, there was an explicit recognition of this tendency of the electorate after the defeat in 1962 of the *Cartel des Non*. The *Cartel des Non* was a coalition of the politicians of the Fourth Republic against a new advance of personal power. The lesson of the defeat has been learnt: the young elements of the opposition started to look for "a man" who would have the necessary qualities to become accepted by the electorate: this way of thinking could not be better revealed than in the process adopted, which consisted of describing first a "Monsieur X" and only naming him afterwards.

⁴⁵ Mark Abrams, *Must Labour Lose?* London, 1960.

The singling out of one man as the nation's guide, or as his "challenger" is a characteristic of our time. It has been explained in terms of television and the other mass media: but, at bottom, all that can be said is that these media give form to what is a deep tendency in society. It is probable that power has always been conceived as personalised. But in the great days of the French Third Republic, the person who embodied the idea of power was the deputy, who was to be seen in the market place, to whom one addressed a multitude of requests, and the power that he was supposed to possess in Paris increased his local credit, which in turn provided him with a real basis of power for the political intrigues of the capital. It is true that the decline in the local activity and standing of the deputy, together with the establishment by newspapers and television of the image of the national leader have enormously aided the transfer of attention and popularity from the deputy (and consequently from Parliament) to the national guide. But it must be repeated that this concentration of interest on a single leader has been too frequent an historical occurrence for it to be useful to seek particular causes, and the ones worthy of study are rather those which in certain times and places have presented an obstacle to this phenomenon.

But as Georges Vedel has very rightly remarked, the personalisation of public power does not necessarily involve the grandeur of personal power. Thus the monarchy of the Ancien Régime presented a complete personalisation of the State and yet the degree of personal power was very low.⁴⁶

It is easy, therefore, to sympathise with the position taken by Akzin. If I rightly understand it, he accepts the personalisation of power, which answers a psychological need, and is concerned to limit the effective concentration of power in one hand. Such limitation can be obtained if, and only if, the public gives to others than the Prince other forms of confidence and allegiance. Speaking of others, obviously I do not mean this or that other who would in turn be Prince, but others who would not be Prince, who play and are content to play different roles, and who, being trusted in these roles, thereby constitute a limiting environment.

But let us examine this problem: What does the public want in our day? Movement. Therefore the people who are looked

⁴⁶ It is telling that Louis XIV regarded conscription, which would have been so well in line with his endless war-making, as an institution he was powerless to establish. And here we are dealing with a king who carried monarchic power to inordinate lengths: calling them inordinate I refer not to our present-day standards but to those of royalist tradition and doctrine.

up to, who enjoy public credit, are those who contribute to movement, not to conservation. If then the "others" whom we would want to use as limitators of princely power become identified with conservation, all their attempts at resistance will do nothing but swell the popularity of the Prince, promoter of movement. If we wish to limit his role, we must turn the tables: the "others" must appear as the bearers of movement. The Prince then would no longer be the leader who initiates movement, but he, who, in the midst of movement provided by others, appeases anxieties, stabilises, reassures, is in one word the Guarantor.

Countervailing Power

Is such an evolution feasible? What makes it seem improbable is that we naturally see the "others" here mentioned in the form of those "notables" who have been and are losing ground: capitalists whose power is sapped by the progress of public authority, parliamentarians whose role is dwindling. The "others" I have in mind are neither survivors or ghosts but newcomers, among them the very companions of the Prince, the *parvenus* of the princely régime, eager to consolidate in their hands that portion of power which he has entrusted to them. Many countries which show us an extreme of princely power also show us the promoted companions making ready to defend their acquired positions against any inroad by the Prince's successor. And if they are capable men, if they have built up their own credit with the general public and especially with the members of the agency which they head, then their position may be secured against the successor Prince. There is more than one side to Napoleon's famous statement: "Nobody has cause to overthrow a régime where every talent is properly placed". True it is that such right placing of merit, in a sense justifies the Prince who has seen to it, but also it imparts a natural stability to such a "right" structure and therefore limits the ability of the successor Prince to alter it at his whim. The various strongholds have been entrusted to the men capable of holding them: hold them they shall even against the master who wants to take them back.

If this were my subject, I would be moved to discuss the subtle relationship which obtains between "ancient" holders of independent power, and the trend towards the autonomisation of powers received as subordinate and dependent: while the newcomers are far the more capable of holding the power entrusted to them, they are

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fortified in their will to do so by the idea of independent power of which some remnant of ancient holders are the bearers.

Illustrations of the phenomena which I am so roughly sketching will come to every mind. The very simplest illustration is, of course, offered by what happens when "the public sector" of the economy is greatly enlarged: so vast a "Crown domain" naturally breaks up into largely autonomous "duchies". Those "dukes" which so perform as to satisfy their own following and the general public are therefore well able to promote the autonomy of their realm.

All this pushing and elbowing in high places is of itself an unattractive subject. If it fully deserves our interest, it is because of its relevance to our individual liberty. This liberty is as precarious as it is precious. We cannot safely entrust it to any hands. And therefore, as it seems to me, we misread our interest if we give any constant backing to any one contendat. If the "barons" are too well entrenched we need the princely threat to shake them, and we should support the "barons" when the Prince flourishes.

RADICALISM AFTER 1964

T. E. M. McKITTERICK

THE recent election was decided, as British elections usually are, by a fairly small number of voters who knew better what they wanted to vote against than what they wanted to vote for. The movement against the Conservatives was not reflected in a corresponding movement towards Labour but was expressed partly in a lower total poll, partly in a big increase in Liberal voters. As a result, Labour obtained a narrow overall majority in the Commons on a minority of votes in the country (which is not unusual; it has happened with every government since the war), and 156 Conservative and 70 Labour members were elected although in their constituencies there were more votes cast against them than for them. The Liberals, with 11 per cent. of the votes, got nine seats. At first sight, this disparity appears to make a strong case for proportional representation; the case would have been stronger still had the Liberals contested all seats instead of only 365, which would have increased their total vote though it probably would not have gained them a single extra place in Parliament.

The statistics will be analysed and re-analysed in the months to come, and many conclusions will be drawn from them. They are not, however, the only reason—and perhaps not even the main one—why it is worth having a close look at the British political scene and asking whether it is really as democratic as we like to think it is.

Statistics apart, the electors in October 1964 had very little real choice. In terms of government-forming capacity, that choice was between two political agglomerations in whose composition the electorate has had practically no say and whose policies were prescribed as much by a calculation of a balance of interests inside each party as on an interpretation of what the electorate was likely to want. The only other alternatives were to stay away from the polls, or to vote for a party which had no hope at all of becoming the government and little enough of influencing it. Something like a quarter of those able to vote did, in fact, opt for one or other of these negative alternatives. One does not know the composition of the non-voters, who must in any case include a proportion who are just lazy or stupid. But one may say fairly safely that there were few who refused to vote for Labour because it was not left

enough or for the Conservatives because they were not right enough; the great majority of deliberate non-voters were, one may assume, somewhere in the middle. To them, as to the 3,000,000 who voted Liberal and (omitting the Communists) the 300,000 who voted for "others" ranging from Plaid Cymru to the Irish Republicans, Social Credit and the Independent Loyalists, neither the Labour Party nor the Conservative Party was acceptable.

British politics have, since the time of Queen Anne, been dominated by two parties for much longer than by three. But the characteristic of the last five elections—not including the exceptional circumstances of 1945—is that the two dominant parties have greatly tightened their grip on the political system and made the electorate's choice narrower still. Elections are now fantastically expensive, and only an organised party machine can foot the bill. Between the two big parties there is, in addition, a sort of compact designed to keep out intruders into the parliamentary arena, expressed most clearly in the inter-party agreements on the allocation of television and radio time. Commanding the funds, the organisation and the means of publicity, they have become immensely powerful bodies in a way that the parties of Disraeli and Gladstone were not. Third parties—even the Liberals—exist by their grace or not at all; the lesser challengers, the regional and specialised groups, the constructive independents—of whom a few, like Daniel Lipson or Edgar Granville, managed to get elected as late as 1945—are excluded altogether from the environs of power. The Labour Party especially should remember that had there been a similar stranglehold by the big parties fifty or sixty years ago, it would itself have been denied the chance to grow.

Self-perpetuating Oligarchies

This might not be very serious if the parties themselves were flexible in structure and responsive in a wider sense than they are to public influence. But in fact both the Labour and Conservative Parties are to a large extent self-perpetuating oligarchies of a complex type, in which the real location of power is not determined by their theoretical constitutions. Both are collections of interest-groups and are by no means monolithic, but this does not save them from a rigidity which may serve their parliamentary purposes reasonably well, but can only be harmful to the freedom of choice of the electorate.

It is often said that the British political system is drawing steadily closer to the American, which also rests on two exclusive

political parties; the Prime Minister is becoming more and more like an American President, a personality who controls rather than shares his responsibility, and who is projected at elections as an individual whom the party exists to support. That this is a misunderstanding of the American system is not relevant for the moment. The comparison is also untrue. Superficially there are many resemblances between the British and American parties, especially in the sense that both pairs overlap over large areas of political thought and action. But the American parties are vastly more flexible than the British, and vastly more diverse. They are more responsive to local and sectional interests. Their methods of selecting candidates for office, and ultimately their leaders, are different—and in some respects preferable. They do not suffer from the abuses of the whip system which, allied to the more powerful sanctions against dissidents, has done so much to concentrate the structure of the British parties.

Of the two effective alternatives in Britain, the Conservatives are controlled by the narrower oligarchy, though they are rather less rigid in practice; they have adapted themselves remarkably well to changes in the economic and social climate, and usually succeed in keeping their sillier reactionaries in the background. Power inside the party owes little to its public organs, the constituency associations, and (contrary to the belief of many anti-conservatives) less still to the large subscribers to party funds. Authority descends from the leader, whose powers of appointment and patronage are far greater than those of the leader of the Labour Party. The leader himself gets there by a peculiar and still (in spite of Mr. Randolph Churchill) largely secret method of calculating the influence of various groups and of balancing conflicts of interest between people of whom many, in turn, owe their influence to having been appointed by previous leaders. The system works at least in the sense that it preserves continuity without preventing adaptability in policy. Only occasionally do the Conservatives lose elections, and even then they recover pretty quickly.

The Labour Party consists not of one oligarchy but of three: the trade unions, the constituency parties, and the intellectuals who manage to emerge from one of the other two even though they are out of sympathy with them. Out of these three disparate elements it has to synthesise a working super-oligarchy. Because its internal conflicts are less easily resolved, it is less stable than the Conservatives, more prone to fission, less able to recover after

defeat, less adaptable in policy. Its constitutional practices are more precise and the diffusion of responsibility is greater. The leader is chosen, in fact as well as in theory, by the parliamentary party. The party organisation is governed by the extra-parliamentary National Executive Committee, a body with much greater authority than any single constitutional organism of the Conservative Party, but one which is chosen in such a way as to make for minimum efficiency. The constituency parties, which themselves form local oligarchies, have a substantial say in selecting who goes to Westminster, and so indirectly in the choice of the leader and the parliamentary oligarchy, and can also cause both the National Executive and the parliamentary leadership considerable embarrassment at the annual conference, whose precise powers under the constitution have never been fully settled.

Party Discipline

But although the methods of acquiring authority differ, the results are very much the same. In Parliament the discipline is strict, especially when the government majority is small. It is true that in the last Parliament there was room in the Labour Party for Mr. Woodrow Wyatt and Mr. Fenner Brockway, and on the Conservative benches for Mr. Enoch Powell and Mr. Julian Critchley, which would suggest that both permitted a pretty wide spectrum of political ideas. But had any one of these four, or of the others who held, and sometimes expressed, dangerous views, consistently pressed them to the point of voting against the party whip, he would have been out. Out, that is, in the sense that at the next election he would have been refused endorsement as a party candidate and would have been opposed by an official nominee. He would have been like any other independent, left to foot the bill for the election himself, unable to claim benefit of the national publicity of the party, as effectively in the political wilderness as Dr. Donald Johnson at Carlisle, the outgoing member who last October collected less than 3 per cent. of the vote. This awful fate is a powerful incentive to conformity.

It is also in sharp contrast to the American practice. Shortly before the American election Mr. Johnson pointed out that, during Mr. Eisenhower's presidency, he had supported the President in something like 90 per cent. of the votes on foreign policy, while Senator Goldwater had been in opposition on 76 per cent. of the occasions. Doubtless the same would not have been true of votes on home issues, but even there it is common for senators and

representatives to go against their party and still survive. This is made easier by the fact that the Administration does not have to, and indeed cannot, resign if defeated even on a major issue. It will run its full term in any case, and it will then be up to the electorate to put it back or kick it out on the basis of its whole record, not of a single success or failure.

The rigid discipline of the parties in the British Parliament puts enormous power into the hands of the party oligarchies, but this is not the main objection to it. What is much more serious is its effect on the choice of the electors. They must vote for all or nothing. If they want, as many did last October, Labour's policy on economic expansion, the social services and education, they must willy-nilly accept the nationalisation of steel, even though this may have been included in the programme mainly to satisfy the intransigents in that unrepresentative group, the constituency parties. Few Labour candidates dared to say they were against it, no Labour member dare vote against it. Yet the choice left to the electors was between accepting a programme which included it, which some of them did not want, and voting against a lot of things they did want. All democratic choice involves this sort of thing to some extent, but good democracy reduces that extent as far as possible.

In other words, it would increase the freedom of choice if the parties were to relax their discipline even to a point where a government might now and then be defeated in Parliament and still not be obliged to resign. That is theoretically possible on minor issues. There is no reason why it should not be possible on issues as big as steel nationalisation. It would be a sound reform if parliamentary practice could be so modified that resignation need only follow defeat on a vote of confidence on broad policy, not on any single issue. (It is in fact forty years since a government did resign as a result of a defeat in the House. But it is only thirteen years since we saw the undignified lengths a government had to go to to prevent it happening again—and in this Parliament the majority is even smaller.) Then, at least, the electorate would know it was voting for or against a form of approach to politics rather than a rigid set of programme points, and the evidence of October 1964 is that that is what it wants.

Non-rigid Radicalism

The result of the last election suggests that the country was prepared to vote for radical policies, but not specifically for the

Labour programme. Over 56 per cent. of those who voted voted against the outgoing government. If there had been a system of proportional representation reflecting exactly the ratios of votes cast, the new Parliament would have contained 276 Labour members, 276 Conservatives, 70 Liberals and 8 "others". This would have been pretty unsatisfactory; the country did not vote to put the real power in the hands of a minority. But it is probably true that, had the electorate had the chance to vote for a flexible radical grouping instead of rigid parties, there would have been a clear majority against the Conservatives.

This is the basis for the case, so far made chiefly by Mr. Woodrow Wyatt and Mr. Desmond Donnelly, for an agreement between the Labour and Liberal parties which would enable them to co-ordinate action in the present Parliament and go forward to the next election with a pact under which, in a certain number of seats, they would not oppose each other. According to Mr. Wyatt (who advocated such a pact before the last election) something similar would have gained Labour 25 seats and the Liberals several had it been in force in 1964. The proposal has been ignored by official Labour and treated disdainfully by the Liberals, but it deserves more attention than that.

It is, in the first place, not absolutely certain that Mr. Wyatt's calculation of the effect of his proposal is right; there is no means of proving it. Liberal voters comprise people of very varied outlook, including fairly certainly quite a lot who, while unwilling to vote Conservative, would do so rather than support a party allied with Labour. Among such are some traditionalist Liberals in the "Celtic fringe" and some of the near-poujadists who supported Mr. Lubbock at Orpington and helped to put the Liberals into second place in several Home Counties constituencies; among them, too, are those who voted Liberal in Huddersfield and Bolton in 1959 under the pact with the Conservatives but defected in 1964. On the other hand, the voters at Orpington and elsewhere included many who are genuinely radical but do not want to go the whole way with Labour—and here there ought to be some sort of significance in the disparity referred to above between Conservative and Labour seats held on minority votes. The danger is that both categories may contain a good few who simply like voting against the government, and whose support could not be relied upon after a period of Labour rule.

Nonetheless, there is clearly much truth in Mr. Wyatt's claim that a Labour-Liberal pact would have strengthened both parties.

It would also have given more effective representation to the three million Liberal voters. The alternative method would appear to be one form or other of proportional representation, but it is hard to see how that could in 1964 have resulted in anything but a position where the Liberals would have been left holding the balance and so with much greater power than their vote would have entitled them to, while one of the other two held the responsibility.

If the radical trend is to be satisfied, and the large minority vote to be made fully effective, something other than a mathematical formula is required, and Mr. Wyatt's proposal is a move in the right direction, even though there is little chance of its being adopted officially by either party in the near future. It would mean that Labour would drop from its programme one or two points which offend non-socialist radicals, such as the nationalisation of steel; in return, the Liberals would give the government general support. A loose arrangement on these lines might be preferable to a formal coalition with Liberals sitting in the Cabinet. An electoral pact might, it has been objected, be the kiss of death for the Liberal Party, which would go forward to the next election without any clear identity, and would lose its own right wing. But a pact would be less likely to have this result than a coalition in which the Liberals would be junior partners but with full responsibility. Had there been a pact in force in 1964, Liberal representation in Parliament would be greater than it is, and if the right wing of the party had been shed that would have been no great loss. The Labour Party would presumably lose some of its left wing as well, but that would be pure gain. If ultimately the dividing line between radical Liberals and moderate Labour were to become blurred, it would be all to the good.

With the sole exception of the nationalisation of steel, every measure announced by the new Labour Government in its opening days was acceptable to any genuine radical; even the controversial plan for a Land Commission implied a difference of opinion on means rather than on ends. It would be a major political tragedy if this programme and the thinking behind it were to be lost because the radicals cannot find a method of organising their interests in common. The only result could then be a frustrated swing back to conservatism at the next election and a return to the stagnation of the last thirteen years.

THE POLITICS OF EXAMINATIONS

K. W. WATKINS

THE first months of a new Labour Administration, which is firmly committed to both the expansion and the democratisation of education, would seem to be a good time at which to take stock of the role which examinations now play, and are likely to play, in our society. Since it is no exaggeration to say that the area of controversy extends from the heat of public debate over the 11+ to the more esoteric discussions about post-graduate qualifications, it is probably best to start by considering five characteristics that are common to examinations in general before proceeding to an analysis of a specific case—the C.S.E. (the Certificate of Secondary Education).

The Role of Examinations

The first and obvious role of examinations is as educational tools. In this connection there are two fairly well-defined schools of thought. One, whilst admitting their self-evident limitations, believes that they provide, at the least, a reasonably good test of ability and achievement, and at the same time serve, in the majority of instances, as useful incentives. The other school of thought sees them as distorting the true purpose of education, causing psychological damage and as being, even within their own terms of reference, the most imperfect of instruments. It is tempting to interpolate that on many occasions the adherents of the latter view might do well to concentrate more of their fire on the inadequacies of the pre-examination teaching rather than on the examinations themselves.

The second characteristic of examinations is their role as a factor of social mobility. In certain fields, technology is possibly an outstanding example, where a certain level of qualification, as determined by passing an examination, is the only real guarantee of the likelihood of being able to do a job satisfactorily, the "piece of paper" brushes aside any handicaps of birth and background that might otherwise come into play.

Their third and opposite role is as a factor of social rigidity. This extends far beyond the customary arguments about the 11+

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and comprehensive secondary education. There remain the cases where entry to training for a particular profession or occupation is dependent, irrespective of all-round ability, on having passed an examination in some particular subject such as Latin. Similarly, exclusion and limitation of numbers can be achieved if, as a matter of policy, a ceiling is placed on the number of candidates who, again irrespective of ability, are, within narrow limits, allowed to pass a specific professional examination on each occasion. Another variation is when organisations with a professional or allegedly professional status decide, at a given moment in their history, to introduce examinations which will be compulsory for those seeking to enter their ranks after a particular date. Here it is necessary to distinguish between the genuine and the false. The former is where entry by examination is a true reflection of the importance and growth of the field. The latter is where the technique of exclusion by examination is used to achieve "window-dressing status" and to conceal lack of any real substance. There remain far too many instances where an impressive string of "letters" masks an almost pitifully low level of training and knowledge.

The status conferred by examinations is not enjoyed solely by those who pass them. Much accrues to those who teach for them. It is here that the fourth characteristic emerges. At different levels in the educational system this status can develop into a very real pattern of vested interests which find their material expression in higher salaries, enhanced prestige, and better promotion prospects. In many discussions this feature is entirely ignored or overlooked.

The fifth characteristic is their essentially political role. It can be argued that any examination can be confronted with the fundamental questions: "Who is educated, by whom and for what purpose?". According to the relatively objective answers that can be obtained, each examination will receive more or less acceptance according to the political standpoint of the questioner and his view of the good society.

These characteristics can serve as invaluable yardsticks when one is attempting to assess contemporary controversy and development. This is particularly so when it comes to the "politics" of the new Certificate of Secondary Education (C.S.E.).

The Certificate of Secondary Education

Frequent complaints are heard that the welter of publicity given to the Robbins Report has led to inadequate attention being given to the Newsom Report, entitled *Half Our Future*. Outside

educational circles the name of the Beloe Committee, from which the C.S.E. sprang, is virtually unknown. Yet the C.S.E. examination is designed to cater for somewhere in the region of 40 per cent. of our children, ranging from those whose ability just overlaps that of "O" level G.C.E. down to those of slightly less than average ability. Candidates are already being prepared for the first examination which will be held in the summer of 1965. Further, the birth of this new certificate probably casts more light on the politics of examinations and education than any other recent development.

Even the Beloe Committee—the progenitor of the C.S.E.—acknowledged that this new examination was the result of parental desire, a change in the climate of opinion, and the views of a section of teachers; and, on the whole, cannot have been said to have greeted its own offspring with undiluted enthusiasm. In the Crowther Report the view was expressed that: "In some subjects a good modern school education seems to us very difficult to reconcile with an external examination". More recently the Newsom Report declared:

"Since, however, examinations are undoubtedly here to stay, and as time goes on the tendency is always for more rather than fewer pupils to be involved, *we must seek means to minimise the more adverse effects*" (my italics).

How was it, therefore, that with so much official and "expert" feeling against the development, the C.S.E. ever came into existence? The answer is essentially political even if not in the narrow party sense.

The roots lie deep in the early days of the Secondary Modern Schools when the dominant educational theory—a theory which was swallowed hook, line, and sinker by many teachers—was an acceptance of the proposition that a child's I.Q. was a given constant. Despite subsequent concessions about "late developers" and "border-line cases" the dogma was propounded that those children who failed to secure Grammar School places would, far from being helped, be positively harmed by academic education, let alone examinations.

Soft Options

In this climate of opinion English deteriorated into "free expression" on paper. So long as there was a germ of an idea it did not matter if every sheet of paper was covered with spelling and elementary grammatical mistakes. History and Geography became Social Studies and "topic", "patch", and "project" methods held

the field. Several terms could be spent studying costume through the ages as long as the dangerous abstract process of reasoning from cause to effect was kept at bay. Science, where it was taught, became mending the fuse or servicing the Hoover. A term's Religious Education could be spent making a *papier-mâché* model of the Israelites crossing the Red Sea. Mathematics meant adding up a shopping bill and reading the gas meter.

A parallel myth was propounded, even if on occasions implicitly, to the effect that Secondary Modern boys were automatically talented at woodwork and metalwork. Naturally their sisters were regarded as being equally gifted at domestic science and needlework.

This total outlook extended beyond these schools. In the Training Colleges there was relatively little concern about the fact that over 50 per cent. of all entrants did not themselves possess "O" level mathematics; this despite the fact that in a situation of acute teacher shortage virtually every teacher would have to tackle some mathematics teaching at some stage, usually early on, in his career. In textbook publishing gimmicks and match-stick men proliferated under the banner of stimulating interest and catching the imagination. Experienced teachers who claimed that many of these so-called modern techniques led in practice to distraction and confusion were ignored.¹

The Turning of the Tide

The reversal of this situation, or rather its first big step, provides a fascinating example of the movement of internal political forces in a key sector of the nation's life. Both the role of ideas and the role of the mass movement can be clearly seen. Paradoxically, the first warriors to enter the arena were those who would have been described as somewhat old-fashioned and reactionary teachers. Often they were graduates who, from working and lower-middle-class homes, had come up through the pre-war Grammar Schools. They were bitterly opposed to a doctrine which "wrote off" large numbers of children and were appalled by what they regarded as a monstrous waste of talent. In the face of fierce opposition they fought to develop more academic courses in the "A" streams of the Secondary Modern Schools and, in so doing, paved the way for the first "O" level G.C.E. candidates from these schools.

¹ An admirable summary of the position was given by Cyril Hughes in *The Times Educational Supplement* on October 16, 1964, in an article most appropriately entitled "Stones Instead of Bread". Even five years ago such an article would have met with a storm of abuse and ten years ago publication would almost certainly have been out of the question.

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Often they were charged not only with being reactionaries but with being self-seekers who were seeking enhanced status as a result of teaching examination work and with aiming, through this channel, at getting the senior posts which carried higher special responsibility allowances. Despite acute initial difficulties they were soon joined by powerful allies—large numbers of parents!

At first the parents, almost as a whole, had accepted the verdict of the 11+ and had resigned themselves to the fact that their children, as a result of not getting a Grammar School place, had lost all opportunity of preparing for one of the professions or more favoured careers. But when, in an area, first one school and then another took tentative steps towards "O" level G.C.E. there was a vast upsurge of interest from those parents who were most keen on education and who were most ambitious for their children's future. The mass movement had commenced. Soon a stage was reached in which individual parents expressed a preference for one Secondary Modern School rather than another, purely because the former was running an "O" level course. It was not long before the Secondary Modern Schools were as anxious as the Grammar Schools to have lists of their G.C.E. successes published in the local press. At the same time, these schools began either to develop their own "Leaving Certificates" or to use the examinations of such bodies as the Royal Society of Arts, Union of Educational Institutions, and Union of Lancashire and Cheshire Institutes for their non-G.C.E. streams. The tide leading to a new national examination below "O" level was running swiftly. The ground for C.S.E. had been laid.

The Attitude of the Parties

It is arguable that at national political level the issue tended to be confused in the major parties by a combination of doctrine and total lack of first-hand experience. The Secondary Modern Schools had come into existence long after the leaders' school days had finished. Many of them, including almost all their educational experts, were themselves the products of either Grammar or independent schools. It is possibly fair to say that the Conservatives saw in the development first of "O" level work and then in the birth of C.S.E. a strong weapon which would support their arguments for the retention of separate Grammar Schools and an effective counter against the case for an all-in comprehensive system. In the Labour Party so much emphasis was placed, for social and political reasons, on the virtues of the comprehensive

school that the changes and growing possibilities in the Secondary Modern Schools were not appreciated.

The present position is one in which many Secondary Modern Schools have some years of solid "O" level achievement behind them. In addition, a start has been made on "A" level work in quite a number of places and their first students are now in Universities and other places of higher education. No one now upholds the concept of a fixed I.Q. Indeed, it is difficult to find anyone who ever did!

For the 40 per cent. of our children for whom it caters the C.S.E. does not mean that the battle is over. The new examination is essentially a compromise solution resulting from a shift in the balance of forces, not from a victory. This, too, is reflected in the Newsom Report, where the Committee states:

"We are convinced that many of the pupils with whom this Report is concerned ought not to be entered for public examinations: and that for all the pupils a substantial part of the curriculum should be unexamined."

No one with first-hand experience of the "backward" streams (not educationally sub-normal) in these schools would argue that those pupils should be entered for an examination. The danger lies in the possible emasculation of the examination for those for whom it is intended.

Emerging Problems

In day-to-day reality other types of problems will arise. These will include the allocation of funds for textbooks and equipment; the distribution and use of the more able and experienced teachers; the variation in the size of classes as between one stream and another. In many schools the best teachers have often been given to the best forms, solid attention has been given to "backward" forms and the "middle-run" forms have suffered as to size and attention. Thus there already exists the counter political argument that the introduction of C.S.E. will lead to favouring some children at the expense of others. This is essentially a repetition, at a lower academic level, of the argument that the existence of the Grammar Schools is an act of deprivation as far as the Secondary Modern children are concerned. What is in danger of being overlooked is the old problem of the allocation of scarce resources between competing ends when some of the resources are very scarce indeed.

The C.S.E. will also have its external effects especially in the field of careers. When the pre-war School Certificate, with its

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minimum of a pass in a group of five subjects, was replaced by the present General Certificate of Education, in which it is possible to obtain a pass in a single subject, many professional and other bodies altered their entry or pre-training registration requirements in order to ensure that only those would be admitted who possessed qualifications equivalent to the former level. The new C.S.E. will unquestionably lead to a new pattern of employment acceptability. Internally it will be complicated by a number of factors, including: the five levels at which subjects can be passed; the fact that it can be taken in one subject only; the arrangement whereby individual schools can both set and mark their own papers, subject to outside assessment; the great latitude allowed in the examination as between oral, written and course (*i.e.*, the submission of books and projects over the last two years of school life) work. Despite all this a situation will be faced in which some 40 per cent. of children will have a C.S.E. of some sort whilst another 40 per cent. will not have one.

Of the non-examinable pupils the Newsom Committee has written:

"For many pupils 'other pieces of evidence' may be the most important: employers, as one headmaster reminds us 'do not always want clever people'. Other qualities, whether in employment or in private life, may count high: patience and persistence in seeing a job through, for example, where care matters rather than speed; general attitudes to learning, rather than performance in a single test; honesty, cheerfulness, pleasant manners and an ability to get on with people."

It is precisely here that the danger of another myth being established can be most clearly seen. After all, even a decade ago these human virtues were not entirely lacking in the Grammar School child and it is doubtful whether the introduction of C.S.E. will entirely blot them out among the more able Secondary Modern children. But it was precisely this type of argument that was being used a decade ago when comparing the Grammar School child and the child in the top of the Secondary Modern School. There is a serious danger that the old mistakes will be repeated.

The Political Question

The great political question in education is whether administrative, political and social measures will be used to bolster a false egalitarianism instead of their being concentrated on concrete practical measures to help the less able children.

The C.S.E., despite its obvious imperfections and limitations, represents a source of encouragement and a considerable opportunity for many of our children. It should not be weakened in any way. It is necessary to recognise that there are two-fifths of our children with an even lower level of academic ability. Instead of indulging in another round of barren theorising it will help them more if we concentrate on creating targets for them—targets which they themselves will regard as worthwhile—and on providing all the facilities and help which will enable them to achieve them.

RUSSIA REVISITED

WILLIAM A. ROBSON

My first visit to the U.S.S.R. was in 1936. I went there in the company of the late Lord Simon of Wythenshawe (then Sir Ernest Simon), Lady Simon, Professor Jewkes, and a son and nephew of the Simons. Our purpose was to make a study of the city government of Moscow, its planning, housing, education, industry, and finance. We spent about a month in the capital, and made shorter visits to Leningrad and Kharkov. The results were published in a book entitled *Moscow in the Making*.¹

I recently paid a second visit to the Soviet Union to take part in a symposium organised by the United Nations in Moscow. The subject was new towns and I was one of the delegates. The first week was spent in Moscow, after which we went to Leningrad for three days. Then came visits to Baku on the shores of the Caspian Sea and Erivan, the capital of Armenia. We finally returned to Moscow to agree a draft report of the symposium, which will be published in due course by the U.N.

I have written elsewhere on planning and housing in the U.S.S.R.² Here my aim is to set down some general impressions and observations of life in the Soviet Union today in comparison with what it was in 1936, which was almost a midway point in the 47 years which have elapsed since the Revolution.

The outward journey from London involved a change of plane at Copenhagen from an SAS aircraft to one of the big jets of the Aeroflot fleet. The Aeroflot planes are very large, very fast, subject to much noise and vibration from the engines, and with low standards of passenger comfort. There are often no individual lights or air ducts; the food is very poor; and the service minimal. Passengers were given no instructions about safety in case of an emergency. The planes on which I flew had tourist class only. On the other hand, air travel is said to be much cheaper inside the Soviet Union than in Western countries.³ These characteristics are typical of life in Russia: cheapness and availability for popular consumption are deemed more important than quality or service.

¹ Longmans, Green (London, 1937).

² "Russia Plans her Housing", *New Society*, October 15, 1964.

³ The fare from Moscow to Irkutsk, a flight of 2,830 miles, costs 82 roubles; from Leningrad to Rostov, 1,200 miles, 32 roubles; and from Moscow to Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, 2,500 miles, 52 roubles.

Signs of Progress

The appearance of the people has undergone a remarkable transformation. I shall never forget the appalling shabbiness of the crowds who thronged the streets of Leningrad and Moscow in 1936; or the marks of hardship, cold, and hunger which they bore on their faces. Today, the people are well clad, well fed, and clean (which implies hot water and washing facilities in their homes). The women use cosmetics in a discreet way, they are often dressed in a becoming manner, and they get their hair done in modern styles. Western dress is now worn in all the towns we visited: the moujik's blouse and Asian styles of costume have disappeared except perhaps for use on special occasions or in some of the most remote towns.

Far more important than the signs of material progress was the expression on the faces of the people. The marks of hardship, cold, and hunger have gone. The faces that I studied bore an expression of purpose, of a serious interest in life, of self-confidence, of certainty about the future. In Armenia and Azerbaijan our hosts showed us the gaiety, the *joie de vivre*, the warm-hearted attitude of welcome which one associates with the sunshine and the abundance of nature in many southern parts of Europe. But even in the northern cities people are visibly enjoying themselves in a way which was non-existent in 1936. They dance to old-fashioned jazz music in many hotels, restaurants, and cafés. They have extensive facilities for recreations of all kinds; the theatre (including special theatres for children), the ballet and the opera retain their traditional popularity, while museums, libraries, picture galleries, exhibitions, concert halls, "palaces of culture" exist in great profusion. Both indoor and outdoor sports and games, as well as athletics, are well provided with facilities. There is, indeed, some ground for believing that attractions outside the home have been provided on a lavish scale in order to distract attention from, or at least compensate for, the very poor housing which most Soviet citizens have had to put up with until now.

In the Streets

In the pleasant summer weather vast numbers of people were walking in the streets and squares, or sitting in the public parks and gardens. Moscow and Leningrad are among the few great cities in the world in which walking is agreeable by virtue of the fact that the onslaught of the private motor-car has been resisted. In consequence, the very wide streets are not crowded with vehicles;

public transport and Shanks' pony are the methods of getting about for most people; and one realises what an immense relief it is not to have the noise, smell, danger, confusion, disamenity, and ugliness of the motor-vehicle as the dominating feature of urban life. The Russian people walk extremely well: their deportment is so good that one can infer that physical culture must play a considerable part in the school programme. The women have not yet arrived at that stage of sophistication at which they try to balance themselves on the point of a stiletto heel. In 1936 all infants had to be carried in the arms of their parents—an exhausting task. Today, perambulators are quite common.

In 1936, huge portraits of Stalin were exhibited on the outside of many of the large buildings. These have, of course, disappeared, and they had not been replaced by portraits of Mr. Khrushchev (who was still in power) or anyone else. Statues of Lenin are plentiful; and his portrait abounds in schools, hospitals, factories, etc. Another pre-war feature which has disappeared are the messages in huge letters exhibited outside buildings addressed to the Red Army and assuring the soldiers of the affection and confidence with which they were regarded by the citizens, and the conviction that they would defend and uphold the glorious Revolution. Such crude appeals to the loyalty of the Army are no longer considered necessary; and nowadays one sees very few soldiers in the cities. Those I did see were mostly on leave and were visiting museums of art or the Kremlin.

What People can Buy

There is today plenty of food to be seen in the U.S.S.R. It can be bought in large quantities in shops, restaurants, cafés, buffets, bars, and kiosks. The range of food is very wide: it extends from caviare, still the favourite luxury, to fresh fruit from the fruit-growing regions in the South or from neighbouring countries such as Hungary or Bulgaria.⁴ Alcoholic drinks of all kinds are on sale, including beer, wine, vodka, liqueurs, and other spirits. The shops have ample supplies of clothing of many different qualities. Books are on sale everywhere and are eagerly bought. Toilet requisites, cosmetics, and perfumes are easy to obtain; and so too are children's toys. Household durables, such as furniture, refrigerators, electric vacuum cleaners, cooking utensils, gas or electric cookers, etc., are

⁴ My visit coincided with the seasonal flush of fruit. I understand that fresh fruit is unobtainable for many months of the year in Moscow and that fresh vegetables are often scarce.

displayed in many shop windows. Luxuries like cameras, transistor radios, binoculars, television sets, sporting rifles, and fishing tackle can be bought without difficulty. I cannot say to what extent the sizes and qualities of the goods on sale correspond with consumers' needs; or whether spare parts are readily available when replacements or repairs are necessary. Frequent complaints on these matters are said to be made. The things which are wanted and cannot be obtained are chewing gum, ball-point pens, and American cigarettes. Nearly all the delegates to the U.N. meeting were frequently stopped in the streets or elsewhere by men and boys who asked us for these items.

What People Earn

The interesting question is, of course, not only what is available in the shops, but what is the level of prices in relation to earnings. I have collected a limited amount of information on the latter point and rather more details about the former.

The minimum wage for unskilled workers and those who have had 11 years of schooling is 60r. a month. (All the following rates are given in roubles per month. A rouble is equal to 8 shillings at the official rate of exchange.) Girls of 18 years old or over employed as shop assistants receive 65r. School teachers who have received a 5-year training after leaving school are placed on a scale of 60-120r. Semi-skilled workers earn about 100r.; skilled workers 130-180r.; foremen 200r.; engineers and designers 250r.; chief engineers and designers 300r.; the director of a large factory employing as many as 10,000-20,000 workpeople receives a salary of only 350r. A full professor at the University of Minsk earns 600r.; an academician receives 1,000r.⁵

These are the basic rates. In addition there are bonuses for exceeding the planned output of a factory, which may not be greater than 50 per cent. of the wage, and I was informed that the average factory worker gets 125r.⁶ There is an incentive payment for doctors who practise in rural areas; and men who work at Oil Stones, the network of oil wells in the middle of the Caspian Sea, 3½ hours by boat from Baku where they live, receive 55 per cent. above the standard rate for their grade. This is to compensate them

⁵ Tipping is no longer necessary in the U.S.S.R. I saw tips refused by some waiters, railway porters, etc., while others accepted them.

⁶ British experts in Soviet economics regard some of the figures I have given as somewhat too high. In particular they doubt if the average factory worker earns as much as 125 roubles a month. I have merely reproduced the information which was given to me in the U.S.S.R. in apparent good faith.

for working a 12-hour day away from home for 15 consecutive days each month. They also receive a special allowance of $1\frac{1}{2}$ r. a day for meals. Their average pay is 180r.

To give a few examples. The head of the Moscow Planning Commission, with a staff of 8,500, earns 650r. One of our interpreters, a young married woman who normally teaches English by correspondence courses, earns 100r. and her husband, a bridge engineer, earns 250r.

One of the notable features of the system is the very slight differential between the wages of unskilled factory workers and the director of a large factory, which seems to bear little relation to the latter's heavy responsibility and the need for special ability.

The highest earnings are those of top scientists, leading actors and actresses, ballet dancers and musicians, popular writers and the most eminent sculptors and artists.

Medical personnel appear to be poorly paid in comparison with other countries. A newly-graduated doctor with 6 years' medical training and 10 years' general education (now being raised to 11 years) earns at age 23-24 at most only 120r., which is the maximum for a primary school teacher. After 3 years' practice he can earn more, but the director of a hospital is likely to receive only 250r. Partly qualified doctors with only a 3-year medical training (called *feldscher*) earn 60r. Qualified doctors are on the same salary scale as school teachers who have completed a 5-year training. I understand that no less than 80 per cent. of all medical doctors are women, and this is presumably due to the low remuneration.

Any appraisal of incomes in the Soviet Union must take account of the very large benefits received through the services provided by the authorities. Thus, education and health are entirely free. Rents are very low and seldom exceed 5 per cent. of wage or salary. They usually amount to between 4 and 5 per cent. of the chief male occupant's salary. Fares are cheap: in Moscow a journey by trolleybus costs the equivalent of fourpence, by metro or motor-bus fivepence, by tramcar threepence—all irrespective of the distance travelled. A taxi costs only tenpence a kilometre, plus a tenpence service charge. Theatres and all forms of entertainment are much cheaper than in the West—the Moscow Art Theatre, for example, charges from 90 kopecks to 2r. for a seat (*i.e.*, 7s. 6d. to 16s. in English money). The cost of social insurance benefits in cash or in kind is met entirely from public revenues without any individual contribution. Vacations and travel expenses are largely paid for by the trade unions or public authorities.

Direct taxes fall lightly on the individual, and as a rule only on the urban population. Income tax is levied on industrial and office workers and other persons at rates which vary from 3.6 to 8.2 per cent. of incomes up to 100r. and 13 per cent. for those exceeding this figure. Pensions and incomes below 50r. are exempt from tax. Bachelors bear an additional tax of 6 per cent. of wage or salary. Agricultural workers are taxed according to their wage rates on 1/100 of a hectare of their personal holding.

In 1960 the Supreme Soviet passed a law abolishing all taxes and this was supposed to come into force by 1965. Direct taxes have not, in fact, disappeared. When they do, all public expenditure will presumably be financed by means of revenue derived from the difference between the costs of commodities and manufactured goods and the prices charged for them.

One other point worth noting is that it is extremely easy for married women to work for wages if they wish, owing to the very extensive provision of crèches, kindergartens and schools in every housing estate or neighbourhood unit. In consequence, children can be placed in the charge of qualified nurses or supervisors near the mother's home and without charge. So in a very large proportion of homes two or more members of the household are contributing to the family income.

Finally, there are perquisites attaching to certain important posts which provide the occupants with a car and chauffeur, a secretary, travelling expenses, a dacha in the country and other benefits in kind. These are the Soviet version of the expenses account for higher executives under private enterprise.

Labour Relations

I tried in vain to discover how wages and salaries are determined; where the final decision rests; and what considerations are taken into account. I received only vague answers to my questions; and even a Party member was not able to say more than that these matters are settled by the Government. An official guide book informed me that there is equal pay for equal work, without discrimination against women or workers belonging to minority national groups. "Wages", it says, "are determined in relation to working conditions and skill, the importance of a given enterprise and, in some cases, geographical location. Most workers are paid on a piece-work basis. Without permitting wage levelling, the Soviet State is nonetheless concerned with raising the wages of the lowest paid groups, and systematically reviews and improves

wage rates." But how does one spell out from such a vague and general statement the reasons underlying the recent decision to increase the salaries of teachers and medical doctors by 21 per cent.? One suspects that the undue proportion of women doctors had something to do with it.

I was repeatedly assured that the labour market is free in that everyone can choose the occupation he would like to enter, and is at liberty to quit his job or to change it if he wishes. I was puzzled how individual freedom of this kind could be reconciled with central economic planning, which requires a specific allocation of manpower to correspond with the plan of production. The answer is to be found mainly in the regulation of training and recruitment. Every skilled occupation or profession has its appropriate training institutes; and the intake of students or trainees can easily be adjusted to bring about required increases or decreases in the flow of labour into the various vocations.⁷ Wage differentials will also affect the distribution of labour almost as effectively in a socialist economy as in capitalist conditions. Furthermore, talks are given to children at school (as in Britain) about the different occupations, and these can exercise a considerable influence.

Aptitude and mental ability are naturally important determinants of labour distribution. There is often very stiff competition to enter the institutes which train men and women for the higher occupations.

The pressure to remain at work must be very strong in the Soviet economy, because not only earnings but most benefits in kind, from housing to holidays, are linked with or derived from the job.

Prices

The following prices are taken by direct observation from shops in Moscow, Baku, and Yerevan. The prices are given in roubles; and the rate of exchange is 2.50 roubles to the £, or 1 rouble = 8 shillings.

Meat:

Beef—1.60 a kilo

Pork—1.90 a kilo

Cooked ham—3.70 a kilo

⁷ Anyone who is accepted by, for example, the Institute of Foreign Trade, is assured of a job in the Ministry of Foreign Trade or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when he has completed his training in a satisfactory manner.

Clothes:

- Men's suits—30 to 220
- „ sports jackets—8 to 22
- „ overcoats—62
- Women's cloth winter overcoats—117 to 190
- „ coat and skirt—49, 58
- „ wool suits—60, 87, 165
- „ cotton dresses—8, 14, 17
- „ scarves and stoles—3, 5, 14
- „ gloves (poor quality, in cloth)—2.20-4.50
- „ (leather)—4 to 7
- „ silk-like hose—2.50, 3.10
- Men's knitted sweaters—14, 15
- „ felt hats—15
- „ cloth caps—2.48, 4, 7
- „ straw hats—3, 5
- „ shirts—9.50
- „ shoes (ordinary quality)—5 to 14
- „ (good quality)—19 to 32
- „ cotton or rayon scarf—2.80
- Baby shoes—2.10
- Small boy's suits—6 to 22
- Men's cotton socks—under 1

Household durables:

- Small vacuum cleaner—40, 65
- Electric floor polisher—63
- Small refrigerator (about 3 cu. ft.)—225
- Small electric washing machine (with hand wringer)—75
- „ (with power wringer)—140
- Electric room heater—7.50
- Sofa—121
- Television set (about 16-inch)—288
- Record player and short-wave radio combination—230
- Radio set—25 to 150 (a good-looking short-wave set sells at about 100)
- Transistors—27 to 45
- Small table lamp—2.50
- Accordions—40 to 400
- Pianos (small upright)—1,100
- „ (concert grand)—3,234

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Sewing machines (hand-operated)—50 to 60
(treadle)—77
(electric)—186, 213

Baby carriage—43

Bicycles—50 to 78

Motor-scooters—300, 430

Motor-cycle—500

Cameras—30 to 85

A private telephone in Moscow costs 2.50 a month irrespective of the number of calls.

It will be seen that there is a wide range of prices in regard to many articles, depending on quality, style, and finish. Particularly in regard to clothing, there are very low-priced articles somewhat reminiscent of our utility clothing products in wartime, while higher quality or more fashionable articles are available at very much higher prices.

The best way to compare Soviet prices with those elsewhere is to consider their relation to earnings, and then to make a similar equation for Britain or any other country in which one happens to be interested. Assuming that the average factory worker earns 125r. a month—and this assumption is not accepted by experts in Soviet economics in Britain, who consider a figure of 100r. a month or less is nearer the mark—he would have to work for a month to buy a sofa, about 9 weeks for a television set, about 4 weeks for a medium quality suit, between 10 and 14 days for a small vacuum cleaner, and between $2\frac{1}{2}$ and $3\frac{1}{2}$ months for a motor-scooter. The prices of the better quality goods and luxuries are much higher in these terms in the U.S.S.R. than in Britain; but the basic necessities, particularly rent, canteen meals, travel and holidays, are much cheaper in the U.S.S.R. As already mentioned, direct taxation is far lower and there are no contributions to social insurance.

On balance, one can conclude that the standard of living is at present substantially lower in the U.S.S.R. than in the Western countries; but it is rising rapidly and may conceivably catch up in the next two or three decades. Apart from motor-cars, the ordinary worker and his wife are now offered almost all the luxury goods which are available in the West; but the quality, design, and finish are at present far lower while the prices are considerably higher. The important thing to bear in mind is that the workers in the

U.S.S.R.—and their wives—now have similar realisable aims, so far as the acquisition of material goods is concerned, to the mass of the employees in private enterprise economies.

Retail Distribution and Consumer Needs

There are, however, some fundamental differences. While anyone may work for the market as an individual in the U.S.S.R., either as a producer, repairer, or provider of a service, he cannot set up in business on his own account either by employing other persons for gain, or engaging in speculative trading by buying and selling goods. In consequence, the road upwards for able and ambitious men lies through the large organisations which carry on manufacture, the extractive industries, distribution, government functions; or as a member of one of the professions; or in the armed forces; or through the hierarchy of the Communist Party.

One very important feature of Soviet society regarding the distribution of goods is the almost complete lack of advertising. The torrent of commercial publicity in newspapers, posters, television, cinemas, etc., to which we are accustomed, is totally lacking in the U.S.S.R. The absence is one which some people will find agreeable in contrast to the incessant din, ballyhoo, untruthfulness, and vulgarity of much of the advertising on which private enterprise relies; but one consequence is that there is no attempt to stimulate the consumer to buy.

Another feature of the distributive system is the low standard of salesmanship. There is, indeed, no such thing as a salesman or saleswoman in the U.S.S.R. There are merely shop assistants or vendors in kiosks who will reluctantly permit a purchaser to buy something which is available. I have not seen any shop assistant display the slightest interest in a transaction or take any pains to satisfy the customer. Their attitude is one of complete indifference, a "couldn't care less" outlook. Retail distribution and personal service are the two spheres in which the collectivist economy appears at its worst.

Take, as one example, the service of meals in the Moscow and Leningrad hotels. In 1936 it took $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 hours to get served with a simple meal in the Metropole Hotel, Moscow. At the time we thought this was due to the restaurants being staffed by elderly waiters who were a relic of pre-revolutionary times. Today, the position is completely unchanged in the Moscow and Leningrad hotels, although in fairness one must add that the service is better in the hotels of Baku and Erivan. Why is this?

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The answer, in part, may be that the waiters and waitresses are either untrained or badly trained, or that the kitchens are poorly organised. But there is also a deeper reason, which is that human comfort and convenience do not loom large in the Soviet *weltanschauung*. How else can one explain the fact that the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad, with its world-famous collection of paintings and other works of art which every visitor wants to see, does not open before 11 a.m. and closes at 5 p.m. (no one is allowed to enter after 4 p.m.)? Again, the post office in our hotel at Leningrad did not open until 10 a.m. and breakfast was not served until 9 a.m., although many visitors had to leave the hotel much earlier than that. A contributory factor to this kind of indifference to consumer needs may be that either an improvement is achieved on a huge scale by central direction of the party, or nothing whatever is done about it.

The Status of Women

There appears to be a greater degree of equality between the sexes in the U.S.S.R. than in most Western countries. At one end of the scale one sees women engaged in heavy road repairs and excavation work; and in the house-building factories we saw the immensely sturdy Russian women employed side by side with the men with no apparent job-discrimination. At the other end of the scale one finds women working as engineers and physicians to a far greater extent than in Britain; one of the great ballets in Leningrad has a woman conductor; and women are appointed to be captains of some of the Soviet ships on the inland seas.

It has been noticed that whereas the hours of work in employments of all kinds are low—the normal working day is one of 7 hours with an hour less on Saturdays, making a 41-hour working week^a—women in the home continue to work much longer hours: this presumably applies whether or not they are in gainful employment. In the coming decade there will be a steady increase in restaurant, canteen, and cafeteria facilities in order to obviate the need for a good deal of home cooking. This is intended to liberate women from their long hours and household drudgery.

Ethnic Minorities

The record of the Soviet government in dealing with its national minorities has been stained by many dark episodes. Repression,

^a Miners and other underground workers, and young people aged 16 to 18 years, work a 6-hour day.

force, and fraud have often been used in dealing with such minorities as the Baltic republic, the Volga Germans, the Jews, and the peoples of Western Ukraine and Georgia. It is not my intention to absolve the U.S.S.R. from displaying violence and cruelty on a large scale towards these and other ethnic groups. I can, however, testify that in remote places like Armenia and Azerbaijan one can witness the uninhibited expression of the ethnic culture accompanied by vigorous social and economic development on the lines laid down by the national plans. Modern towns, schools, universities, hospitals, scientific institutes, up-to-date factories, highways, air-fields, etc., demonstrate the drive and power of the party and its plans; the museums, art galleries, opera and ballet performances, the music, dances, and folk customs, reflect the ethnic culture which the people are free to enjoy. The result is highly successful in raising the standard of living in what might be depressed or backward areas if they were left to their own resources.

In Erivan one can see not only modern opera written by Armenian composers and sung in Armenian in the fine new opera house; but also an excellent museum of Armenian history and culture; Armenian films, folk dances, music, and so on; and above all the Matenadaran, a magnificent collection of more than 10,000 manuscripts concerning every aspect of Armenian culture and knowledge during the long history of the people in ancient times and the middle ages. A fine new building has been constructed to house this unique collection.

In all the places I visited, I observed care being taken to preserve historic monuments, and to cherish and enrich the museums, art galleries, libraries, etc., which form the cultural heritage of the past. Peterhof, the Tsar's summer palace near Leningrad, was severely damaged by the German army during the last war. It has been repaired or reconstructed at great cost. The domes of the churches in the Kremlin have been repainted with pure gold leaf and now gleam in the sunshine with renewed brilliance.

The Language Problem

There are more than a hundred distinct ethnic or cultural groups in the Soviet territory. At least 60 languages are spoken by various linguistic groups.

The curriculum to be followed in the schools and universities is laid down at the centre, and the textbooks to be used are the same throughout the Union; but each republic may use its own tongue as the language of instruction. Every boy and girl must,

however, learn to speak, read, and write Russian; and Russian is the ubiquitous language of the Soviet people. What this means can be understood by contrast with the political passions, social tensions, and practical difficulties which exist in multi-lingual states which have not established a national language, such as India, Belgium or Canada.

The movements of population caused by immigration to new or developing towns have often brought language problems in their train. For example, in Sumgait, a large satellite town of Baku, only 60 per cent. of the pupils are natives of Azerbaijan. About 20 per cent. are Armenians and have their own schools in which the language of instruction is Armenian. The smaller ethnic groups for which separate schools cannot be set up go to a so-called international school in which classes are held in several languages. All of them, of course, must also master Russian.

The standard of English spoken by the corps of interpreters is extraordinarily high. Their command of the language and their excellent accent would lead one to assume that they must either have studied in England or been taught by an English teacher. Neither of these was true in the case of the excellent interpreters I encountered. They had been taught by Russians in Moscow or Leningrad with a good phonetic groundwork.

Conclusions

No fair-minded visitor to the Soviet Union can fail to be impressed by many of their achievements or the unlimited material advances which the future promises. Their technological competence is obvious even to the uninitiated—one has only to visit a whole town built on steel piles at Oil Stones in the middle of the Caspian Sea, with 22 kilometres of car track, hostels, restaurants, shops, and offices serving the oil rigs 40 miles from the shore which employ 5,000 workers. The Baku oilfield, which before the war produced about 80 per cent. of the country's total output, has today a larger output which represents only 10 per cent. of Soviet oil output. No less impressive is the tremendous expansion of educational facilities at all levels. Azerbaijan, with a population of about 2m., is commissioning annually between 10 and 13 secondary schools, each accommodating 960 pupils. Examples could be taken from many other spheres.

But this is not the whole picture. Leaving aside material shortages and inefficiencies, some of which have been mentioned,

there are some psychological limitations of Soviet society which demand attention.

The Soviet citizen is still living in a strictly cloistered world. No foreign newspapers are available to the general public except Communist papers like *The Daily Worker* and *L'Humanité*. The Soviet papers are carefully doctored and present a highly distorted picture of the world. Even the educated and professionally gifted men and women whom I met at the United Nations symposium appear to know little of what is going on in other countries. They frequently remarked on the benefits of an exchange of experience and views, but actually they asked no questions and did not seek for information about what is going on elsewhere. They are proud of what their country has achieved but are quite unable to appraise it on a comparative basis. They are critical of other economic-political régimes on dogmatic grounds but quite uncritical of their own. Hence, they are ready to criticise matters about which they have little knowledge but are unwilling to criticise matters about which they must know a great deal.

Boastful or misleading statements are to be found even in publications intended for serious technical experts. For example, an official book on *Housing Construction in the U.S.S.R.* which was circulated to all members of the U.N. round table opens with the statement: "For the volume and rate of housing construction and for the number of flats built annually per 1,000 inhabitants, the U.S.S.R., as everybody knows, occupies first place among the biggest countries of the world. This has been achieved thanks to the social, political and economic system". There is not a word to indicate that Soviet housing standards are among the lowest in Europe; that until the middle fifties housing needs were shockingly neglected in the U.S.S.R.; and that the Soviet Government are striving to achieve by 1980 a standard of 12-15 square metres per person in their new flats, which is substantially lower than the *present* standard in Council houses in Britain (15 to 20 sq.m.). Furthermore, the number of flats built per 1,000 of the population may not necessarily be a significant figure of productivity since it takes no account of the size of the flats.

Are misleading utterances of this kind due to a deliberate desire to conceal the true position; or to give credit to the U.S.S.R., which it certainly does not deserve in this particular sphere of activity; or to sheer ignorance? Whatever may be the explanation, such

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statements can only be detrimental to the reputation of the U.S.S.R. and should be avoided by the Soviet authorities in their own interests.

The Soviet citizen gives the impression of being somewhat too inward-looking in his outlook, and insufficiently critical of activities in his own country. The Poles, for instance, discuss the progress and shortcomings of their country as freely and critically as we do in England, or the French or Americans. This is far from the position in the U.S.S.R. In consequence, a feeling arises from time to time that the citizens of the U.S.S.R. are in danger of becoming numbed by complacency.

It is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to discover how and why a particular decision or policy was arrived at. One asks for the reasons and a typical reply is: "All the relevant factors were taken into consideration in order to arrive at the best possible solution of the problem". And it is seldom, if ever, that one hears an admission that a mistake has been made.

Soviet society has great achievements to its credit; and most important of all, it has discovered or created a genuine dynamic among its people. The ceaseless insistence on the rightness of everything which has been done is not only tedious but enervating. The men and women of the U.S.S.R. are far too intelligent and well balanced to need bolstering up in this way. It would therefore be a distinct gain if a little more light and air could be let into the world which Soviet citizens inhabit. What they most need is greater discrimination in appraising their own policies and achievements, and more information and insight about what other countries have managed to accomplish.

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DEREK SENIOR

"IN conjunction with a progressive transport policy and a system of comprehensive regional planning, these [housing and land acquisition] measures will be directed to providing a fresh social environment in keeping with the needs and aspirations of the time."

This is all the Queen's Speech had to say about regional planning; the structure of local government was not mentioned. By the time this article is printed the Government may have raised the curtain a little further: it may, on the other hand, still be getting its intentions clear in its own interdepartmental mind. At the time of writing these intentions could be judged only from the statements, formal and informal, made about them by the Ministers concerned before and immediately after the election—among them Mr. Crossman's repeated statement that the sorting out of the relationship between his own responsibility for "providing a fresh social environment" and Mr. Brown's for "regional planning" presented much greater difficulties than the apportionment of functions between the Ministry of Housing and the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources.

Regional Economic Development

What appeared to be intended was that Mr. Brown's department should plan the country's economic development, and in particular should determine the priorities for national investment as between different fields and different parts of the country. Other departments would work out the policies for giving effect to this "national plan" in their several fields—fiscal and monetary management, education and research, transport, land use and so on. This would involve not only the co-ordination of policies in Whitehall by a committee of the Ministers concerned under Mr. Brown's chairmanship, but also the setting up of a corresponding "Little Whitehall" in each "region" to prepare a strategic development programme for the application of these policy decisions in the light of an analysis of regional trends and conditions.

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These "Little Whitehalls" would be interdepartmental teams of civil servants—researchers, planners and administrators—led by senior officials of Mr. Brown's department and advised by appointed "regional councils" with members drawn from local government, industry, commerce, trade unions and universities in the regions.

It was evident that "region" in this context meant "standard region", or at any rate an area of standard-region scale: about one-tenth of England and Wales. It was not clear how the civil servant working in a "Little Whitehall" would reconcile, in case of conflict, his loyalties to his regional leader and to his departmental superiors. Nor was it clear how the "regional advisory councils" were to be constituted, or how they could usefully function without replacing the local authorities in the regional planning field. But it is not the purpose of this article to criticise the specific form of the arrangements proposed by central government for the exercise of its proper planning responsibilities and for the taking of whatever advice it thinks it may need. Still less is it my purpose to question the view that central government must be responsible for "regional planning" of this sort and at this level. On the contrary, I am convinced that planning can make no headway unless central government does organise itself to think with one mind about all aspects of physical development and takes the initiative in formulating regional *strategies*, on whatever scale it finds convenient, for the timing and relative location of major residential, industrial, commercial and recreational developments and of the communications between them.

Planning and Local Government

I am equally convinced, however, that such strategies can serve no useful purpose unless competent agencies exist to discharge the quite distinct function of making land-allocating development *plans* within the framework so laid down; that while it is an inescapable obligation of central government to see to it that such agencies do exist, it is neither practicable nor proper for central government itself to assume their function; and that planning (as Dame Evelyn Sharp has said) "must be a function of representative government", and in so far as it conditions the environment of our daily lives "lies at the heart of local government". I am also convinced that the only basis on which a plan-making authority can effectively operate in this motor age is the city region, and therefore that local government cannot long remain responsible for plan-making unless its major authorities are reorganised on this

basis; that the loss of its plan-making function, on top of all the other functions which local authorities, as at present constituted, have been found incapable of discharging satisfactorily, would carry the decline of local democracy beyond the point of no return; and that this would be a national disaster.

The City Regions

By a "city region" I mean an area whose inhabitants look to a common centre for those specialised facilities and services (social, cultural, professional, commercial, educational and other) whose economic provision demands a user population of large but less than national proportions. Before the motor age the city itself and latterly the conurbation were the only areas that could make effective use of such opportunities; now their centres serve large hinterlands in the same way as they serve the surrounding built-up areas.

England and Wales can be conveniently divided into thirty-odd such units—mature, emergent, embryonic or potential. Apart from London there are five, based on the centres of Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds and Newcastle-upon-Tyne, which can be described as mature in the sense that the centre of each is readily accessible to a more than sufficient population (over two million) to sustain all humanly provided social facilities other than those which are so specialised that the whole nation must seek them in London or abroad. Another six, based on the centres of Nottingham, Sheffield, Preston, Southampton, Cardiff and Bristol, have ample dependent populations (over a million each), but their centres are as yet either not so readily accessible from some parts of their hinterlands or for various reasons less fully equipped. Preston, in particular, could hardly be included in this "emergent" category but for the prospects opened up by the M6 and Lancaster University.

A dozen more, based on the centres of Swansea, Brighton, Hull, Leicester, Norwich, Stoke, Oxford, Exeter, Cambridge, Coventry, Middlesbrough and Gloucester, are developing along the same lines, with hinterland populations of between a third and four-fifths of a million. In the South East the proposed large-scale expansions in the vicinity of Ashford, Newbury, Northampton, Ipswich, Peterborough and Bournemouth could by the end of this century make their centres effective counter-magnets to London in respect of regional (as distinct from national) facilities, serving over half a million people each and thus reducing the London

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city region to an area extending only five to ten miles beyond the approved metropolitan green belt in all directions but the east. A Solway barrage and a Mid-Wales new town (if sensibly sited in relation to Dawley) would bring the Carlisle and Shrewsbury hinterlands within this "potential" class, leaving only the fringe areas dependent on Plymouth, Lincoln, York and Bangor, with a combined population of little more than a million, unlikely in the foreseeable future to support services of regional standard—though nonetheless regionally "structured" by their dependence on the centres named for such specialised facilities as their inhabitants can reach without making an expedition of it.

All these centres, save those of Newbury and Ashford, are already identifiable, by such indices as bus and rail services, newspaper circulations, store deliveries and rateable values, as dominant in their regions, which are virtually self-contained in respect of retail sales. Twenty-seven have universities in or near them, and the other nine are the strongest candidates for future academic foundations. Only in sparsely populated areas—West Cornwall, West Wales, Mid-Wales, the Welsh marches, the Lake District, the Cheviots and West Norfolk—are there people living more than an hour's drive from one or other of them, and the 1961 Census returns show a distinct tendency for these people to move to places within easier reach of them, as well as for people to move from the built-up areas round the bigger centres into the outer metropolitan zones.

Communities in the Making

It cannot, of course, be pretended that even the mature city regions are yet communities in the corporate sense that towns and sometimes counties used to be in the pre-motor age. There is, indeed, a school of thought which colourably holds that no unit can inspire a sense of belonging until it has been defined, named and institutionalised. What *can* be claimed is that the city region, even in its embryonic form, is a social entity much more relevant to the concerns of local government than any other now that the motor-vehicle has come into general use. Its inhabitants may share no feeling of community with people living on the other side of its centre, but at least they all have a lively common interest in the quality and accessibility of the services that that centre can afford. Culturally speaking, townsfolk and countryfolk in the same region are ceasing to differ: both are demanding all the satisfactions, urban and rural, that modern technology and

personal mobility are making available to all. Few of us can still be said, in any meaningful sense, to *live* in town or country, no matter where we may sleep: the range of our normal activities is region-wide.

Terms like "city", "town", and "village" now mask the most important realities of social life and block the communication of ideas about them. The brief interregnum of the "conurbation", too, is over and unmourned: "from a planning point of view it cannot be looked at separately from the life of the region it dominates . . . the only valid concept is the city region, which effects a marriage between the built-up core and the area which comes under its direct social and economic influence, and which is shaped and held together by its system of communications". So said the Ministry of Housing's chief planner at a summer school just three months before his department's Bill to set up a planning authority for the Greater London conurbation was given its second reading. Nothing, indeed, is now more irrelevant to the structure of contemporary society, or to the requirements of public administration, than continuous built-upness. Whether or not the city region will ever command such loyalty as is lavished on our Rutlands, it has emerged as the outstandingly significant unit of human settlement—or rather of human activity—in modern times. It is, indeed, the only unit in terms of which the problems of "providing a fresh social environment in keeping with the needs and aspirations of the time" can fruitfully be formulated.

At the time of writing there was no overt sign that our new Government had yet looked beyond the standard-region strategy to the machinery by which it might be implemented. The Regional Advisory Councils could clearly be of no value for this purpose, except in so far as they might help to mobilise regional opinion in general support of the strategy proposed. Theoretically, no doubt, it would be possible for the planning section of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government to get the positive proposals of such a strategy tested and elaborated at city-region level, as it is doing in the case of the South East Study, by engaging teams of planning consultants (for the Southampton region) or putting its own staff on the job (for the Ipswich region). But in practice it could hardly build up a sufficient organisation to do more, over the whole country, than produce outline "structure" plans covering the broad layout of each city region's main road system, the relative capacities of its main and minor service centres, the siting of major employment generators and

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large-scale overspill developments, and the disposition of regional open spaces.

These are, of course, the big problems; and they are problems which no existing administrative county or county borough is in a position to tackle. But every component of such a plan would inevitably be regarded by one or other of the city region's constituent counties and county boroughs as conflicting with its own sectional interests, and could be nullified by the mere inaction of the authority concerned, as the South East Study's proposals for the allocation of housing land in the outer metropolitan region are now being nullified. If a county planning authority simply omits to make such allocations the Ministry has no remedy but to allow appeals by developers against the county's refusals of planning consent, thereby transferring the initiative in the choice of site to the individual developer. This is the negation of planning.

So long as the local authorities remain land-allocating authorities it is therefore quite true, as Mr. Crossman said at his first Ministerial press conference, that any form of regional planning has got to be acceptable to them. But it is equally true that the built-in antagonism between neighbouring administrative counties and county boroughs must normally make it impossible for the Ministry to win their acceptance for any "structure" plan addressed to the needs of the city region as a whole. On six occasions in the last eighteen years a Minister has vainly "decided" where a new town should be built to take the overspill from Manchester's slums. As a last resort the choice has now fallen (provisionally) on Risley, for no better reason than that it is expected to be less unacceptable to county opinion than any other, since nobody seems to want it for any purpose—least of all housing. This, too, is the negation of planning.

Mr. Crossman Follows the Tory Line

At the same press conference Mr. Crossman echoed his predecessor's rejection of the whole idea of elective regional authorities on the ground that it must involve the interposition of another tier of representative government between Parliament and the county and county borough councils. This, of course, is a complete misconception, such as could only occur in a mind conditioned to take it for granted that a regional authority must be of standard-region scale. In strict propriety this is the one scale of unit between the town and the country as a whole to which the word "region" ought *not* to be applied, since it has no social,

geographic, economic or other distinctive character of its own, but exists only as an administrative division defined for the decentralised exercise of national authority: its only proper appellation, therefore, is "province", and 90 per cent. of the current confusion about regional planning would never have arisen if it had always been so called. And so it would be called if someone in Whitehall had not once hoped that the provincial proconsuls appointed to run the country in the event of invasion might escape the unpopularity of Cromwell's major-generals if they were dubbed "regional commissioners"—and thereby caused the very word "region" to stink in the nostrils of all good local democrats for twenty years.

"Region" and "Province" Distinguished

But this is a lost cause. To the Whitehall mind "region" will never mean anything but province. In order to insinuate the idea that elective regional authorities should be based on city regions a quarter to a third the size of standard regions, and should supersede, not be superimposed upon, the top tier of local government, one has to call them something else. The only available alternative is "counties". What is proposed, then, is not the interposition of a *tertium quid* between central and county government, but the reorganisation of county government itself. What is proposed is the abolition of all existing county boroughs and administrative counties and their replacement by thirty-odd continuous counties, on average about the same size, geographically speaking, as the larger existing counties, but having the main urban concentrations included in their jurisdiction and located at their centres instead of astride their boundaries.

The drawback of this formulation is that "county" also denotes the time-honoured *geographical* unit which inspires a loyalty so blind that county councillors can, by a simple confidence trick, induce its temporary transference to the *administrative* county wherever the boundaries happen to be roughly congruent. Looked at in historical perspective, Rutland's stint as an administrative unit is but an insignificant episode. Nowhere is county loyalty so strong as in Yorkshire, which has never been an administrative county, or Lancashire, three-fifths of whose inhabitants are citizens of seventeen gaps in the administrative county. This admirable sentiment would remain entirely unaffected by any change in administrative machinery once the change was made; meanwhile we shall just have to put up with the difficulties created by its misappropriation.

The "Standard Region" Obsession

Even when it is made plain that what the regionalist wants is not the interposition of another governmental tier, but the modernisation of an obsolete one, the official reaction is one that still shows how impenetrable is the Whitehall mind's obsession with the standard-region scale. As voiced by Sir Keith Joseph (and echoed by his opposite number at the time) it runs: "Can we really accept areas *as big as regions*" (my italics) "for the services now undertaken by counties?". It is, of course, essential that an elective authority should be concerned not merely with a single function, however important, but with the general welfare of its electors over a sufficient range of functions to command their interest and to attract the services of councillors and staffs of high calibre; but that is the strongest of all arguments for the reorganisation here proposed. It is precisely because the scale and scope of the functions appropriate to top-tier local government, developing in step with the scale and scope of our social organisation, have far outstripped its capacity to discharge them that it has been found necessary to withdraw or withhold an increasing number of such functions from local government and entrust them to *ad hoc* bodies, or leave them undischarged. And it is precisely for this reason that central government has recently been driven to institute official inquiries into the quality of the councillors and staffs that our present local authorities attract.

Eight years ago, when the current review of local government areas and boundaries was put in train, the Government rejected any idea of radical reform on the ground that the existing system had not shown itself incapable of discharging the functions entrusted to it. This would, of course, be true of any system, however obsolete, so long as care were taken to entrust to it only those functions which it was capable of discharging. But in fact there is not a single major function now undertaken by counties and county boroughs that can be discharged in all its aspects as effectively as we have a right to demand by any authority smaller in scale or less comprehensive in scope than the city region. Nor is there now any occasion to sacrifice effectiveness in the interests of convenience, since the motor-vehicle has made the largest city region's centre as accessible to its remotest inhabitant as that of Rutland was when county councils were constituted. Much more than that, continuous counties based on city regions would be ideally equipped in catchment area, case-load and financial

resources to be responsible for the management of a unified, positive health service (including health centres and hospitals), of traffic, commuter transport and regional motorways, of seaports and airports, land drainage and water supply; for all higher education short of university standard; for organising the demand for house-building components on the scale required to make possible a user-centred system of industrialised building; for the comprehensive renewal of city centres; for the abatement of air and river pollution and the reclamation of derelict land; for crime squads and multi-purpose sports centres; for the promotion of regional development—and for the making of development plans. These are all important functions which either have been, are being, or are likely soon to be transferred from counties and county boroughs to *ad hoc* bodies covering wider and more suitable areas, or which have been neglected for lack of competent agencies to take responsibility for them, or which have nominally been entrusted to local authorities but suspended, abandoned or never even undertaken by them.

Local Government in Decline

Local government, in short, has ceased to be the agency of choice for the conduct of public affairs. Whitehall has accepted the overwhelming evidence that most existing local authorities would rather join the guilds and livery companies in the limbo of picturesque relics than let local government be dragged into the motor age; and Whitehall regards the existing local authorities' conception of their corporate self-interest as the only valid expression of the public interest in local democracy. That, in effect, was the pretext on which a structural reform, though recognised to be overdue, was deferred twenty years ago—that and the Government's view of the tasks confronting it in the social field as being far too urgent to be put off until we had got ourselves organised to deal with them. When we did have leisure for reform the pressure had evaporated, so the local authority associations were allowed to set limits to the current reorganisation which prevent the establishment of continuous counties except for the built-up conurbations. In consequence even this almost uselessly restrictive application of the continuous county principle is now totally opposed by county councils (such as Lancashire's) which fifteen years ago would have welcomed the benefits of its general application. And in consequence we now find ourselves in the same position as before: because local government could not be reformed in time to take

THE CITY REGION AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT

charge of a comprehensive health service it has not been reformed in time to take charge of regional planning; and for that reason it is not going to be reformed in time for the next urgent development within its proper field. And so it will go on.

There are, indeed, signs (such as Burnley's recent initiative in the Association of Municipal Corporations) of a death-bed repentance among local authorities. But only a complete reversal of their collective policies, a positive pressure from them for radical reform, could make it practical politics in the next ten years. Two faint hopes remain, however. One is that the Minister of Housing, confronted with the manifest absurdity of any other possible course, will spare the time for a single-clause amendment of the Local Government Act that would permit the Local Government Commission to recommend the constitution of continuous counties for Merseyside and the Manchester city region, embracing their quite compact commuter hinterlands as well as their built-up cores, and will then instruct the Commission to reconsider its proposals for the other conurbations in the light of the possibilities thus made available. The other is that, in setting up the plan-making and development agencies that will in any case be required if the strategies worked out by the Regional Planning Boards are to be put into effect, he will define their areas of operation and fields of responsibility on the only appropriate basis—the city region. The result of the first step would surely be a resurgence of local democracy in the new continuous counties, relieving his own staff of the local decision-making that now keeps it from its proper work. As a result of the second step, the transfer of plan-making and other major functions to new elective city-region authorities might proceed smoothly as each emergent, embryonic, and potential city region attained a respectable degree of maturity. Provided these things were done, it might not greatly matter if in the meanwhile the rest of the country continued to exemplify the pitiful irrelevance of top-tier local government as we have it today to the “needs and aspirations of the time”.

THE POLICY OF RUSSIA TOWARDS SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT

HEMEN RAY

ON September 9, 1959, Soviet official news agency Tass in a statement outlined the policy of the Soviet government toward the Sino-Indian border conflict. It blamed "certain political circles and the press" in the West about an "incident" on the Chinese-Indian border to drive a "wedge" between the two largest states of Asia "whose friendship has great importance in ensuing peace and international co-operation in Asia and in the world".

After depicting the West as the No. 1 enemy of the Chinese and the Indian people, Tass recalled Russia's friendly relations with both Communist China and India. "The Chinese and the Soviet peoples", according to Tass, "are tied together by indestructible bonds of fraternal friendship based on the great principles of socialist internationalism. Friendly co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and India according to the ideas of peaceful coexistence is developing successfully. . . . Soviet leaders express conviction . . . that both governments will settle the misunderstandings . . . taking into account their mutual interests in the spirit of the traditional friendship between the peoples of China and India."¹ With this statement the Soviet Union laid down its policy of neutrality amidst Chinese protest in the border dispute between India and China.²

A few weeks later, strictly neutral and correct to start with, the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, referred to the Ladakh armed clash during a foreign policy report to the Supreme Soviet. "We greatly regret", he declared, "the incidents that have recently occurred on the borders of the two states friendly to us. . . . We are especially aggrieved that these incidents have resulted in losses

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¹ *Pravda*, September 10, 1959.

² For Chinese protest see New China News Agency (NCNA), Supplement No. 45, November 2, 1963, p. 2. The Chinese said that Chinese government intimated the Soviet government that it would be better to refrain from making a public statement on this question. However, "ignoring China's advice the Soviet government issued the Tass statement . . . thus revealing the differences between China and the Soviet Union. . . . Without distinguishing between right and wrong, the Soviet government expressed general 'regret' over the Sino-Indian border conflict and although assuming a façade of neutrality, actually favored India and condemned China".

of life on both sides. For the parents and near ones of the men who perished, nothing can make amends for the bereavement suffered. It would gladden us if there were no repetition on the Sino-Indian border, and if the frontier disputes were settled through friendly negotiations to the mutual satisfaction of both sides."³

Sino-Soviet Differences

Since then Nikita Khrushchev tried variously to help the settlement of the border dispute between India and Communist China. In his anxiety to maintain a strict neutrality, Khrushchev withdrew his ambassador, Pavel Yudin, from Peking after he publicly took the Chinese side in the frontier conflict.⁴ The Soviet Premier also rebuked the East German Premier Herr Otto Grotewohl when he blamed India for aggression against China.⁵ Anxious to see an early settlement of the border conflict to save the face of Communism, Nikita Khrushchev is reported to have denounced the Chinese aggression as "a tragedy for the communist movement".⁶ Later, in a personal message to Mr. Nehru, the Soviet leader pleaded for an early settlement of the dispute.⁷ And finally on December 19, 1959, an unnamed Soviet diplomat publicly expressed his government's "anxieties" and "embarrassment" created by the Chinese aggressiveness toward India. "It is more than just untimely", said the Russian diplomat, referring to the Sino-Indian border conflict. "It would be inopportune at any time. . . . We are not happy about the situation."⁸ Early in February 1960 the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party also criticised China's handling of the border dispute as "an expression of a narrow nationalist attitude" that could hamper the "peace-loving" activity of the Soviet Union. According to the Chinese Communists, in a verbal notification, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party also stated that "one cannot possibly seriously think that a state such as India, which is militarily and economically immeasurably weaker than China, would really launch a military attack on China and commit aggression against

³ *Prauda*, November 1, 1959.

⁴ *Newsweek*, November 16, 1959, p. 17.

⁵ *Ibid.* November 30, 1959, p. 7. For Grotewohl's statement see *Neues Deutschland*, September 29, 1959.

⁶ *Newsweek*, December 14, 1959, p. 19. See also *Newsweek*, November 16, 1959, p. 15. Also NCNA, Supplement No. 45, *op. cit.*, p. 3. Receiving a correspondent of the Indian magazine *New Age* on November 7, 1959, Khrushchev described the Sino-Indian frontier conflict as "sad" and "stupid".

⁷ *The Times*, December 21, 1959.

⁸ *New York Times*, Paris Edition, December 20, 1959.

it".⁹ During his visit to India early in 1960, Mr. Khrushchev defended the neutrality policy of the Soviet Union toward the border conflict. He said that he believed that the best position which a country "that stands for the maintenance of peace and strengthening of friendship can take is the one we have taken".¹⁰ During the Rumanian party Congress in 1960 Mr. Khrushchev once again seized the initiative to help the solution of the frontier dispute. He asked the Red Chinese delegate attending the Congress to evacuate the Indian territory and settle the border dispute.¹¹ The Soviet Premier is also reported to have denounced the Chinese attack on India as "Hitlerist policy" and "not Marxism" during a talk with the Indian Communist leader, S. A. Dange, when he visited Moscow early in 1963 to discuss the Chinese aggression with the Soviet leader.¹²

Indians Welcome Soviet Neutrality

In the months that followed, the Sino-Indian conflict continued to play a major role in relations between Moscow and Peking. China's aggressiveness toward India intensified the strains between the two Red giants. It challenged the policy of peaceful coexistence pursued by Nikita Khrushchev and threatened to wreck the main pillar of his foreign policy—an attempt to use India as the base to win friends and influence the non-aligned countries of Asia and Africa. The Soviet Premier has attached greatest importance to India.

As the relations between Moscow and Peking began to deteriorate, the relations between India and the Soviet Union became closer and more cordial. At the same time the Soviet Union speeded up its economic aid to India in order to demonstrate its disapproval of Red China's frontier aggression.¹³

The Indians appreciated the position of the Soviet Union in regard to their conflict with Red China. Khrushchev's refusal to support Communist China on the frontier dispute also pleased

⁹ NCNA, Supplement No. 45, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁰ *Hindustan Times*, February 17, 1960.

¹¹ *Newsweek*, August 29, 1960. Also NCNA, Supplement No. 36, September 6, 1963, p. 13. The Chinese said that during the Roumanian Party Congress Khrushchev accused China of being "pure nationalist" on the Sino-Indian border issue. Also NCNA, Supplement No. 45, *op. cit.* Here the Chinese revealed that Khrushchev told the head of the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party during the Bucharest meeting, "I know what war is. Since Indians were killed this meant that China attacked India. We are Communists, for us it is not important where the frontier line runs".

¹² *Overseas Hindustan Times*, February 7, 1963.

¹³ *Newsweek*, October 14, 1963, p. 37. The magazine quoted an Indian official saying, "Russia's difficulties with China caused Moscow, overnight, to change her attitude toward us".

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Mr. Nehru.¹⁴ He was happy over the continued neutrality of the Soviet leader over this critical question. He was convinced that though Russia had adopted a neutral attitude toward the dispute, her neutralism had "a slant in India's favor". He said, "Russia did not appreciate Chinese adventurism . . .".¹⁵

As early as 1961 V. K. Krishna Menon, then Defence Minister of India, expressed his conviction that "when it comes to be an issue she (U.S.S.R.) will do everything she can to resolve it".¹⁶ A month later Mr. Menon again referred to the Soviet attitude toward the border dispute and declared that for the first time, the Soviet Government had declined to support another Communist Government, right or wrong. While it is true that the Soviet Union had not publicly expressed support for India, it had supplied equipment to India for construction of roads in the northern border region. Practically all the machinery for this purpose had been bought from the Soviet Union. "If it had been the intention of the Soviet Union to support China", he said "or to put it differently to weaken us in this dispute, it could have refused to sell the equipment to us."¹⁷

Soviets Support Chinese Ceasefire Proposals

But soon the Indians were disappointed. High hopes placed on the effective assistance of the Soviet leaders proved illusory. When the Chinese Communists launched the massive armed attack on October 20, 1962, for days the Soviet press and the radio did not mention the eruption of severe fighting. Finally on October 25, the Soviet Union indicated that if it came to a choice, it would stand by Peking. It did this in a leading article in *Pravda* which lashed out against the western countries for giving military aid to India and denounced the McMahon Line. On the other hand, *Pravda* praised China's ceasefire proposals as "manifestation of sincere anxiety . . . to put an end to the conflict. The proposals made by the Chinese government are constructive . . .". Then dutifully *Pravda* blamed the imperialists for the frontier dispute and declared, "the question of Chinese-Indian border is a heritage of those times when British colonialists who drew and redrew the map of Asia at their will ruled on the territory of India. The notorious McMahon Line, which was never recognised by China,

¹⁴ See Prime Minister on Sino-Indian relations, Vol. 1, in Parliament, External Publicity Division, 1961, New Delhi, p. 156. Also Prime Minister on Sino-Indian relations, Vol. 2, Press Conferences, External Publicity Division, 1961, New Delhi, p. 42.

¹⁵ *Sunday Standard* (New Delhi), March 10, 1963.

¹⁶ *The Statesman*, January 2, 1961.

¹⁷ *The Statesman*, February 26, 1961.

was foisted on the Chinese and the Indian peoples. . . . The imperialists are dreaming day and night of bringing these two great powers to loggerheads as well as undermining the friendship of the Soviet Union with fraternal China as well as friendly India".¹⁸ On November 3, Mr. Nehru received a letter from the Soviet Premier urging him to accept Peking's ceasefire proposals but the Indian leader turned down the Soviet overtures.¹⁹

Yet many Indians did not give up hope that the Soviet Union would try to persuade the Chinese Communists to withdraw from the Indian territory. Mr. Nehru thought that with Cuban pressure lowered, the Soviet Union would try to take a more sympathetic view of India's side in the dispute with China. When the Congress members of the Parliament brought to his notice the editorials of the Soviet newspapers supporting Communist China, Mr. Nehru told them that he was quite aware of these and it was not necessary to antagonise anybody.²⁰ A few days later in almost an apologetic tone, the late Indian leader declared that the Soviet Union had been consistently friendly to India all along. "It has been put in a very difficult position in this matter because they have been and are allies of China. Hence the embarrassment to them as between the country with which they are very friendly and a country which is their ally. We have realised that and we did not expect them to do anything which would mean a definite breach with their ally. That is not for us to suggest to a country. But we have had their goodwill and good wishes all along, even recently; that is a consolation to us and certainly we hope to have them in the future."²¹ But other Indian leaders did not share this optimistic view of Mr. Nehru. Mr. Y. B. Chavan, defence minister of India, said that he was not among those who believed that the Soviet Union would side with India in this crisis. He said Russia would go to the help of those whom Moscow has described as "brothers" rather than to their "friends".²²

Soviet Returns to Neutrality

However, on November 5, the Soviet Union returned to its former neutral position in the border dispute between India and Communist China. In a long editorial *Pravda* urged the thing "to do is to

¹⁸ *Pravda*, October 25, 1962. See also *Izvestia*, October 26, 1962, for a similar leading article.

¹⁹ *The Times*, November 5, 1962.

²⁰ *Indian Express*, November 10, 1962.

²¹ *Indian Express*, November 15, 1962.

²² *The Times*, November 16, 1962.

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cease fire and without advancing any terms sit down at the round table of negotiations. . . . Soviet people cannot remain indifferent seeing how the blood of our brothers and friends, the Chinese and the Indian peoples, is flowing". It did not ask India, as it did on October 25, to accept Peking's terms as a basis of opening talks on a settlement. *Pravda* also did not assert that the McMahon Line, which India regards as the border and Communist China does not, was invalid because it was "the creation of imperialists" during the colonial era. However, the Soviet newspaper did not indicate that the Soviet Union was prepared to side actively with India. The editorial was equally sympathetic to India and Communist China.²³ Next day Alexei Kosygin, one of the first deputy Premiers, speaking in Moscow said that the sooner talks were held, the more the cause of peace would benefit. "We consider", he said, "that a correct solution would be a ceasefire between India and China on a reasonable basis. All the more so as there are no basic contradictions between India and China, no disagreements that could not be solved in round table talks."²⁴

During the Congress of the Italian Communist Party in Rome in December 1962 Frol Kozlov criticised the Chinese Communist régime for what he called its "adventuristic position" on the Chinese-Indian frontier conflict. "Those who are certain of their historic future", said Kozlov, "have no need to play with fire and endanger all the achievements of civilisation." The only ones who wished to profit from the conflict between India and China, Kozlov claimed, were the imperialists and the reactionary circles in India, who dreamed of defeating the Communist Party and of drawing India from her neutrality and involving her with the imperialist bloc.²⁵ In late December, Leonid Brezhnev, President of the Soviet Union, expressed his "deep concern" in regard to the Sino-Indian border conflict. During a conversation with the President of the Peace Council of India, he assured the Indian visitor that the Soviet Union would "study" the border dispute and see what it could do for a speedy settlement.²⁶ Even Madame Khrushchev expressed her "unhappiness" over the border conflict during a conversation with an Indian delegation of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society that visited Moscow late in 1963.²⁷

²³ *Pravda*, November 5, 1962.

²⁴ *The Times*, November 7, 1962.

²⁵ *New York Times*, December 4, 1962, and *The Guardian*, December 4, 1962.

²⁶ *Sunday Standard*, January 1, 1963.

²⁷ *The Statesman*, September 27, 1963.

Soviets Blame Indian Reactionaries

In the meantime, the Soviet newspapers kept on blaming the "imperialists" and the "reactionaries" in India for the Sino-Indian tension. Early in February 1963, *Izvestia* attacked "certain reactionary elements in India", who despite the much calmer situation along the India-China border "are proceeding against the peaceful adjustment of the Sino-Indian dispute", and "against the foreign policy of the Indian government". The Soviet newspaper claimed that "the main target of the forces of reaction (in India) is the cornerstone of India's foreign policy—non-alignment with military blocs".²⁸ The organ of the Soviet defence ministry, *Red Star*, repeated *Izvestia's* charge and accused the United States and Britain of "trying to use their economic and military aid to India to force that country to give up its position of neutrality". The Soviet army newspaper claimed that "the U.S.A. and Britain want to include that country (India) in the military system of NATO and SEATO". *Red Star* also said that the U.S.A. and Britain had already tried to persuade India to accept their plan for the creation in India of a "western shield" or of an "air defence umbrella" on Indian territory. "The subordination of the Indian forces to U.S. and British military leaders", *Red Star* warned, "might lead to serious consequences with regard to the maintenance of peace in South East Asia and the security of India itself."²⁹

Soviets Condemn China

As Communist China intensified its ideological war against the Soviet Union, Moscow began to woo India. While still not supporting India publicly against Communist China, a Soviet magazine published for the first time the news of the massing of Chinese troops on the Tibetan-Indian border.³⁰ During a conversation with Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Soviet Premier expressed his "deep concern" at the Chinese build up near the Indian border. Mr. Khrushchev told Mrs. Gandhi that he thought that the Chinese would think twice before launching another offensive against India.³¹ Indian news agency PTI reported from Moscow, quoting a knowledgeable source, that in the event of any aggressive action by China in future against India, the Soviet Union would not remain a silent spectator.³²

²⁸ *Izvestia*, February 14, 1963.

²⁹ *Red Star*, July 27, 1963.

³⁰ *Za Rubezhom*, August 10, 1963.

³¹ *New York Herald Tribune*, August 7, 1963.

³² PTI message from Moscow, September 22, 1963.

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In a series of articles the Soviet party newspaper *Pravda* denounced the Chinese Communists for aggression against India. On August 10, it accused China of encouraging the "right wing groups" in India to criticise Mr. Nehru's non-alignment policy. "It should be noted", *Pravda* said, "that for many years the right wing did not display an open opposition to the policy of non-alignment, knowing that it enjoyed enormous popularity among the masses of the people. The Sino-Indian border conflict presented itself as a heaven-sent opportunity for them." Three days later *Pravda* lashed out against Peking for failing to find a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian border conflict by means of negotiations. It said that the Chinese position on the border conflict was one of "maintenance of tension in that region and rejection of a speedy settlement of the territorial dispute by means of negotiations". On August 16 *Pravda* renewed its criticisms of Communist China and accused it of exploiting the Cuban crisis to attack India. "This fact has not escaped notice that exactly at the time a serious threat is hanging over Cuba and when all peace-loving people considered it as international duty to mobilise forces to repel this threat of aggression by America, military action on the India-China border was intensified."³³

A few days later *Red Star* followed *Pravda* in a bitter denunciation of Peking for attacking India in the autumn of 1962. Pointing its finger at Communist China, *Red Star* asked, "who saved Cuba from an imperialist invasion as well as the whole of mankind from the threat of a nuclear war?", and answered, "not those who turned their weapons against neutralist India . . .".³⁴ In a round-table discussion arranged by the Soviet television, four Soviet journalists squarely accused China of aggression against India. The Soviet journalists, referring to the frontier dispute, said that the Chinese "have done nothing but reinforce the popularity of (the then) Nehru's government and have given the trumps to imperialism".³⁵

Finally, in an official statement referring to the India-China conflict, the Soviet government stated bluntly that the peoples of the world watched with "bitterness and bewilderment" as one of the socialist countries—itsself only recently independent and an example to them—entered into armed conflict with a young

³³ *Pravda*, August 10, 13 and 16, 1963.

³⁴ *Red Star*, quoted in *New York Herald Tribune*, August 26, 1963.

³⁵ *The Statesman*, August 19, 1963.

neutralist state, using its military superiority to secure an advantageous solution to a territorial question.³⁶

The Soviet criticism of Communist China raised high hopes in India. Former Indian leader, Mr. Nehru, described *Pravda's* articles accusing China of aggression as "significant". He said that there was now better appreciation of India's case in the Soviet Union.³⁷

Meanwhile the Soviet newspapers have continued to accuse Communist China of aggression against India. On October 13, 1963, *Pravda* published a condemnation of Chinese leaders by French Communist leader Maurice Thorez for starting a war with India. The Soviet newspaper quoted Thorez as saying: "... we openly told the Chinese comrades ... we do not understand your war (with India). We do not understand these military operations. We also told them India is one of the countries in the cause of peace".

The Soviet Communist Party also denounced Chinese Communists for their aggression against India during the plenary meeting of the Soviet Communist Party on February 14, 1964. In his report to the plenary meeting Mikhail Suslov, referring to the Sino-Indian border conflict, said, "no matter how the Chinese leaders try belatedly to justify their behaviour, they cannot escape the responsibility of the fact that by their actions they essentially helped extreme circles of Imperialism, thereby aggravating an already complicated and dangerous situation in the world".³⁸

On the Chinese Communist alliance with Pakistan against India, Suslov said in his report that "while allowing relations with Indian which, as everybody knows, is not a member of military blocs, to deteriorate sharply the Chinese leadership at the same time actually leagued together with Pakistan, a member of SEATO and CENTO".³⁹

Soviet Economic and Arms Aid to India

Meanwhile the Soviet Union has stepped up its economic and arms assistance to India. Over 95 per cent. of the Soviet and East European economic aid to India has been given after the first series

³⁶ *The Times*, September 24, 1963.

³⁷ *India News* (London), October 5, 1963. Indian newspaper *Patriot* saw in *Pravda's* articles an apparent support of India against Red China. "Soviet condemnation", it said, "establishes India's demand for vacation of aggression before any negotiations with China as a sound and responsible one." *Patriot* (New Delhi), August 18, 1963. See also *The Tribune* (Ambala), August 17, 1963, for a similar editorial.

³⁸ *Pravda*, April 3, 1964.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

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of Chinese incursions into Indian territory. After the massive Chinese armed attack on October 20, 1962, the Soviet Union and its East European allies have concluded a number of agreements with India covering specific industrial projects, including the expansion of trade. So far thirty-three industrial enterprises either have been completed or are on the way to completion with Soviet assistance. They embrace vital aspects of Indian economy such as electric power, steel, petroleum, coal, heavy engineering, precision instruments and pharmaceuticals. In addition, under the long-term trade agreement, the Soviet Union has ordered Indian goods to the value of ten million pounds sterling. On December 20, 1962, exactly two months after China's aggression, the Soviet Union offered its readiness to set up a helicopter factory in India. But the most significant of all deals between India and the Soviet Union is the establishment of the MIG factory to produce Soviet-type MIG fighters in India. The Soviet Union has also agreed to supply India with guided missiles, transport planes, radar equipment and other military hardware needed for India's defence against Communist China.⁴⁰ The Soviet Union will also help India to manufacture anti-aircraft missiles.⁴¹

The Soviet military aid to India to fight Chinese Communists has been rated "very high"⁴² by the Indian government. The reason for this "gratitude" is that it is coming despite misgivings in the Communist countries about the decision of the Indian government of joint air training with the United States and British air forces. However, during her last visit to the Soviet Union, Mrs. Indira Gandhi assured the Soviet leaders that the air training exercises between Indian, American and British air forces would not impinge on India's national sovereignty.⁴³

The total value of the Soviet military aid delivered or firmly committed to India since October 1962 is calculated at about 130,000,000 dollars.⁴⁴

Soviets Support Colombo Proposals

The Soviet Union has also given its unreserved support to India's firm stand to solve the border conflict on the basis of Colombo terms. The Soviet party organ *Pravda*, while supporting India, ridiculed the Chinese Communists for not accepting the Colombo

⁴⁰ *New York Times*, August 2, 1963.

⁴¹ *The Mail*, January 20, 1964.

⁴² *Mainstream* (New Delhi), August 3, 1963.

⁴³ *India News*, August 17, 1963.

⁴⁴ *New York Times*, May 13, 1964.

proposals to solve the border conflict. The Soviet newspaper also accused the Chinese Reds of using the border conflict with India to disrupt the solidarity of the Asian and African peoples and their relations with socialist countries.

The Soviet newspaper took the Chinese leaders severely to task for "slandorous" statements that the Soviet Union was instigating India against China. *Pravda* also asked Communist China why the Colombo proposals asked only China to withdraw twenty kilometers beyond the original line and not India.

In the meantime Soviet diplomats stationed in India revealed that the Soviet pressure forced China to retreat from its forward march into NEFA and to declare a ceasefire. The Soviet Vice-Consul in India, Mr. V. A. Makhoti, referring to the border issue, said that "the Chinese leaders preferred to cross the traditional Himalayan boundary line mainly depending upon their armed forces until we appealed and stopped them by imposing restriction on the supply of petrol".⁴⁶ The view that the Soviet Union exercised pressure on China to retreat from its forward march was also expressed by the widely respected British journalist Kingsley Martin. Addressing the International Centre in New Delhi, Mr. Martin said that "perhaps China indulged in wishful thinking when it wanted to make it known to Russia, through the aggression against India, that the ways of Mr. Khrushchev were not in keeping with the goals of world Communism. It miserably failed in this attempt".⁴⁷

China Criticises Soviet Aid to India

The Soviet economic and military aid to India has been bitterly criticised by Communist China. Early in July 1963, Panchen Lama criticised the Soviet Union for inviting an Indian Arms Mission to Moscow. In a broadcast over Radio Lhasa he said, "this duplicity of the Soviet government to arm a lackey of the United States and British imperialism against the Chinese people cannot help the cause of international socialism". Panchen Lama compared the attitude of the Soviet government with that of the "imperialist war mongers".⁴⁸ A few days later, Peking openly criticised the Soviet Union for giving economic and military aid to India. *People's Daily* in an editorial told the Soviet Union that "there is no reason for thinking that aid rendered by a socialist country to

⁴⁶ *Hindustan Standard* (Calcutta), April 15, 1964.

⁴⁷ *The Statesman*, December 30, 1963.

⁴⁸ Radio Lhasa, July 4, 1964.

THE POLICY OF RUSSIA TOWARDS SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT

India will change its political orientation".⁴⁹ The Chinese newspaper repeated its criticism of the Soviet Union on August 22 for "championing India" in its border dispute with China during the last four years. "Recent Soviet gestures of support for India including stepped up military aid has opened a new chapter of collaboration between the Soviet leaders and the United States imperialism to ally with India against China." *People's Daily* also claimed that "the Soviet leaders bolstered Prime Minister Nehru every time he got into difficulties".⁵⁰

The Future

While giving India economic and military aid, the Soviet government is also reported to be anxious to see an early settlement of the border dispute.⁵¹ The anxiety of the Soviet leaders at the continuation of the conflict between India and Communist China has been influenced by the fact that Mao's aggressiveness against India has been motivated by political rather than military factors. As early as 1961, Mao Tse-tung was quoted as saying to an East German diplomat that through his aggression against India he wanted to drive Nikita Khrushchev into a "corner where he will have to choose between China and India".⁵²

An early settlement of the Sino-Indian border conflict would contribute to the Soviet efforts to ease the international tension as well as to curb the bellicose and chauvinistic elements in Communist China. A settlement might also help to strengthen the "liberal" elements in Red China by opening the way to a solution of the ideological conflict between Moscow and Peking.

However, the immediate policy of the Soviet Union is to prevent India from leaning toward the West. The Soviets fear that under growing pressure of public opinion in India, the Indian government might modify its policy of non-alignment. This Soviet fear has been vividly demonstrated in the past months in various articles in the Soviet press and speeches made by Soviet leaders.

The Soviet Union considers India as the "pillar" of neutrality in Asia and Africa. It fears that if the "pillar" falls apart then the dream of the Soviet leaders to spread their influence in Asia

⁴⁹ *New York Times*, July 16, 1963.

⁵⁰ Reuters message from Peking, August 22, 1963.

⁵¹ *The Patriot*, August 7, 1963.

⁵² *Newsweek*, February 29, 1961, p. 7.

and Africa will be dashed to the ground. Therefore, the maintenance of the non-alignment policy of India has become the major preoccupation of Soviet policy. In order to achieve this objective, the Soviet government has stepped up its economic and military aid to India. In the last months scarcely a week has passed without an announcement of either economic or military aid to India. This development emphasises the importance accorded to India by the Soviet Union. And if the Soviet Union can continue its policy in its present vein then the psychological effects of its relations with India will make an indelible impression on the whole of Asia and Africa.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE LAW OFFICERS OF THE CROWN. By J. LL. J. EDWARDS. [*Sweet and Maxwell*. 1964. xviii and 425 pp. £3 10s.]

THIS work provides a comprehensive and scholarly account of the origin and development of the offices of Attorney-General and Solicitor-General in England and Wales. It is based upon a wealth of material drawn from parliamentary debates, parliamentary and other papers and reports, legal cases, newspapers, biographies and autobiographies, records in the Law Officers' Department, and many other sources. The powers, privileges, and emoluments of the Law Officers are explained and, in many cases, subjected to a close analysis. Most controversies with which the Law Officers have been associated are to some extent or other brought out in the course of the book. These include the Enahoro affair and the subsequent charges of unprofessional conduct brought unsuccessfully against Sir John Hobson in 1963 (pp. 51-53), the role of Sir Richard Webster in representing *The Times* before the Parnell Commission of 1888-89 (pp. 94-98), the unhappy part played by Sir Donald Somervell in the flare-up of 1938 over an alleged breach by Mr. Duncan Sandys of the Official Secrets Acts (pp. 244-245), the "scandalous arrangement" whereby Sir Gordon Hewart's appointment as Lord Chief Justice was first delayed and then secured (pp. 326-328), and—in particular—the circumstances in which the first Labour Government was censured in consequence of Sir Patrick Hastings's withdrawal of the prosecution of J. R. Campbell in 1924. Indeed, two chapters concerned with the independence of the Attorney-General in criminal prosecutions are built around the *Campbell* case (pp. 177-225).

A large amount of historical material has to be incorporated in a work of this nature. Professor Edwards succeeds in blending it satisfactorily with the more up-to-date political and legal aspects of his subject. Hence, although the first few chapters do in part cover medieval and early modern developments, any strict chronological account of the evolution of the Law Officers is avoided. The approach has rather been to take particular topics—such as the claims traditionally made by Law Officers to judicial preferment—and to examine them thoroughly in single chapters or sections. A concise introductory chapter precedes the sixteen "substantive" chapters of the book, and this helps the reader to put into context the various topics which are accorded separate treatment. In the result the book may be read either in its entirety or as a series of essays. In addition, a bibliography of over eight pages is provided, and there is a useful index.

The book will appeal in the first place to those who are concerned with the legal machinery of government in England and Wales. The absence of a Ministry of Justice, or of a department of state comprehensively concerned with the administration of justice, has been a striking feature of the English legal system. We rely instead upon the Lord Chancellor's Department, the Home Office, and the Law Officers' Department. Professor Edwards deliberately avoids expressing an opinion upon the desirability of a Ministry of Justice, but his book now provides a sound basis for "a broad assessment of the Attorney-General in relation to the executive government". There is

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much in the book also that will appeal to constitutional and criminal lawyers. Constitutional lawyers will find valuable accounts of the independence of the Attorney-General (which is closely linked to judicial independence proper), of the extent of the Law Officers' responsibility to the House of Commons, and of the Attorney-General's role in relator actions. Criminal lawyers will welcome the discussion of several topics which are often inadequately treated in other books: these include the *nolle prosequi* power and *ex officio* informations. There is a most useful study of the now common statutory requirement of the consent of the Law Officers or of the Director of Public Prosecutions, as the case may be, to the initiation of prosecutions. And the final two chapters deal at some length with the evolution and modern development of the office of Director of Public Prosecutions.

A high standard of accuracy has been observed throughout the book, both in the text (which unavoidably includes a substantial number of quotations) and in the copious footnotes. A few points of detail, however, might be mentioned. For example, is it true to say that the Attorney-General's consent is a prerequisite to a prosecution under the Incitement to Mutiny Act, 1797? (see p. 200). The tenure of Sir John Maule as Director of Public Prosecutions is given slightly differently on pp. 367 and 380. The date of the Parnell Commission is slightly out on p. 296. It might also be mentioned here that, since the publication of the book, the account of the Law Officers' right to the last word to the jury in criminal cases must be read in the light of the Criminal Procedure (Right of Reply) Act, 1964.

At various points in the book, Professor Edwards criticises existing practices and privileges. For instance, he calls (at p. 157) for a new study of the requirements of the Law Officers' Department in terms of legal and clerical staff and (at p. 401) for "a thorough re-examination" of the statutory restrictions which have grown up around private prosecutions. In every way, his approach is constructive and his arguments are carefully marshalled. In short, this is an informative, readable, and lively work. As a major contribution both to legal scholarship and to a fuller understanding of the working of an important organ of executive government, it deserves to be widely read and frequently consulted.

D. G. T. WILLIAMS.

THE EICHMANN TRIAL. By PETER PAPADATOS. [Stevens. 129 pp. 37s. 6d.]

MR. PAPADATOS, a Professor at the University of Athens, attended the trial of Eichmann in 1961 as an official observer of the International Commission of Jurists. The primary purpose of Mr. Papadatos's book is to examine the whole case and proceedings from a legal point of view, a case which raised the whole question of international law and, in particular, international criminal justice. The book is commendably short; the author has a complete knowledge of his subject; makes his points clearly and has hardly an irrelevant sentence in his book. The story of the Nazi massacre in cold blood of 6,000,000 Jews is so horrifying that any book which deals factually with it depresses one to the point of despair; Mr. Papadatos's English is always adequate to express his meaning, but it is so flat, and often so awkward and rheumatically, that despair is in the reader reinforced by secondary depression.

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The scheme of the book is simple. The first chapter states the facts and the law under which Eichmann was tried. In the second the most important legal problems involved are discussed. The third deals with the questions of admission of evidence, prescription, and the death penalty. In the fourth the main objections to the trial are considered.

It is useful to have the legal side of this horrifying trial investigated so thoroughly and so competently. The author discusses practically all the questions of law involved in the trial, and, except on some few unimportant points, comes down on the side of the prosecution and the judgment, and against the defence. The most important legal arguments of the defence were four: (1) the court had no jurisdiction, for the acts had been committed by the national of another state before the state of Israel came into existence against persons who were not nationals of Israel on territory not Israelian; (2) the law which purported to make Eichmann's acts international and national crimes was made after the acts had been committed; (3) Eichmann was not legally and criminally responsible for his acts because he was only obeying the orders of a superior; (4) he was not responsible because the acts performed by him were "acts of state", and for such acts the state alone is responsible and not the individual who performs them as an agent of the state.

Mr. Papadatos makes out a fairly good legal case, as the prosecution did, for the indictment, and the judges for their judgment and verdict. Yet, although the case against the Nazis and Eichmann for committing the most appalling crimes against humanity and civilisation is unanswerable, the legal case against him—a different thing—as set out in the indictment, the speech for the prosecution, the judgment, and this book, can only be maintained, as the book indeed shows, by a certain amount of legal quibbling. This is shown by the fact that too often crucial points in Mr. Papadatos's arguments are introduced by such phrases as "it has been recognised that", or "it has been recognised by the universal conscience that", or "it is well known that". Any argument of a strictly legal nature which relies upon "recognition by the universal conscience" is slightly groggy. Whatever may be the non-legal justifications for the trial, condemnation, and execution of Eichmann, the legal justification must rest upon the existence, nature, and terms of international law and laws. The difficulty—Mr. Papadatos's difficulty in this book—is that international law exists and does not exist; it is in the category of becoming, not being. So the Eichmann trial and judgment were in part determined by international law, but in part made the international laws under which he was tried and convicted. In this particular case this may or may not have been justified; on the other hand, it is only in this kind of way that a body of international law can be established.

LEONARD WOOLF.

ECONOMIC PLANNING: THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE. By PIERRE BAUCHET.
[Heinemann. 1964. 320 pp. 35s.]

This book is an English translation of a work by a distinguished and knowledgeable French economist. It was first published in 1962, and so goes up to the preparation of the Fourth and latest Plan, for the period 1962-65.

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For those who believe that in planning lies the future of capitalist as well as communist economies, of rich countries as well as poor, here is a very important book. Its purpose is not so much to describe the institutions and mechanics of planning in France, as to examine the whole economic structure from the standpoint of the Plan. The author believes not only that French plans have got a real grip on economic activities, but that they have so transformed industry, and the way enterprises take decisions, that orthodox ideas about how capitalism works are outdated and irrelevant. The new planning institutions and the new environment of economic decision-making are so different from the old that new analyses are needed. Experience of planning in France is now sufficiently long for some such analysis to be attempted.

Such a description sounds like poor advocacy for the English translation, as it may suggest general philosophising about the nature of economic systems that makes good British pragmatists shudder. But this is not at all the case. After a penetrating and all-too-brief discussion of general principles, there follows a workman-like account of French planning institutions and the work they do. This assumes no special prior knowledge of the French economic or political system, though it really needs some supporting familiarity with at least recent French economic or political history, if not institutions, to make it as rewarding as it should be. Given such a background, this is the clearest outline of what goes in French planning that has yet appeared in English (or perhaps that can be expected). The exposition, factual and trim though it is, gains tremendously in forcefulness by the author's concern on the one hand for principles, and on the other for the underlying realities of how the various units and sectors of the economy do in fact behave.

The second part of the book examines first the techniques of French planning, again with great clarity; then examines rather briefly the record against past Plans; and finally examines the effect of the Plans on the allocation, or re-allocation of resources. No words are wasted throughout this part, and in consequence some of it must be tough going for unpractised economists. The two brief but important chapters on the "logic of the optimum", "the choice of investments in the French plans", in particular, need whole paragraphs of welfare economics and investment theory to be read between the lines.

The third part is the one which most general readers are likely to find most readable and most controversial. It is here that the real impact of the Plans on enterprise decisions and on the social and economic structure is assessed. It all leads up to a highly controversial conclusion.

"The class struggle", says M. Bauchet, "has not so far destroyed capitalism. As a result of technical changes it has led to institutions such as the Plan, which have profoundly modified the system and increased its stability. But the advance to a new stage of development is conditioned upon a reinforcement and extension of the present Plans. . . ." By no means everyone, pro-planning or anti-planning, will want to be led to this conclusion, or perhaps to have a conclusion formulated in quite this way. Indeed, throughout Part III, came a series of extremely arguable propositions. The very section headings are a provocation: "Profit has altered" (subhead to chapter on "Fixing the production and investment programmes"); "The class struggle and the collapse of capitalism: the real situation today"; "The

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Plan as a means of agreement among the social groups". It is a justified tribute to the book that these propositions arise out of both description and analysis in the earlier chapters, and that they are matters of great, even urgent, importance in many countries besides France.

Pierre Bauchet's book is not the last word on French planning, nor on planning in mixed economies either. But it is a very welcome addition to the rather meagre literature on this important topic. Finally, it must be added that the translator has done her work remarkably well. The usual intermittent awkwardness of phrase in translated work, especially in one involving technical terminology, does not intrude in an agreeably readable book.

JOAN E. MITCHELL.

POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IN JAPAN AND TURKEY. Edited by ROBERT E. WARD and DANKWART A. RUSTOW. [*Princeton University Press*. 1964. 502 pp. 70s.]

THIS is the third volume to appear in a series of seven studies in political development sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. The first was a study in communications, which looked at the relations between communications and political development in a number of "new" nations, particularly Turkey, Iran, Japan, Thailand, and Communist China. The second looked similarly at the relationship between bureaucracy and development by examining a host of "case-studies". This third volume is the outgrowth of a conference held at Dobbs Ferry, New York, in 1962 where papers which have been subsequently revised were read on Japan and Turkey. The final product, with its introductory and concluding essays, narrows itself down to a straight comparison of Turkey and Japan as two Asiatic societies, each of which, before modernisation began, had a sophisticated non-colonial government, and each of which "suffered" modernisation at approximately the same point in time. A team of writers set down the two national experiences in order to draw conclusions for other evolving nations.

The team is impressive, the eight topics catholic and comprehensive and the treatment vividly contrasting. John Whitney Hall and Halil Inalcik look at traditional society, Robert A. Scalapino and Roderic H. Davison at environmental and foreign contributions, William W. Lockwood and Peter F. Sugar at economic and political modernisation, R. P. Dore and Frederick W. Frey at education, Shūichi Katō and Kemal H. Karpat at the mass media, Masamichi Inoki and Richard L. Chambers at the civil bureaucracy, Roger F. Hackett and Dankwart A. Rustow at the military, and Nobutaka Ike and Arif T. Payaslioglu look at political parties, and the two editors sum up at the end. Each essay is in itself admirably lucid, especially those of R. P. Dore and Nobutaka Ike, Roderic H. Davison and Halil Inalcik. Of the book as a whole one cannot be so flattering.

What do the editors discover that will serve as guides, and are their findings both valid and significant? They describe modernisation impeccably, and in stimulating fashion: a process giving growing social control over the physical environment and growing social interdependence; it may not involve democracy—Germany was more modern in the 1930s than in the 1880s, but

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its government was less representative and less liberal—but it will involve some movement towards a mass society, with expanded functions and demands, schooling for all, roads for all villages, taxes paid by all, so that even where it is not democratic, it is likely to be egalitarian; it seeks expression in units of an effective size, so that the modern state is a territorial state, and its spirit is secular, rationalist, and pragmatic. Modernisation means, in other words, fewer deaths by lightning but many more on the highway: this is progress, in Europe or Asia, Turkey or Japan, in the 1960s.

If we accept this as definition, is there, however, a valid basis of comparison between these two states? Turkey is twice as large as Japan, but with only one-third its population; the standard of living in Turkey is far below that prevailing in Japan; in Japan 98 per cent. of the population is literate and only 37 per cent. engaged in agriculture or in primary production, whereas in Turkey the relevant figures are 39 per cent. and 77 per cent. Turkey remains in essence underdeveloped and dictator-prone, Japan is industrialised, Americanised (if not democratised), and now itself an advanced "donor" country. Can any comparison of them be other than superficial, and can it be attempted at all without becoming a series of abstractions?

The problems that the editors investigate are essentially "those which are set or predetermined in such a manner as to be wholly or largely beyond the control of the leaders of the modernising society, and those which are amenable to some significant degree of influence or control by these leaders". The former are geopolitical or traditional, the "givens" of a society's history and situation, the latter those involving leadership, economic development, and politics, themselves disguised by generic phrases like the crisis of identity, the crisis of security, the crisis of integration, the crisis of penetration, the crisis of participation. This is to impose on the variety and distinctiveness of each society a quite false comparative schema.

One can sympathise and support the editors' intentions. They say rightly that "England" (they mean, I assume, "Britain") "is often spoken of as the first 'modern' society. Yet it achieved this condition without the aid of any pre-existing model. Like Topsy, English society just grew, and one day the consequences were identified as 'modern'. For a long time, the standards set by the accidents of English history—somewhat elaborated by analogous Western European and American developments—stood alone as models of what a 'modern' society should be like. But, more recently, this happy circumstance has been drastically altered. Today there is also a Russian Communist model of political modernity, and there may shortly be a somewhat different Chinese Communist one as well. One may also speak of a Japanese model". But what evidence is there that the Turkish state is a "model"—to whom, and of what; or that Japan is a model, and to whom and of what? We certainly need to study the evolving societies and seek guidance for them; and we certainly need useful non-European models. But in American sociological (and in much of their economic) analysis what is in danger of emerging is a pseudo-science, in which the facts of historical uniqueness are twisted into meaningless and dangerously abstract shapes. There was in history hardly any connection at all between Turkey and Japan. The editors recognise this. "Japan was an island kingdom of remarkably homogeneous racial, religious, and linguistic composition; of an ancient tradition of unity *vis-à-vis* outsiders; and of naturally delimited frontiers. More

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favourable environmental conditions for the development of a modern nation-state are hard to envisage. Nineteenth-century Turkey, on the other hand, was an empire stretching over parts of three continents; lacking racial, linguistic, and religious homogeneity; precariously compounded of a motley assortment of peoples with separate and competitive traditions and aspirations; and possessed of few natural boundaries" (p. 438).

A comparative analysis of these two countries in today's setting can be attempted; a good essay on one aspect of one country can be set alongside an equally good essay on a related aspect of the other. But to attempt an analysis of their processes of growth is a much riskier enterprise. This produces a book that is stimulating, in many places lucid and in some places original, but which is as a total enterprise in the end unsuccessful. For in history certainly, and even in sociology, one cannot build a comparative study out of dissonant and unique components. And the story of any country's modernisation must be seen to be, and be treated as, unique and special. That moral—and that alone—is the only guide any self-respecting new nation will be ready to accept. What was good enough for Old Ireland serves for Ghana and Malaya, Turkey, and Japan. *Sinn Féin*. "Ourselves alone."

ESMOND WRIGHT.

BRITAIN AND INDIA: REQUIEM FOR EMPIRE. By MAURICE and TAYA ZINKIN. [*Chatto and Windus*. 1964. 191 pp. 21s.]

A NATION IN MAKING. By SIR SURENDRANATH BANERJEA. [*Oxford University Press*. 1963. 389 pp. 35s.]

INDIAN NATIONALISM AND HINDU SOCIAL REFORM. By CHARLES H. HEIMSATH. [*Oxford University Press*. 1964. 379 pp. 68s.]

GOVERNMENT IN RURAL INDIA. By DAVID POTTER. [*G. Bell & Sons, Ltd. (for the London School of Economics and Political Science)*. 1964. 91 pp. 21s.]

THERE is bound to be more than one version of the story of Britain and India. Emotions involved in the relationship between these two countries have been so complex that there cannot be any commonly accepted version of it. Moreover, it is a story that cannot be told in its entirety. There is so much to it. It is, therefore, likely to be told again and again.

From the British side it has been narrated mostly by men who worked in the Indian Civil Service, some of them dedicated and with a sense of mission; and by journalists, who thought that not enough was known to the British public about their rule in India. On behalf of India it has been attempted by men who were deeply involved in the struggle for independence and who suffered from an intense feeling of humiliation. The post-Independence period, which has been one of many activities, all-round changes and baffling problems, has kept the thinking Indians too occupied with current events. Unlike the British story-tellers, therefore, they have, for the time being, turned away from the subject.

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The Zinkins, the authors of *Britain and India: Requiem for Empire*, combine a first-hand knowledge of the working of British rule in India with an insight into her religious, social, and economic life. Their book is the product of painstaking scholarship, lively interpretation of day-to-day administrative experience and bold conclusions. They have told their story in gripping style.

The authors have assigned, as could be expected, a special place to men on the spot, not only for the conquests but also for the administration of India. In both cases directives from London, whenever they were issued, remained in the background. While the East India Company sent out its men to carry on trade, they got involved in political machinations and territorial conquests as a result of the political disintegration of India. The Company forbade wars and conquests because they were expensive but the men on the spot went on annexing territory. Before London could fully appreciate the significance of territorial conquest thousands of miles away, the Company's servants had carved out an enormous empire.

The men on the spot were equally important in running the day-to-day administration of India. This was because the British public remained ignorant of the complexities of the situation and Parliament indifferent, excepting when it came to pontificating on the moral responsibility of Britain in India. The successive governments found themselves hopelessly ill-informed about India and left a great deal of uncircumscribed freedom to men on the spot.

The Zinkin story is told essentially from the point of view of the background, professional excellence, sense of purpose, dilemmas, and limitations of the men on the spot who tried to run a vast administrative machinery and also to transplant the best there is in Britain's legal and political tradition. They were Britons who wanted to go back when their work was done. They came from well-educated middle-class homes and were exceedingly hard-working. What ultimately mattered to them was the welfare of the people of India. The period which preceded the establishment of British rule was characterised by the lack of law and order, clean administration and unity. The men on the spot worked very hard to establish these in India. In addition they built roads, railways, universities, etc.

Whatever these men had to offer was assimilated by Indians fairly quickly. They always asked for more. The spread of Western education and, through it, the appreciation of Western political ideals resulted in the demand for freedom of speech and the right to self-government. Such a demand evoked an ambivalent response from the men on the spot. On the one hand, they were in sympathy with the demand as it reflected, in the last analysis, the appreciation of the best in their own political tradition. And on the other hand, apart from the fact that London alone could accede to such a demand, they were not sure whether Indians were ready for it.

The authors, unlike most accounts of retired Indian Civil Servants, have rightly pointed out that there was a limit to what a highly trained and competent civil service could do. It could neither have given a jolt to the highly static social structure of India nor undertaken development projects as has been done by the government of independent India. Only an *Indian* government with administrative personnel trained in the light of its own objectives could have done it.

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The Zinkins have written their account with a lot of feeling. Every page of the book reflects a deep sense of fulfilment. How far this would be true of the feeling of the average member of the Indian Civil Service I am not very sure.

One of the earliest Indian versions of the story of Britain and India was Sir Surendranath Banerjee's *A Nation in Making*, now reprinted. It consists of a vivid account of his participation in public life over a period of nearly half a century: from the 1870s to the 1920s. It was during this period that the Western-educated élite intensified its demand for self-government. This demand was expressed through legislative assemblies, Press, platform, street marches, and terrorist activities. The story of political rebirth, of a nation pressing its demand on a grudging alien rule is told in great detail by one of the greatest fighters for Indian freedom. Oxford University Press has done a great service to students of Indian politics by reprinting this useful volume.

A considerable degree of political stability and intellectual stimulus received during the period of British rule helped the thinking Indians to reflect on the drawbacks, rigidities, and excesses of their religious and social systems. They came out with their unsparing criticism and suggested reforms. Some of them were inspired by the need to rouse the Indian nation in her struggle for freedom, whereas others confined themselves to their religious and social objectives. The social reform movements undertaken by these men have been examined by Charles H. Heimsath in his *Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform* in great detail. His treatment of the literature on social reform, however, remains at a factual level. He should have been able to draw more meaningful inferences, on the basis of the vast amount of facts collected, than he has actually done.

David Potter's *Government in Rural India* aims at providing a simple account of district administration and its problems in India. The pattern of district administration, under a recent Indian experiment of decentralisation, has changed considerably. Its functionaries have assumed new responsibilities and are required to work with popularly elected men. Potter's study should prove a useful introduction to the subject.

A. H. SOMJEE.

BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1955-1963. By MIRIAM CAMPS.
[Oxford University Press. 547 pp. 63s.]

THE story of the unfolding of Britain's relations with post-war continental Europe makes instructive but agonising reading. It is a record of missed opportunities, of lack of imagination, of failure to understand and judge correctly the strength of the European drive for unity, of timidity and half-heartedness on the few occasions when Britain took the initiative, of omissions and inadequate responses spanning a period of nearly fifteen years, brought finally to a head by the historic decision to seek membership of the Community.

General de Gaulle's veto on British membership of the EEC has undoubtedly turned back the tide that nearly carried Britain into the Community and as a result all the major questions of Britain's relations with Europe are still unanswered. But they cannot be pushed aside for very long.

The Communism of Mao Tse-tung

Arthur A. Cohen

An objective, closely documented evaluation of Mao Tse-tung's contribution to Communist thought and practice. *37s. 6d. net*

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What makes the study of Britain's post-war search for a viable European policy and an accommodation with the Community so fascinating is the way in which the political, economic, and military aspects of the problem are intertwined. It is the merit of Mrs. Camps's full, skilfully balanced, and very lucid account of the successive British negotiations with the Six that she never loses sight of the crucial and very complex interaction between these seemingly separate aspects. Throughout the long debate between the United Kingdom and the Six the substantive negotiations have been about tariffs, quotas, commercial and economic policies, agricultural support systems, and the like. In more general terms, at least until 1961, the difference of view between Britain and the countries of the European Communities revolved around the practical issue whether a customs union or a free trade area arrangement was to be preferred. Although it might appear that as far as the United Kingdom and several other EFTA countries are concerned this issue has now been resolved, it is well to remember that both in Whitehall and the Labour Party it is still felt that the most desirable solution to the problems arising from the existence of two economic groupings in Europe is an agreement between the EFTA as a group and the EEC as a group—the formation in fact of a single large European market consisting of the inner group of the six EEC countries surrounded, though not threatened, by a free trade area consisting of the present EFTA countries and several other European states not yet associated with either group, including possibly some Eastern European countries looking for closer trade links with the West.

As Mrs. Camps shows, these technical problems of trade and economic policy are real and they occasionally lead to genuine conflicts of domestic interests. But she makes equally plain that they are only the piece of the iceberg which shows above the water and that the negotiations between Britain and the Six have fundamentally been about the future shape of Europe and Europe's role in the Atlantic Alliance. "Throughout the whole period reviewed in this book", writes Mrs. Camps, "the negotiations on European economic arrangements have been complicated by the existence of an unacknowledged power struggle between the British and the French. In all the negotiations in which the two countries were involved the French and the British have been the protagonists" (p. 476). Mrs. Camps has some hope that during the next stage in the long search for the right relationship between Britain and the Continent, a way to overcome the rivalry between "the only real protagonists" can be found. Her grounds for this optimism are that she feels that General de Gaulle's veto has blotted out with one large daub the whole series of past British mistakes and, more importantly, that "there is now a rough parity of power between the United Kingdom and France which did not exist ten years ago". She believes that "a kind of equilibrium has now been established which, unless the new nationalism of the Gaullists in the end prevails, should make it easier . . . for the French to accept the British in Europe and easier for the British to accept for themselves a role as 'Europeans'" (p. 519). *On verra.*

The plan of the book is straightforward enough. Mrs. Camps's starting-point is the Messina Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the member states of the ECSC, meeting in May 1955 to consider new plans for European integration, in particular the suggestion for a general Common Market. She then considers the work of the Spaak Committee which prepared the texts of

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the Rome Treaties, and follows this with a lengthy account of the abortive negotiations to establish an OEEC-wide industrial free trade area in Western Europe. This is followed by two chapters dealing with the formation of EFTA and the various proposals, including some American initiatives, for "bridge-building" between the Six and the Seven.

The chronicle continues with an admirably clear description and analysis of the shift in British policy from "close association" with the Six to the recognition that no basis for a middle position existed and that nothing short of full membership in the Community could realistically be sought. The book concludes with a series of chapters devoted to the Brussels negotiations and the discussions on the subject of a European Political Union. There is also a chapter on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting and the 1962 party conferences. The chapter dealing with the last phase of the talks contains a useful section on the state of the negotiations at the time of the breakdown. Mrs. Camps reminds us that the problems still outstanding when the General so rudely slammed the door were potentially more troublesome than the Government seemed to suggest. The two big unsettled problems were the arrangements to be made for New Zealand and the EFTA countries.

Mrs. Camps is a real master of her subject which she has followed closely for many years. She knows her way around Whitehall and the Avenue de la Joyeuse Entrée in Brussels, she has talked on many occasions with several of the senior officials on both sides of the Channel who have participated in all the negotiations which form the subject of her book. There are few people as competent as Mrs. Camps in this field.

E. WOHLGEMUTH.

BEAVERBROOK: A STUDY OF MAX THE UNKNOWN. By PETER HOWARD.
[Hutchinson. 164 pp. 25s.]

In the middle of the war, when Bevin and Cripps refused to have Beaverbrook in the Cabinet, he threw out sprats to catch any mackerel within reach. One night in a high suite at the Savoy, he tried to catch me. He shouted, in a voice tuned for an audience in Trafalgar Square, "I've got power. You've got power. I've got the power of suggestion to millions. You've got power over the people who run this country". This, of course, was meant to be flattering. It was only true if you substituted the word influence for power. Beaverbrook always muddled the two. He had had power behind the scenes when Lloyd George took the place of Asquith, and as long as Bonar Law lived and he was not in the Lords, he could successfully pull strings. But he was quite wrong in thinking that newspapers could wield power. He could not foist Empire free trade on England, and though he did his best, he could not dismiss Baldwin from the Premiership. Worst of all was his mistake in persuading Churchill to say that Attlee, who had loyally supported him through the war, would introduce a Gestapo into England. An elaborate essay might be written about the influence of the *Daily Express* in confusing the values of the public and befuddling it about politics. But when he told the public what to do, it did not obey.

The only interest I can find in Peter Howard's book is his account of how Beaverbrook became a peer. It contains some new stories—at least to me.



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But as he gives no references or authorities, and writes as if he were still a columnist in the *Daily Express*, I am not inclined to pay much attention to them. He did for years write in the *Express*; he has now taken Frank Buchman's place as head of the M.R.A. These two sources of inspiration, neither of them very reassuring, are nauseatingly intermingled in his book, which is interspersed at points with pious little rhymes. He is a great admirer of the *Express*, and knows perfectly well that Beaverbrook could not have become the worldly success he was if he had remained faithful to the teaching of Christianity. To praise Beaverbrook and the *Express*, and to interlard his encomiums with exhortations to live according to the teaching of the Gospels is, I fear, typical of M.R.A. morality. He remarks that Beaverbrook's "advocacy of the Presbyterian Church came more from inheritance than from the heart. He carried it too far. It was with him a sort of religious gymnastics. There was not much back of his churchmanship except the money he gave. Cash cost him less than conversion—and he would rather pay than pray". That is well said, and ought to have been enough. Beaverbrook foundations, he informs us, give presents "to all retired or ageing Presbyterian Ministers in England". He tells us that Beaverbrook agreed that he was right when he told Beaverbrook, at their last meeting, that he should have surrendered to the "full claim of Christ which he had always known, always resisted, and which still bears constantly upon him". But Mr. Howard can't bring himself to the logical conclusion. According to him, Beaverbrook "is now an apprentice in Heaven. He will express surprise at finding the late Lord Baldwin there".

KINGSLEY MARTIN.

THEORY AND PRACTICE IN AMERICAN POLITICS. Edited by WILLIAM H. NELSON. [*University of Chicago Press*. 149 pp. 41s.]

THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES. Third Edition. By WILLIAM GOODMAN. [*Van Nostrand*. 672 pp. 58s. 6d.]

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BOOK REVIEWS

For the reviewer the none too welcome task is to assess the value of such masterly treatises for the ordinary student of American government. They are, I think, too large and rich for the undergraduate with average digestive powers. For the specialist they are invaluable works of reference, likely to be used as indicators of the more specialised monographs and reports he may need. For the teacher who wants all the facts about American parties, their operations, origins, organisation, strength, and weaknesses, there is nothing which cannot be tracked down in Goodman, or on the legislative process in Keefe and Ogul. Goodman does tell you, for example (as most other works do not), when the party National Committees were first set up and for what purpose, while Keefe and Ogul do say how often and with what effect the "discharge" procedure has been used in the Congress. But with so much valuable fact and history something still is missing—and it is argument, argument which proposes or rejects schemes for reforming an admittedly far from perfect state of affairs. To be sure there are discussions and reports in plenty of other people's views and proposals, but to arrive at p. 653 of Goodman not knowing whether, in the author's opinion, reform is desirable or practicable is a bit of a let-down.

It may well be that Professor Goodman's definition of party (p. 6) which allows no great weight to "principles" contributes to the lack of excitement about the party battle; Section III, "Bases of Bipartisanship", though a useful review of the economic and sectional forces making for party rivalry in the U.S.A., is curiously bloodless. It is wise to accept the point that American parties are not "ideological" (and that distinctions between Republicans and Democrats are not accurately described if only ideological language is employed), but it is not helpful if the impression is left that there is no general body of tradition, prejudice, sentiment, even thought, that moves the struggles of the "outs" versus the "ins". Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., may overdo it, but at least he makes one feel that the study of American political history is both important and exciting. The foreign observer often gets the feeling that many American political scientists regard it as an educational duty not to point out party differences, lest passions be aroused and once again secession result from an unwillingness to compromise.

Keefe and Ogul take the legislative process in Congress and the states as their centre of operations and work outwards into the wide territory of representation, parties, interest groups, the committee system, legislative-executive, and legislative-judicial relations. Theirs is a most impressive and complete work. Their final chapter, "Problems and Perspectives", is a little more positive in tone than Professor Goodman's. They doubt whether, necessary as it is, the public's "mild interest" in the legislative system will do more than produce "small and uncertain increments" of improvement.

Professor Nelson's volume is a collection of nine essays delivered by various authors as lectures at Rice University in 1962. There is considerable variation in quality and interest but those of Professor Mason on "Myth and Reality in Supreme Court Decisions" and Professor Benjamin Wright on "The Southern Political Tradition" are good reading. Finding a title for a collection is, I am sure, always a difficult editorial task, but to call the volume "Theory and Practice in American Politics" is hardly accurate; and 41s. is a high price to pay for 149 pages!

R. H. PEAR.

BOOK REVIEWS

BRITISH GUIANA: PROBLEMS OF COHESION IN AN IMMIGRANT SOCIETY. By
PETER NEWMAN. [*Institute of Race Relations and OUP.* 104 pp.
9s. 6d.]

THE Institute of Race Relations has already published a number of valuable short studies of some of the world's lesser-known and more intractable trouble-spots, and Professor Newman's little paperback is well up to standard. After a brief historical survey and an account of the economic structure of this turbulent British colony, he analyses the demographic and social pressures which result when a mixed society in which no single race forms a majority is divided in such a way that the economic, geographical, and ethnic divisions largely coincide. This, plus an overdose of political immaturity, which past British policy has done little to help, is the fundamental reason for the country's instability, for the racial character of its politics, and for the gathering gloom which the prospect of independence is bringing with it. Professor Newman does not pull his punches. But his book will be an admirable standby for anyone trying to follow Guianese affairs in the coming months.

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
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